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Abstract
This thesis provides an economic analysis of banking crisis, regulation and deposit insurance. 
Chapter 1 offers a critical review of the literature, identifying the main determinants of 
banking crises and their channels of contagion.
Chapter 2 studies the effectiveness of deposit insurance in containing panic runs when 
depositors have private information. The region of panic runs decreases with the size of the 
guarantee and the degree of supervisory involvement of the agency in charge of insurance. 
High levels of insurance tend to increase the equilibrium demand deposit contract and so the 
probability of runs, but supervision can also limit this effect. Therefore, a scheme with limited 
insurance and a high degree of supervisory involvement should be preferred.
Chapter 3 evaluates subordinated debt and disclosure requirements as instruments of market 
discipline. In the presence of deposit insurance, the former can be used to complement the 
latter, providing a new set of information which is useful to the regulator. If the subordinated 
bond has a long maturity, the probability of insolvency decreases for any level of noise in the 
information disclosed by the manager. If the bond can be rolled over, the quality of 
information improves substantially but the probability of insolvency increases slightly.
Chapter 4 studies the inter-temporal effects of capital adequacy requirements. A bank’s risk- 
taking dynamic depends on critical thresholds of the capital requirements in each period. 
When the requirement binds in the initial period, risk can be reduced to the social optimum 
but at the cost of reducing financial intermediation as well. Moral hazard increases because, 
among the binding banks, the better capitalised ones raise relatively more insured deposits and 
take on relatively more risk. When the requirement binds in the interim period risk-taking 
increases, the more so the less capitalised is the bank, making smaller banks weaker.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Margaret Bray 
Title: Reader in Economics
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Introduction
Since the 1980s many emerging economies have experienced serious financial crises, 
which costs of recovery have in some cases been as high as 60 percent of GDP. It has 
been argued tha t many of theses crises had their roots in the weaknesses of the banking 
sector, which were exacerbated by insufficient or inefficient supervision and regulation.
Situations of financial distress have not been absent in developed economies either. 
Some examples are the Savings and Loan crisis in the USA, the financial crisis in Japan 
in the late 1980s and the ongoing subprime crisis, originated in the USA in 2007 but 
still having repercussions in other developed countries’ financial centres. All these crises 
have involved hidden losses and increasing moral hazard in financial institutions.
As the soundness of the banking system has proved to have direct effects on macro- 
economic stability, poverty and economic growth, the debate on optimal supervisory and 
regulatory frameworks for the banking industry has increased in the past years. This 
thesis provides an economic analysis of banking crises and contagion, giving special con­
sideration to some policy issues contained in the design of the so-called “safety net” , 
which includes capital regulation, subordinated debt, systems of deposit insurance and 
the lender of last resort.
Chapter 1 provides a critical review of the literature on banking, highlighting the 
sources of vulnerabilities in this market and the grounds for regulation, characterising 
events of failure and discussing the channels of contagion. Two main channels of conta­
gion are identified. The informational channel refers to situations where signals of bad 
performance of one or more banks are interpreted by depositors as valid information 
on the solvency of banks with similar characteristics, or for the banking industry as a 
whole. Contagion through this channel might be controlled by regulatory measures to 
restore depositors’ confidence, such as those included in the safety net. The credit chan­
nel, on the other hand, explains how the failure of a single bank can spread throughout 
the web of linkages developed in the interbank funding market, the payment system or 
derivatives markets. In this case, an analysis of the possible problems in the design of 
financial systems is developed in order to understand and prevent contagion.
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In the same way tha t the propagation of a crisis among banks in a local economy 
serves as a justification for the intervention of a local lender of last resort, fears of 
contagion across economies in a globalised world have raised questions about the need 
for an international lender of last resort. The most relevant models in the growing 
literature about international financial architecture are also considered here.
Chapter 1 puts into a homogeneous context the two main models available in the 
literature, namely sunspot and rational expectation equilibrium models. Sunspot equi­
librium models are popular because of their tractability but they have limited capability 
for use in policy design, as a relevant set of players (depositors) is neglected. Conversely, 
in rational expectation equilibrium models investors are able to evaluate the probability 
of a bank run before making their investment decision. Thus, even though they are 
more complex, they allow for a richer analysis.
In particular, models of deposit insurance have tended to concentrate on the effect 
that non-risk adjusted premiums have on moral hazard, more than on the direct impli­
cations tha t the introduction of these types of contracts might have on the equilibrium 
behaviour of depositors and banks. Chapter 2 returns to this problem, introducing 
deposit insurance in a model of information-based bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 
2000). An im portant feature of this model is tha t it has a unique equilibrium. This 
allows for a proper evaluation of the effects of insurance on the behaviour of the diffe­
rent players. I show th a t while consumers achieve better risk-sharing in a competitive 
banking system than in autarky, more solvent projects are liquidated. This is because 
uninsured depositors fail to coordinate in a subset of fundamentals and run on banks they 
know to be solvent. When introducing deposit insurance, I show tha t its effectiveness 
in eliminating panic runs varies with the size of coverage and the degree of supervisory 
involvement of the agency in charge of insurance. When the agency is not involved in 
the supervision of banks (narrow m andate), a deposit insurance contract preserving the 
monitoring role of depositors involves offering less than full protection. The trade-off is 
that panic runs cannot be completely eliminated with a partial guarantee, although it 
does reduce the region of fundamentals for which tha t occurs. W ith a high degree of 
supervisory involvement (broad m andate), I show tha t panic runs tend to disappear for 
any level of insurance as the regulator’s signal becomes more precise, given that liquidity 
assistance is committed to solvent but illiquid banks. Moreover, it is cost efficient never 
to provide liquidity to  insolvent banks. However, only extremely insolvent banks are 
closed, and those with enough funds to cover the payment of the final period guarantee 
are allowed to continue in operation. Therefore, the smaller the protection offered to
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depositors, the higher is forbearance. All these results hold, irrespective of the specific 
values of the guarantee, which in particular might imply tha t the social cost of deposit 
insurance is lower under a broad mandate.
Finally, I show tha t deposit insurance increases the equilibrium value of the demand 
deposit contract in the interim period and so the probability of runs, at least for high 
levels of the guarantee, but this effect seems also to be smaller under a broad mandate. 
Limited insurance can contain this externality to some extent, justifying the observed 
conduct of governments across the world in normal times.
Given the combination of these results and the empirical evidence provided by other 
authors, this chapter concludes th a t a preferable scheme would be one in which the 
agency in charge of insurance has more supervisory involvement (broad mandate) or a 
high degree of coordination with the supervisory authority.
Chapter 3 uses a variation on the three-period, imperfect information model intro­
duced in Chapter 2, where uninformed insured depositors, informed uninsured sophis­
ticated investors (equity holders and bond holders) and the regulator interact in the 
market, in order to study and compare the effects tha t disclosure requirements alone 
and in combination with a subordinated debt requirement, have on the equilibrium 
probability of insolvency of the bank and on the regulator’s closure policy. I also study 
how the m aturity of the subordinated bond modifies these results.
W ith a disclosure requirement, I prove tha t the regulator uses a fully financed closure 
rule tha t avoids inefficient survival but involves an inefficient liquidation of assets in a 
region of the bank’s fundamentals. Although the probability of insolvency is higher than 
the first best, it converges on it as the manager’s signal noise goes to zero. When, on 
top of the disclosure requirement, the bank is asked to issue a zero coupon bond with 
long maturity, the probability of insolvency is further reduced. The regulator’s closure 
policy in this case forces fewer banks into liquidation, given the subsidy from bond 
holders to deposit holders when the bank becomes fundamentally unprofitable. Finally, 
when debt can be rolled over in the interim period and so bond holders do monitor the 
bank, this period sub-game equilibrium provides very useful information that, in some 
cases, can completely eliminate inefficient liquidation of assets because the regulator 
can perfectly observe the bank’s fundamentals. However, this will come at the cost of a 
higher probability of insolvency than in the non-rollover case.
The results in this chapter allow us to conclude tha t a subordinated debt requirement, 
when issued with a long maturity, is able to reduce the probability of insolvency for 
any size of noise. Indeed, intuition suggests tha t when the manager’s signal noise is
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expected to be high, an appropriately high subordinated debt requirement could restore 
the first best. On the other hand, a subordinated bond issued with a short m aturity can 
substantially improve on the quality of information (by reducing the noise). Therefore, 
a subordinated debt requirement can be used to  complement disclosure requirements, 
providing a new set of information which is useful to  the regulator.
Capital regulation is a clear counterpart of deposits insurance, as banks receiving a 
subsidy from the financial authority must agree to be regulated. Going back to sunspot 
equilibrium models and assuming full deposit insurance, to rule-out panic runs, Chapter 
4 studies the intertemporal effects tha t capital regulation has on curbing a bank risk- 
taking. In order to do that, in this chapter I build on Blum’s (1999) seminal paper in 
order to  obtain some im portant lessons neglected in his original work. The reason for 
changing the Diamond and Dybig (1983) setup used in the previous chapters is that 
Blum’s model allows for the study of asset substitution in a much simpler fashion: the 
bank manager can choose among different returns of the portfolio, which have associated 
a unique probability of default. Moreover, common knowledge and the assumption of 
universal risk neutrality allow for the risk choice of the bank to be completely isolated 
from any other decision in the game.
In this setup, I show th a t for unregulated banks risk-taking is decreasing on the level 
of initial equity and converges on the social optimum when equity is sufficiently high. 
When introducing capital requirements, I show there exist critical threshold values in 
each period for which regulation starts binding. W hen the requirement binds in the 
initial period only, risk can be reduced below the unregulated solution -  even to the 
social optimum for sufficiently tight regulation -  but fewer deposits are taken, which 
reduces financial intermediation. Moreover, capital requirements are not sufficient to 
control moral hazard because, among the binding banks, the better capitalised ones 
raise relatively more insured deposits and take on relatively more risk. When the re­
quirement binds only in the interim period, bank risk-taking increases, most likely above 
the unregulated solution for all values of the requirement. In tha t case, risk would be 
decreasing on equity, making risk-taking even more aggressive for poorly capitalised 
banks. Therefore, interim period binding capital requirements will not only worsen the 
risk choice of banks but make smaller banks weaker. When a constant capital require­
ment binds in both periods, the tighter the regulation the fewer deposits are taken from 
the public, though better capitalised banks raise relatively more deposits. The dynamic 
of risk in this case depends strongly on the relationship between the threshold values of 
the requirement in each period, which in turn  depends on the level of initial equity of
15
the bank.
These results are of extreme interest in the current situation, where the crisis in the 
international financial markets has called for tighter regulation in the banking industry. 
The discussion in this chapter shows th a t an anticipated rise in capital requirements 
in the next period, combined with a shock reducing the expected return of the risky 
technology, might increase the likelihood of a more aggressive risk-taking response by 
banks. In the light of these results, any amendment to the current regulatory framework 
should be carefully analysed.
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C hapter 1
Crisis, Contagion and R egulation  
in the Banking Industry. A  
R eview  of the Literature
1.1 Introduction
Episodes of financial distress have been neither uncommon nor isolated during the past 
four decades, when more than 100 serious banking crises have occurred in different 
economies, especially in emerging markets.1 The crises in Latin America in the 1980s, 
in the South Asian economies in the late 1980s and 1990s and, more recently, in Turkey, 
Argentina and Uruguay are a few among many examples.
Financial crises can occur in the form of stock market crashes, currency crises, ex­
ternal debt defaults or banking crises. Different types of crises can happen at the same 
time or precede new turbulences. A stock market crash can affect the solvency of an 
otherwise sound banking system; severe bank failures can precipitate a flight to currency, 
eventually forcing devaluation or the abandonment of a currency system, etc.
Indeed, banking and currency crises have tended to occur simultaneously in emerging 
markets.2 In Argentina (2001-02), for example, the collapse of the currency peg regime 
and the subsequent devaluation of the Argentine peso led many banks into insolvency. 
In Ecuador (2000), the weakness of the banking system and the failure of the authorities 
to act promptly led to  a flight to currency tha t culminated in a strong devaluation, fo­
llowed by an abandonment of the currency (dollarisation). Empirical evidence, however,
1 According to IMF estimates, between 1980 and 1996 alone, nearly 130 countries experienced serious 
banking crises (Goodhart et al, 1997).
2This has been known as a twin crisis, a concept first introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996).
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suggests tha t the frequency of banking crises has increased over time while the frequency 
of other types of crises has remained relatively constant (Glick and Hutchinson, 1999).
The costs of the resolution and recovery from crises have been high, especially when 
the banking sector is affected, varying from 2-3 percent of GDP in the Savings and Loan 
crisis in the USA (1986-1995) to as much as 50-58 percent of GDP in Kuwait (1990- 
91) and Indonesia (1997).3 These estimates are just one part of the real net costs to 
society, as general activity substantially declines when the payment system is suspended, 
international investment falls and jobs are destroyed.
These experiences have underlined the importance of a sound banking system be­
cause of its direct effect on macroeconomic stability, poverty and economic growth. 
Indeed, a robust banking sector can help a country which is facing difficulties to avoid 
major problems, as in Chile and Argentina after the Tequila crisis; or to recover faster if 
it is affected, as in Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong after the Asian crisis. Conversely, 
a weak or unsound banking sector may generate or exacerbate a crisis, as happened in 
Thailand in 1997 or in Turkey in 2000.
For efficiency reasons, insolvent banks should be allowed to fail, in order to contain 
moral hazard and exercise effective market discipline. The objective of regulators should 
be to “minimize the cost of a crisis rather than to avoid it” (Freixas and Rochet, 1997), 
which in particular implies implementing appropriate policies to  control the failure of 
one single institution from spreading to the rest of the financial system.
The proposal to have internationally accepted standards promoting a safe banking 
system is part of the regulatory framework contained in the Basel Agreements. The 
traditional justification for regulation has been based on the protection of uninformed 
dispersed depositors against the risk of failure and the guarantee of a safe and efficient 
payment system, arguments tha t involve a strong commitment to financial stability. 
However, as with many other topics in economics, there is no clear consensus on the 
definitions of financial contagion or financial stability, let alone when this is narrowed 
down to banking. W hat is clear, though, is tha t by reducing the risk of contagion a 
higher level of stability can be expected.
This chapter surveys the literature on banking and is organised as follows. Section
1.2 describes the nature of banks, presenting theories tha t explain both their existence 
and the reasons for their failure. Section 1.3 provides evidence on the characteristics 
and determinants of banking crises. Section 1.4 introduces the main aspects of the 
safety net, including prudential regulation, deposit insurance and the lender of last
3Cooper and Ross (1998), Curry and Shibut (2000), Calvo (2000).
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resort. Section 1.5 discusses the systemic risk shifting problem, which arises when banks 
invest in correlated portfolios, leading to a “too many to fail” phenomenon. Section
1.6 and the subsections therein describe contagion through the credit channel, which 
includes the interbank funding markets, the payment system and instruments for credit 
transfer such as financial derivatives. Section 1.7 presents a discussion of the benefits and 
costs associated with the existence of an international lender of last resort. Concluding 
remarks are given in section 1.8.
1.2 The Nature o f Banks
The origin of banks goes back to the ancient world and probably predated the invention 
of money. The Hammurabi’s Code, in the eighteenth century BC, already included some 
laws regulating banking related activities. Although in more developed markets non­
bank financial institutions and capital markets have progressively come to overshadow 
banks as the main providers of liquidity, in many emerging economies banks remain the 
main or only financing source to households and the corporate sector, as alternatives 
remain underdeveloped.4
Banks have historically been considered special institutions, not only because they are 
financed by a large number of atomised, mostly uninformed depositors bu t also because 
they provide the essential service of transforming the m aturity of short-term liabilities 
into long-term assets, allowing for a smooth functioning of the payment system.
The first theories explaining the existence of banks as financial intermediaries em­
phasised their role in converting securities issued by firms into securities demanded by 
investors. The existence of transaction costs gives them an advantage over individual 
investors and, where indivisibilities in investment are present, they can also achieve a 
better diversification of risk (Gurley and Shaw, 1960; Fama, 1980). Other models ex­
plain the emergence of banks as a consequence of the existence of imperfect information 
in financial markets. Banks can act as providers of liquidity insurance and monitoring 
services for depositors, which are subject to asymmetric information due to  idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks on consumption (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). They can 
also act as providers of liquidity insurance to investors and firms facing liquidity needs 
with different maturities (Diamond and Rajan, 1998). Finally, banks can avoid the 
duplication of monitoring costs (Diamond, 1984) as investors delegate their monito­
4 According to figures from the People’s Bank of China, as of 2006, bank loans represented 99 percent 
of corporate funding in that country. For a study of the differences between bank and market based 
systems, see Allen and Gale (1995, 2001). For a model explaining the simultaneous existence of both 
markets, see Bolton and Freixas (1997).
19
ring power to them (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980), possibly because they are better at 
screening potential borrowers (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) or at supervising the use of 
funds (Boot and Thakor, 1993), making resources accessible to firms at a lower price.
The prominent role of banks in financial intermediation, as providers of information 
and liquidity insurance, exposes them  to the continuous threat of runs, given their ability 
to transform short-term riskless liabilities into long-term risky loans, which is known as 
the fractional reserve system.
Models of bank failure can be broadly classified into sunspot equilibrium models, 
which are analytically more tractable, and models of equilibrium in rational expecta­
tions, which are more complex but which provide a richer framework for policy analysis. 
Amongst the first class of models, the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
provides a very useful framework for understanding how banks’ demand deposit con­
tracts can provide allocations which are Pareto superior to those offered by exchange 
markets, while making them susceptible to runs. Their model considers an economy 
with three periods, a short-term storage technology in which net return is normalised 
to 1, a partially illiquid long-term technology returning r < 1 if liquidated at t = 1 and 
R  > 1 if liquidated at t = 2, and a continuum of mass one consumers, all endowed with 
one unit of an homogeneous good at t = 0 , who are uncertain about their future time 
of consumption. This is because an exogenous fraction 7r of consumers are impatient, 
meaning tha t they must consume in the interim period. Consumers’ types are realised 
in the interim period, this being private information.
If 7r were known, the optimal allocation could always be achieved in a decentralised 
market, with banks offering the same contract as a social planner maximising the ex­
pected utility of a representative consumer. When types are not verifiable, however, 
two equilibrium outcomes are possible: a Pareto efficient equilibrium, where all patient 
consumers wait to withdraw in the final period, and an inefficient equilibrium, where if 
some patient depositors decided to withdraw early, the rest -  because of a first-come- 
first-served assumption -  would fear being left with nothing and would precipitate a 
run.
Bankruptcy in these types of models arises as a sunspot phenomenon, which is 
not related to a bank’s fundamentals but to exogenous stochastic liquidity shocks on 
demand. Indeed, as neither depositors nor banks consider the probability of runs when 
making their investment decisions or computing the optimal level of inter-temporal 
insurance, runs are not equilibriums in rational expectations, making policy evaluation 
extremely difficult. A possible solution might be to introduce incentive compatibility
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constraints, inducing patient depositors to wait until the final period. Von Thadden 
(1998) explores this idea in a continuous time extension of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
but he concludes tha t such constraints always bind in equilibrium, severely limiting the 
provision of liquidity insurance.
Because both investment technologies are risk-free in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
runs cannot be regarded as a desirable equilibrium outcome. However, most banking 
problems in recent years have been associated with the deterioration of asset quality. 
Gorton (1988) provides empirical evidence suggesting th a t even the so-called panic runs 
in the USA at the beginning of the 20th  century were related to fundamentals, as they 
followed when a leading economic indicator, the liabilities of failed businesses, reached 
a certain threshold.
In an economy a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (1998) use the 
idea tha t an economic downturn may reduce the value of banks’ assets, increasing their 
probability of insolvency. When depositors anticipate this, they rationally precipitate a 
run. They model a decline in aggregate output as a shock to assets’ returns, perfectly 
correlated across banks. The first-come-first-served assumption is dropped and the long­
term  technology is assumed to be completely illiquid (r = 0), so tha t something is always 
left for late withdrawal. The first best allocation can be achieved when depositors are 
offered a deposit contract contingent on the return of the risky asset but not on their 
type. If patient depositors observe a low signal about the return of the risky asset, they 
will precipitate a run.
Other models explaining runs as a rational response to negative private information 
include Postlewaite and Vives (1987), where a fraction of depositors observe signals 
on the probability of a run, and Cooper and Ross (1998), where depositors consider 
the probability of runs before making their deposits. In both models, however, the 
probability of runs is an exogenous parameter, which therefore is unaffected by the form 
of the deposit contract.
Some models have allowed for the probability of runs being endogenised but have 
excluded panic based runs as an equilibrium phenomenon (Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 
1988; Alonso, 1996). When introducing asymmetric information, panic runs can be 
recovered as an equilibrium solution, either because private signals are misinterpreted 
(Chari and Jagannathan, 1988) or because signals are noisy and depositors fail to  co­
ordinate on a small region of the fundamentals (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2000). In an 
economy a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Chari and Jagannathan (1988) introduce a 
long-term technology with stochastic returns (with probability p > 0 the return equals
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R  > 1 and with complementary probability equals zero) and asymmetric information. A 
fraction (3 of all patient depositors are informed and receive a credible signal about the 
return of the risky asset. Uninformed depositors can only observe the size of the queue 
to  withdraw, sometimes confusing states of high liquidity demand with insolvency. Here 
the proportion of impatient consumers, 7r, is a random variable tha t can take values 7Tl  
or 7t h i  where 7rh  =  TIT, +  / 3 ( 1  —  t t l ) -  In a state of low liquidity demand, if the signal on 
future returns is high, there are no runs. If, instead, the signal is low, informed patient 
consumers withdraw. Uninformed patient depositors, observing 7t# , decide to withdraw 
as well and an efficient run occurs. However, in a state of high liquidity demand, an 
efficient run occurs only when a low signal on future returns is received in the interim 
period. If the signal is high, uninformed depositors still observe a long line and prefer 
to withdraw, forcing informed consumers to run on a solvent bank if what is left for the 
second period is insufficient to guarantee at least the same level of consumption they 
would get by withdrawing early.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) modify Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model using 
global games techniques and show tha t a unique equilibrium in rational expectations 
arises where both the probability of bank runs and the optimal demand deposit con­
tract are endogenous. This time the long-term technology’s return, R  =  R{9), depends 
continuously and increasingly on a uniform random variable, 9, with support in [0, 1], 
which represents the underlying fundamentals of the project financed by the bank. At 
the beginning of period 1, each depositor receives a private, non-verifiable signal about 
the true value of the fundamentals, 9i = 9 +  e*, where e* are i.i.d. random variables, 
uniformly distributed in the interval [—£,£]. Notice that, in this model, all patient de­
positors receive equally informative signals, though they are not common knowledge. 
After receiving a signal 9*, depositor i knows the true value of 9 lies in the interval 
[9i — e,9i + e]- W ith incomplete information, depositors must condition their beliefs 
upon their private signals, which are positively correlated with the signals of others. 
The effect of private signals is then twofold. The higher the signal, the higher the 
posterior distribution attributed to the realisation of R(9 ), which increases a patient 
depositor’s willingness to wait. Also, as signals are positively correlated, a high value 
signal makes a depositor believe tha t other players are receiving high value signals as 
well, assigning a lower probability to  the event tha t other patient depositors will run on 
the bank. Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) prove th a t a unique equilibrium “on switch­
ing strategies” exists, tha t is, an equilibrium in monotone strategies with threshold 9*, 
such tha t if 9i < 9* a patient depositor withdraws and remains if 9i >  9 . This equili­
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brium turns out to be the only equilibrium of the game. The equilibrium threshold 6* 
is increasing on ci, a measure of intertemporal insurance, as explained in Chapter 2.
A Remark about Dem and Deposit Contracts
“Bank runs are an inevitable consequence of the standard [demand] deposit contract in 
a world with aggregate uncertainty about assets return. But these contracts allow the 
banking system to share the risk among depositors”. Gale (2000)
The natural question is whether a different type of contract could provide a more 
stable banking system. Alonso (1996) demonstrates th a t contracts where runs occur may 
be better than those which ensure no runs because they improve on risk-sharing. Jacklin 
and B hattacharya (1988) compare equity contracts, whose prices are fully revealing, with 
demand deposit contracts with a suspension of convertibility and conclude that, when 
the dispersion of returns is low, demand deposit contracts are preferred. Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1990), in a similar exercise, allow for equity prices not to be fully revealing 
and conclude tha t less informed traders prefer safer deposits to equity contracts.
1.3 Banking Crises
The soundness of the banking system can have a direct effect on macroeconomic stabi­
lity, poverty and economic growth.5 Banking intermediation promotes the growth of an 
economy by providing an efficient allocation of savings to more productive technologies 
and by promoting capital accumulation through the attraction of local and foreign capi­
tal (Beck, Levine and Loayza, 1999; Beck and Levine, 2001). Conversely, banking crises 
can cause severe damage, as they tend to be long and very costly, both in terms of the 
direct fiscal costs involved in their resolution and in terms of net output losses (table 
i . i ) .
IMF (1998) Bordo et al. (2000)
Crisis type Cost Length Cost Length
Currency 4.3 1.6 5.9 2.1
Banking 11.6 3.1 6.2 2.6
Twin 14.4 3.2 18.6 3.8
TABLE 1.1: Estimation of the cost and length of financial crises. Average costs measured as a 
percentage of GDP. Average length in years. The IMF (1998) study includes 53 countries over 
the period 1975-1997. Bordo et al. (2000) includes 56 countries over the period 1973-1997.
5 See Levine (1997) for a survey.
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One of the main roles performed by banks is the monitoring of investment projects, 
through which they learn im portant information about the payment ability of their 
borrowers. This lender-borrower relationship is valuable to both banks and customers 
because it enables reputation building (Diamond, 1991), reduces agency problems (Ra- 
jan, 1992) and allows for more flexible contracts (Von Thadden, 1995). When a bank 
fails, however, this relationship is destroyed and valuable information is lost.
Indeed, as it is difficult and costly in practice for firms to  obtain quick access to new 
credit, especially when bank failures are systemic, a financial crisis can propagate to the 
real sector. Bernanke (1983) argues that, during the Great Depression, the cut-off of 
financing to borrowers strongly dependent on banking lending exacerbated the decline 
in the US economy. Slovin et al. (1993) study the effect of the collapse of Continental 
Illinois, in 1983, on the stock price of 29 publicly traded firms tha t had maintained a 
lending relationship with the bank until its de facto  failure. They interpret the average 4 
percent decline in their market value -  prior to the announcement by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) tha t the bank would be bailed out -  as evidence that 
the costs associated with the loss of lender-borrower relationships can be substantial. 
They argue tha t financial markets may effectively punish firms related to distressed 
banks, if failure is interpreted as an indicator of bad monitoring or poor choice of loan 
customers. Kang and Stulz (2000) reach similar conclusions when studying the deflation 
of the Japanese stock market in the period 1990-93. In particular, they find tha t the 
performance of firms with close banking relationships was lower when their main banks 
were also experiencing financial problems.
1.3.1 D eterm in an ts o f  B anking C rises
Among the typical causes of banking crises are macroeconomic instability, deficient su­
pervision, inadequate management and operational risks (Latter, 1997). All these e- 
lements may appear to be strongly correlated in practice, as in the processes of financial 
liberalisation in the 1980s. Inefficient regulation and supervision, implicit bailout gua­
rantees and lack of competition, led to weak management and moral hazard. Financial 
liberalisation allowed for foreign over-borrowing by banks, high real exchange rate ap­
preciation, sudden rises in real interest rates and large fiscal and current account deficits. 
The result was a long list of banking crises in emerging markets during th a t decade.
Macroeconomic shocks can affect the stability of the banking system due to the dete­
rioration of asset quality. The collapse of asset prices, a sharp increase in interest rates, 
a fall in exchange rates, a slowdown in the pace of general inflation, or the onset of a re­
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cession, can all create pressure on sectors to which banks are exposed, forcing otherwise 
profitable projects into insolvency. Macroeconomic shocks, however, are not always an 
exogenous phenomenon but can also be generated by mistaken macroeconomic policies, 
agency problems or asset mismanagement. A remarkable example of a macroeconomic 
shock is asset price bubbles. Allen and Gale (2000a) show tha t asset prices are related 
to the available and expected amount of credit in an economy. When credit expands, 
investors borrow from banks to finance the purchasing of pre-existing assets. Risk shift­
ing, resulting from the inability of lenders to observe how borrowers invest, may increase 
the prices of these assets, creating a bubble. There are many examples of asset price 
bubbles, with repercussions of varied intensity through the banking sector. Some of 
these are the South Sea Bubble in 1722, the Wall Street Market Crash in 1929, the real 
estate bubble in Japan in the 1990s, the Dotcom Bubble in 2001 and the subprime crisis 
in the USA in 2007.
Prudential supervision is intended to prevent and cope with financial crises. Em­
pirical evidence indicates tha t it was precisely the lack of effective supervision in the 
financial liberalisation process conducted during the 1980s, notably in the former Soviet 
Union countries, which led to many banking and currency crises (Latter, 1997; Stiglitz, 
2002). In fact, “government interventions can be destabilizing as well as stabilizing” 
(Calomiris, 1997). A regulation so strong tha t it eliminates the probability of failure 
could constrain the competitiveness and efficient operation of the banking system. On 
the other hand, lenient supervisory policies, such as bailouts without restrictions, tend 
to increase moral hazard and so encourage risk-taking. Government interference, as with 
the obligation to fund government deficits on non-market terms or the pressure to lend 
to particular customers, could also precipitate liquidity or solvency crises.
Imprudent managerial decisions can clearly affect the solvency of a bank and the 
stability of the banking system as a whole. Taking on too much risk in a rush to expand 
or to “gamble for resurrection”, poor credit assessment and adverse credit selection, 
high credit exposures, concentration of lending and connected lending, taking on new 
areas without the needed expertise (e.g. derivatives trading), unauthorised trading 
or position-taking associated with corruption and fraud, and failures associated with 
human-capital (non-enforceable managerial effort, high staff turnover, etc.) all have a 
direct effect on the solvency and profitability of a financial institution. Some models 
have been developed to study mechanisms inducing proper behaviour by managers, for 
example via the transfer of control to more intrusive supervisory institutions, as in 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) and Repullo (2000). At a more practical level, the IM F’s
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code of best practice establishes th a t a bank’s owners and managers should be subject 
to “fit and proper” tests before being allowed to operate a banking licence (Hoelscher 
and Quintyn, 2003).
1.3 .2  T w in  C rises
During the 1980s and 1990s, a high correlation was observed between exchange rate 
collapses and banking crises. Banking and currency crises appeared to  arise virtually at 
the same time in Latin America in the early and mid-1980s, in Scandinavia in the early 
1990s, in Mexico in 1995, and in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea in 1997-98. 
The term  “twin crisis”, understood as a banking crisis accompanied by a currency crisis 
(or vice versa) in a period of 24 months, was originally coined by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996) when studying the experience of the financial liberalisation processes conducted 
in the 1980s, where this phenomenon became more frequent.6
In an empirical study, Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996) shows tha t twin crises are more 
common in developing than in industrial countries, and particularly so in financially 
liberalised emerging economies. In a database of banking and currency crises in 90 
countries over the period 1975-1997, using a signal-to-noise ratio methodology, she con­
cludes that, in a financial system where depositors may substitute domestic assets for 
foreign ones, a banking crisis may increase the relative risk of holding bank deposits, 
leading to a flight to currency. Indeed, she shows th a t banking crises provide a good 
leading indicator of currency crises (as in Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996).
Other models supporting the connection between a weak banking sector and the 
emergence of currency crises include Obstfeld (1994), where rational speculators anti­
cipate that policymakers will commit themselves to maintain inflation targets rather 
than exchange rate stability in order to avoid bankruptcies; Velasco (1987) and Calvo 
(1998), where a currency attack is prompted by an increase in liquidity inconsistent 
with a stable exchange rate, resulting from a government bailout of the banking system; 
and Miller (1999), who explicitly considers currency devaluation as an option for a 
government confronted with bank runs and a fixed exchange rate regime.
Theories supporting this same connection but in the opposite direction -  tha t is, of 
banking crises caused by currency crises -  include Miller (1996), who shows that, when 
deposits are used to speculate in the foreign exchange market and banks are ‘loaned 
up’, the attack on the currency can lead to a banking crisis; and Rojas-Suarez and
6 It is argued that in the 1970’s, when financial systems were highly regulated, currency crises were 
rarely accompanied by banking crises (Stiglitz, 2002).
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Weisbrod (1995), where a currency crisis can directly weaken a bank’s balance sheet 
via depreciation, or indirectly, by forcing the central bank to  raise interest rates in an 
attem pt to defend the currency.
Finally, some authors explain currency and banking crises as a simultaneous pheno­
menon. In Chang and Velasco (1998), both crises are modelled in a Diamond and Dyvbig 
(1983) set up and, therefore, are explained as sunspot equilibriums. They regard banking 
and currency crises as simultaneous manifestations of a phenomenon of international 
illiquidity. Goldstein (2005) shows how strategic complementarities between depositors 
and speculators generate a vicious cycle between banking and currency crises, which 
magnifies with the correlation between the two crises.
1.4 The Safety N et
The term  “safety net” refers to  the set of instruments tha t are available to central banks 
to insure the healthy functioning of the banking sector and a smooth working payment 
system. It includes tools of prudential regulation and supervision (deposit interest rate 
ceilings, portfolio restrictions such as reserve requirements and narrow banking, capital 
requirements, regulatory monitoring, and restrictions on entry, branching, network and 
merger), deposit insurance and mechanisms for emergency liquidity assistance (lender 
of last resort (LoLR) and open market operations (OMO)).
Before the 1930s, the involvement of official institutions in issues of financial stabi­
lity was modest but, after the Great Depression, several economies started to develop 
systems of protection for depositors and banks. In the USA, in 1933, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation was allowed not only to  offer discount window facilities to  banks 
with good collateral but also to purchase the preferred stock of banks and other firms, 
in order to reduce the probability of failure of distressed institutions. In the same year, 
the Glass-Steagall Act set up the FDIC for insuring bank deposits.
The safety net tha t then emerged remained largely untested during decades cha­
racterised by tranquil market conditions. However, after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in the 1970s, a series of banking crises started to be repeated through­
out the world, marked by abuses of the safety net by banks and lenient regulation 
and supervision by governments. The Savings and Loan crisis in the USA (1986-1995) 
“was of central importance in galvanizing the debate over safety net reform. It provided 
clear... evidence of ways in which government protection of financial institutions could 
be abused...[as] much of the loss experienced within the industry resulted from legal, 
voluntary risk-taking and fraud (rather than exogenous shocks)” (Calomiris, 1997).
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As a result of this, the perception of the success of the safety net changed sub­
stantially. Supervisory intervention has since being criticised for being costly and slow, 
while regulation has been blamed for introducing distortions into the market, which 
induce bank managers to take on excessive risk (moral hazard). The cycle seems to 
spiral, as the distortions created by regulation call for additional regulation, bringing 
about changes in the informational structure of markets, which make the achievement 
of Pareto efficient outcomes more difficult (Stiglitz, 1994).
The following years witnessed im portant steps forward in the task of limiting pro­
tection and enforcing market discipline, of which the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and 
its amendments contained in Basel II; the 1989 Financial Institution Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act; the 1991 FDICIA7 in the USA, and similar initiatives by the 
European Commission, are some examples.
1.4.1 P ru d en tia l R egu la tion
The Basel Committee was established at the end of 1974 by the central bank governors 
of the Group of Ten countries, with the aim of gathering central bankers and bank 
supervisors and regulators to discuss issues related to prudential banking supervision. 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord introduced a minimum risk-weighted capital to asset 
ratio (the Cooke ratio) of 8 percent, which in the earliest version only considered credit 
risk. New amendments to include market and operational risks, as well as credit risk, in 
the computation of weights are part of a more comprehensive revision of the regulatory 
policy, in the context of Basel II, whose first agreed document was published in 2004 
but which only started to be adopted by all credit institutions in the European Union 
in 2008 and is yet to be implemented in the United States.
Although these guidelines were designed for internationally active banks, they have 
been widely adopted by banks in developing economies. In emerging economies, efficient 
supervision has usually been constrained by the limitations in technology, resources and 
the legal environment for applying effective sanctions to banks tha t do not comply with 
regulatory requirements (Laporta et al, 1998). Evidence tha t these measures are in fact 
the best ones for countries with different institutional and political frameworks is still 
limited.8
The objective of capital regulation is to strengthen the soundness and stability of
7FIDIC improvement act, establishing prompt corrective actions to enforce new standards.
8 See Barth, J.; G. Jr. Caprio and R. Levine (2002) in “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What 
Works B est?”. Mimeo, and Griffith-Jones, S. and S. Spratt (2001), “Will the proposed new Basel 
Capital Accord have a net negative effect on developing economies?”. Mimeo, Institute of Development 
Studies, Brighton.
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the international banking system and to reduce competitive inequalities across markets. 
Kahane (1977), Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Sharpe (1978) justify the use of capital 
requirements to control the solvency of banks whose asset allocations are distorted by 
deposit insurance, using models which assume tha t markets are complete and tha t the 
economy lasts for just one period. A static framework, though, may fail to  capture im­
portant intertemporal effects tha t capital requirements have on the behaviour of banks. 
One of the first theoretical models for studying these effects was provided by Blum 
(1999). In a three periods model he studies the incentives for asset substitution coming 
from the reduction in expected profits imposed by the requirement. In the initial period 
the manager has two investment options, a safe asset whose rate of return is normalised 
to 1 and a higher yielding but risky technology. In the interim period, investment tech­
nologies are risk free. He shows tha t when capital regulation just becomes binding in 
the initial period, a tighter requirement reduces risk-taking. However, when capital re­
quirements become binding in the interim period, tightening the requirement raises the 
level of risk. This is because the amount of equity in the final period is endogenous; 
therefore, when raising equity is excessively costly, banks increase their risk in the initial 
period in order to have a higher amount of final equity.
Under an incomplete market approach, Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and 
Santomero (1988) use a mean variance portfolio model with fixed liabilities to prove that, 
in the absence of a solvency requirement and abstracting from the limited liability clause, 
the probability of failure decreases on the capital ratio, which is independent of the (non­
negative) weights used in the computation of the ratio. However, the introduction of 
capital requirements changes the asset allocation of banks so that, while the share of the 
risky portfolio decreases because the bank shifts to those assets within a lower weight 
category, its composition is distorted in the direction of more risk inside the chosen 
weight category, increasing the probability of failure (Rochet, 1992). An example of 
why this might be a problem was the collapse of Argentina’s banking system in 2001-02, 
which was closely related to their over-exposure to defaulted government bonds, with 
zero weight.9 Thakor (1996) also shows how a bad selection of risk weights can have a 
negative impact on the real sector, given tha t asset allocation can be distorted by the 
difference between market and regulatory assessments of risks. As a way of correcting
9 During 2001, banks rolled over maturing debt and increased their holdings of public debt as well 
as their credit to the public sector. The share of public sector assets increased from 17.4 percent 
of the total in December 2000 to almost 20 percent in September 2001. Public sector exposure was 
widespread in the banking system, being particularly high in large and primarily publicly-owned banks. 
For further references, see B. Eichengreen (2001), “Crisis prevention and management: any new lessons 
from Argentina and Turkey?”, The World Bank.
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this problem, Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet 
(1999) propose the introduction of regulatory weights proportional to  market based 
measures of the risk of the assets. This proposal has indeed been adopted by the Basel 
Committee, which in 1995 accepted tha t commercial banks could use their own Internal 
Models of risk assessment. The Brussels Commission did the same for European banks 
in 1997.
Nonetheless, when limited liability is taken into account, Rochet (1992) proves that, 
even with the correct weights, capital adequacy requirements are not enough to control 
moral hazard and an additional requirement, as a minimum level of capital independent 
of the size of the assets, might be needed.
Bhattacharya et al. (2002) model the optimal closure and replenishment rules for 
a bank facing Poisson distributed audits by the regulator. They consider three simul­
taneous regulatory policy instruments: a capital replenishment rule, a closure rule and 
how frequently a bank is audited. They show tha t a combination of these policies can 
completely eliminate risk-taking incentives when the bank is solvent. Weights on capi­
ta l requirement and closure rules can be endogenously determined in this model and, as 
suggested by VaR models, closure levels increase almost linearly in the risk of the under­
lying assets. Their assumptions, though, are quite strong because either all agents are 
risk neutral or agents other than the regulator are assumed to  have perfect information. 
The implicit objective function of the regulator in this model is to completely eliminate 
risk shifting incentives via the closure rule. However, if a cost-benefit analysis were to 
be explicitly formulated, other policies could be evaluated and compared. Moreover, 
the use of VaR models can also have a negative effect on risk shifting, especially in 
situations of financial distress. Danfelsson (2000) argues tha t because “market data is 
endogenous to market behavior, statistical analysis in times o f stability does not provide 
much guidance in times of crisis” . He finds th a t VaR models are excessively volatile, 
sometimes increasing idiosyncratic and systemic risk, and questions how appropriate 
risk modelling is for regulatory design.
Hellmann et al. (2000) blame the deregulation of interest rates for facilitating the 
increasing frequency of financial crises in recent years. They show tha t a Pareto effi­
cient outcome can be implemented by a combination of deposit interest rate controls 
and capital requirements. The use of deposit rate ceilings can complement capital re­
quirements, creating additional policy flexibility and allowing the government to relax 
binding constraints on capital, reducing the total costs imposed by them. Deposit rate 
ceilings create a franchise value for banks, which they lose if a gamble on assets is un­
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successful, introducing incentives for prudent investment. They recognise, though, that 
a trade-off exists, as banks with either better investment opportunities or lower costs of 
intermediation would be limited in their rate of growth.
In the late 1990s a new idea, called the pre-commitment approach (Kupiec and 
O’Brien, 1997), seemed to open the way for more effective regulation, using the private 
interest of banks in assessing their risk-taking and making appropriate provision for 
it. This idea basically states tha t banks, having a better knowledge of the market 
and the credit risk contained in their portfolios, can self-assess their maximum possible 
losses, which would determine their capital requirements. If this capital proves to  be 
insufficient for an observed volatility, the regulator can impose an ex-post pecuniary 
penalty for violation. Nonetheless, and as was noticed by Rochet (1999), the main 
real difference between the pre-commitment approach and the use of internal models is 
simply the time of intrusion by the regulator (when the penalty is applied). In fact, the 
implementation of this method has proved to be no easier than tha t of internal models 
and it has practically been abandoned (Freixas and Santomero, 2002).
Instead, interest has shifted to the use of market instruments and prices to increase 
private discipline (see Freixas and Santomero (2002) for a survey). The new BIS proposal 
for capital regulation, Basel II, includes three pillars: minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review of internal assessments and capital adequacy, and effective disclosure 
to strengthen market discipline. Decamps et al. (2004) and Rochet (2004) study the 
combined effects of these three pillars in a continuous time model. Capital requirements 
are modelled here as an optimal closure threshold for the bank. The bank’s asset value 
follows a stochastic diffusion process, which mean is increasing on the manager’s mo­
nitoring effort level. They show that, when all agents are risk neutral, a requirement 
for the bank to issue a security whose payoff is conditional on the value of the bank’s 
asset (a subordinated bond), can be used to reduce the minimum capital requirement 
needed to prevent moral hazard (the closure threshold). Indeed, when the regulator 
is subject to political pressure for supporting the banks who hit the closure threshold 
(forbearance), they prove tha t market discipline is still effective, the more so the higher 
the frequency of the rollover of the subordinated bond.
As supervisors have access to imperfect information, limited by the frequency of 
balance sheet disclosures and onsite inspections, some policymakers have advocated in­
troducing a requirement of a minimum issuance of subordinated debt, as a complement 
to supervisory efforts to encourage a sound banking system. Efficiency should be en­
hanced, as uninsured junior bond holders have the correct incentives to monitor the
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bank’s investments and demand an appropriate compensation for risk-taking. Then, 
supervisors could use these market prices to  improve their assessments of a bank’s sol­
vency (Decamps et al, 2004). There are, of course, detractors of this idea, who raise 
questions about the reliability of creditors’ signals, given th a t they are also subject to 
asymmetric information, or the depth of the ability of secondary markets to provide 
informative price signals (Kane, 1995).
1.4.2 D ep o sit Insurance
Situations of panic based runs were fairly common in the USA banking system during 
the National Banking Era (1864-1913).10 The introduction of deposit insurance and 
regulation during the 1930s has been regarded by many authors and policymakers as 
the main cause of the disappearance of panic runs (Miron, 1986; Williamson, 1995).11
Systems of deposit insurance started to appear outside the USA only in the 1960s. 
However, with the escalating banking crises during the 1980s, financial stability concerns 
led to the widespread establishment of implicit and explicit deposit insurance systems, 
which are well documented by the work of Demirgug-Kunt and Sobaci (2000).
At a theoretical level, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) were the first to address de­
posit insurance as a mechanism to stop inefficient runs on solvent banks. In the model 
described in section 1.2, they introduce deposit insurance as a promise to pay 1 at t = 1 
and R  at t = 2 — the outside option or autarkic solution -  if the bank goes bankrupt in 
the interim period. This guarantee is financed by a tax charged on early withdrawals, 
in an amount depending on the number of depositors queuing to withdraw their money. 
Since the payment of the guarantee is triggered only by a run, and given that R  > 1, 
waiting until the final period turns out to be the only dominant strategy for patient 
consumers. Therefore, the guarantee is never used in equilibrium.
An alternative to deposit insurance is the suspension of convertibility, which gives 
banks the ability to stop paying out deposits when withdrawals reach a pre-determined 
level. Suspensions of convertibility were an unpopular but common practice in the 1930s, 
before the introduction of the FDIC (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). A recent example 
of its application was the so-called “corralito” in Argentina, in 2002.
In the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), suspension of convertibility means 
that when the number of early withdrawals rises above 7r -  the proportion of impatient
10Miron (1986) documents that before 1914 banking crises in the USA occurred on average every 5 
years.
11 Chari (1989) disagrees with this judgement and argues that runs in the USA were a particular 
consequence of local legal restrictions and problems of regulation.
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consumers -  the conversion of deposits into the consumption good is interrupted. In this 
framework, both mechanisms (suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance) are 
equally effective in deterring patient depositors from withdrawing early. However, the 
authors show tha t when liquidity shocks are stochastic (n is a binary random variable) 
suspension of convertibility can create serious inefficiencies, as some impatient consumers 
could be deprived of consumption in the interim period. Thus, deposit insurance is 
Pareto dominant in this case.
According to some authors, the main aim of deposit insurance is to provide a risk­
free asset to  small savers (Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren, 1998), while others argue 
tha t the market could provide cheaper assets to satisfy this purpose (Calomiris, 1996 
and Stiglitz, 1992). All agree, however, tha t deposit insurance induces moral hazard. 
In fact, a guarantee on deposits can be seen as a callable put option on the agency 
offering insurance (Merton, 1977; Acharya and Dreyfus, 1989), whose value increases 
monotonically in the volatility of the investment portfolio and then is maximised at the 
highest possible level of risk.
Despite the limitations of Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model,12 research has 
abstracted from studying the real effects of this policy on depositors and bank ma­
nagers’ behaviour and has concentrated instead on the study of the pricing of the insu­
rance option and its effect on banks’ moral hazard.13 I will come back to this point in 
the following chapter.
Risk insensitive insurance premiums have been linked to higher bank risk-taking be­
cause the introduction of a guarantee on deposits implies inefficient investment, which 
cannot be compensated for by an increase in capital requirements (Mishkin, 1992). 
Moreover, full deposit insurance suppresses the incentive of depositors to require their 
banks to self-protect through capitalisation (Bond and Crocker, 1993). By fixing the 
banks’ future funding costs, risk insensitive insurance premiums also eliminate the 
funding-related benefits of reputation (Boot and Greenbaum, 1993). This problem is 
particularly severe when there is higher competition among banks, as the monopolistic 
rents tha t would otherwise have encouraged banks to effectively monitor their invest­
ments are eliminated.
Acharya and Dreyfus (1989) develop a model in which the authorities receive a 
signal of the true value of the bank’s assets and can close a bank before the end of
12 Runs are a sunspot phenomenon and, as the possibility of a bank becoming insolvent is excluded, 
runs are always inefficient.
13Notice that as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) deposit insurance is not used in equilibrium, the 
insurance premium is nil.
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the contract. They determine the optimal closure policy together with the price of 
deposit insurance, as the minimum cost policy for the insurer. They find tha t a bank 
is optimally closed if the net increase in the insurer (discounted) liability exceeds the 
immediate cost of reorganizing the bank, or if the bank’s current asset value is too low 
for the insurer to be able to charge an actuarially fair premium. However, as was noticed 
by Chan et al. (1992), when asymmetric information is taken into account, fairly priced 
deposit insurance may not be possible. Adverse selection and the existence of time lags 
between banks’ portfolio decisions and premium adjustments give managers incentives 
to gamble for resurrection, due to limited liability. Freixas and Rochet (1997) show tha t 
deposit insurance may be feasible under asymmetric information but not desirable from 
a general welfare point of view because ex-post cross-subsidies between banks may lead 
to an artificial survival of insolvent banks.
1.4 .3  T h e L ender o f  L ast R esort
The concept of the Lender of Last Resort (LoLR) was first introduced in the eighteenth 
century, originally by Baring (1797) and later by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873). 
They identified this as an im portant role to be performed by central banks, in order to 
promote financial stability and avoid the consequences of the spread of bank failures for 
the real sector.
The LoLR facility can be defined as “a discretionary provision o f liquidity to a 
financial institution (or the market as a whole) by the central bank, in reaction to an 
adverse shock which causes an abnormal increase in demand for liquidity that cannot be 
met from an alternative source” (Freixas et al, 1999). However, as in practice it may be 
difficult to distinguish whether OMOs have been implemented to rescue troubled banks 
or with pure monetary policy objectives, Goodhart (1995) argues tha t the term LoLR 
should be reserved to mean liquidity support to individual banks.
Bagehot’s doctrine is th a t the LoLR should lend only to solvent banks facing a 
liquidity shortage, at a high penalty rate (in order to reduce the incentives for using 
these loans to fund normal businesses) and against good collateral, according to their 
value at pre-crisis levels. He believed th a t without good collateral, an institution is 
plainly insolvent and therefore should be allowed to fail. However, some authors consider 
that banks with good collateral should be able to borrow from the interbank market 
and, therefore, any emergency liquidity assistance should be provided only through open 
market operations, in order to avoid moral hazard (Goodfriend and King, 1988). P u t 
in a different way, with efficient financial markets a solvent institution should never be
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illiquid.
Interbank markets, though, do not always operate efficiently. A recent example of 
this fact is the ongoing subprime crisis, where the spread of the 3 month LIBOR over 
the monetary policy rate kept above 100 basis points on average between September 
2007 and June 2008 in the USA and 80 basis points in Europe.14 This has required 
central banks to inject liquidity in the market, not only though open market operations 
but also through direct emergency liquidity assistance.
Due to problems of incomplete or asymmetric information, a solvent illiquid bank 
may become insolvent if it is unable to obtain liquidity in credit markets. In a model 
of a bank liquidity crisis with a single Bayesian equilibrium, Rochet and Vives (2002) 
show tha t with positive probability a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance, even 
in an otherwise efficient interbank market. Their model considers three periods and a 
continuum of depositors consuming only in the final period. At t  =  0 a bank has a 
positive level of equity and collects 1 unit of uninsured deposits. W ith these resources, 
the bank funds its investment in a risky, partially illiquid asset and its holdings of cash 
reserves. If the return of the risky asset is high, depositors are repaid in the final period 
and stockholders appropriate the profits. On the other hand, if a bad signal on future 
returns is received at t  =  1, depositors can withdraw early, precipitating a run if their 
withdrawal exceeds the cash reserves.
An interesting feature of this model is th a t withdrawal decisions are not directly 
pursued by depositors but are delegated to uninsured, risk neutral fund managers. This 
assumption aims to capture what the authors call “the modern form  of bank runs ”, where 
large well-informed investors refuse to rollover their credits to banks. Fund managers 
obtain a private benefit b > 0 if they make a good investment and get the money back 
at date 2; they are penalised with a reputational cost C > 0 if they have to withdraw 
in the interim period, so they receive b — C  > 0; and they get nothing if the bank fails 
and they do not recover the money. As the expected benefit of early withdrawal is b — C  
while tha t of waiting is (1 — p)6, where p  is the probability tha t the bank fails, managers
(j
withdraw at t = 1 if and only if p > — . In the interim period, managers receive a
b
noisy signal on the deposits’ returns and decide whether to withdraw or to wait. If early 
withdrawals exceed cash balances, the bank is forced to prematurely liquidate assets. 
If the needed amount of assets is greater than the total assets available at t  = 1, the 
bank fails. If not, but what is left is not enough to cover late withdrawals, the bank
14 The normal levels of this spread are about 30 basis points in the USA and 20 basis points in Europe, 
according to pre-crisis estimates.
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fails at t = 2. Otherwise, the bank is solvent and can continue in operation. Prem ature 
liquidation is costly, in the sense tha t for any unit of the risky asset sold at t = 1 the 
bank receives just a fraction r < 1 of its value. The authors show th a t when a bank is 
close to insolvency (modelled by small values of R ) or when there is a liquidity shortage 
(modelled by small values of r), the interbank market is not able to prevent the early 
closure of the bank, due to coordination problems among fund managers. They also 
show th a t coordination failure can be alleviated through a combination of appropriate 
solvency and liquidity requirements and liquidity assistance through discount window 
loans.
Although this model may justify the intervention of central banks, it does not resolve 
the moral hazard issue. As was noticed by Goodhart (1995), the time available to 
decide whether to  lend to  a bank is often not sufficient to assess its solvency and, even 
more complex, ex-ante solvent banks may become ex-post insolvent if general economic 
conditions worsen. It is also true that, on some occasions, central banks have rescued 
clearly insolvent banks because of stability concerns ( “too-big-to-fail”), when they have 
assessed tha t their failure could generate a knock-on effect on the rest of the banking 
system, so the cost of restructuring is smaller than the cost of failure. Indeed, allowing 
banks to fail seems to be not the rule but the exception. In a study of a sample of 
104 failing banks, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) show tha t less than a third were 
liquidated and all the rest were rescued.
A possible answer to the moral hazard problem is the so-called principle of “con­
structive ambiguity”. The basic idea behind this is tha t central banks can rescue some 
banks and liquidate others, without committing ex-ante to a specific policy. In tha t way, 
bank managers and shareholders are uncertain about the cost they will have to bear, 
giving them an incentive not to  take on too much risk. This principle is supported by 
Freixas (1999), who studies the optimal bailout policy tha t should be applied by a LoLR 
using a cost-benefit analysis. By introducing a social cost of liquidation -  increasing on 
the value of the bank’s asset -  and a continuation cost, defined as a function of the 
expected subsidy that uninsured depositors receive through the bailout of the bank, he 
shows tha t banks with large asset holdings (equal to the sum of equity, insured and 
uninsured deposits) are “too big to fa il” and are always rescued (also see Rochet and 
Tirole, 1996). For smaller banks, he finds tha t the optimal policy is to use a mixed stra­
tegy equilibrium, by which banks satisfying certain regulatory requirements are rescued 
with positive probability (but less than one), and computes a threshold for the amount 
of uninsured deposits over which every bank must be liquidated.
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Rochet and Vives (2002) also address this issue. In their model, the commitment of 
liquidity assistance can be seen as a signal whose level of disclosure is decided by the 
central bank. They show that, if this signal becomes common knowledge, its effects can 
be destabilising and so it may be optimal for regulators to send an oblique statement to 
the market or to add enough noise to the signal to limit moral hazard.
While constructive ambiguity may limit moral hazard, it also gives large discre­
tionary power to  the agency responsible for crisis management. Freixas et al. (1999) 
propose a solution, by giving central banks a role as mediators to organize private sec­
tor liquidity assistance. Although coordination problems may be difficult to solve in 
the short-term, there are many examples where the concept of being “too big to  fail” 
makes sense even from a private perspective, so th a t creditors cooperate and invest in 
new equity, as in Barings in 1890, the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 
and the rescue of IKB in Germany in 2007.
1.5 System ic Risk Shifting or “Too M any To Fail”
Regulation should seek the stability of the financial system as a whole and not of in­
dividual institutions, whose failure might be an efficient exercise of market discipline. 
However, in the same way tha t a LoLR implicitly guarantees the rescue of banks consi­
dered “too-big-to-fail” , a partial equilibrium approach in the design of regulation tha t 
does not take into account the emergence of correlated exposures to specific sectors of 
the real economy, could lead to the equivalent of a “too-many-to-fail” outcome. Acharya 
(2001) explains this phenomenon as a consequence of systemic risk-shifting. In his paper, 
he shows tha t regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policies and capital adequacy 
requirements, based exclusively on the assessments of a bank’s own risk, fail to mitigate 
aggregate risk-shifting incentives and can accentuate systemic risk.
Formally, he considers an economy with three periods, two banks geographically 
separated, and a continuum of depositors holding standard demand deposit contracts. 
Banks can decide whether to invest in a safe asset, whose return equals the marginal 
product of capital, or a risky technology consisting of loans extended to entrepreneurs 
over which banks have monopolistic power, so tha t the supply of this asset is determined 
by the amount of the risky investment in each bank.
A bank can choose both the riskiness of the project and the industry in which the 
project will be developed. Information costs are assumed to  be so high tha t it is not 
feasible to  invest in more than one industry. For simplicity, it is assumed tha t there 
are just two industries in the economy. The choice of industry by banks determines the
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correlation of their investment portfolios. If both banks choose the same industry, the 
correlation is high. In this way, systemic risk is an endogenous outcome of the banks’ 
investment decisions. Other interbank relationships are excluded from this analysis.
When a bank fails, two types of externalities affect the surviving bank. There is 
a (negative) “recessional spillover” , reducing the profitability of the surviving banks 
through the reduction in aggregate investment. There is also a (positive) “strategic 
benefit”, resulting from the migration of depositors from the failed bank to  the surviving 
institution, and the reduction in operational costs due to the acquisition of the failed 
bank’s lending facilities. If the negative effect dominates the positive one, banks may 
prefer to increase their correlation, thus increasing the probability of their joint survival 
or failure, a phenomenon tha t the author calls “systemic risk-shifting” .
Such an outcome is not optimal from a social welfare perspective because the cost 
of joint failure is clearly higher. Effective regulation should consider a closure policy, 
consisting of a bailout of the failing bank together with dilution of the bank owners’ 
equity, where greater dilution implies less forbearance. However, while on the one hand 
a bailout eliminates the externalities, on the other hand it induces moral hazard because 
of the resulting “too-many-to-fail” guarantee. If bank owners can anticipate greater 
forbearance upon joint failure, this policy will increase the systemic risk by inducing 
banks to make correlated investments in order to extract greater regulatory subsidies. 
The author proposes a “collective regulation” to counteract systemic moral hazard. By 
conducting sales of failed banks’ assets, the surviving banks’ charter value will increase 
(positive externality) inducing them to prefer less correlated portfolios.
There is some empirical evidence tha t banks may find optimal an industrial or­
ganisation comprising several specialised banks instead of a large number of diversified 
banks, when diversification does not guarantee higher profits or greater safety for them 
(Acharya et al., 2006). Indeed, the contagious effects of the failure of one bank on the 
others, understood in the model as depositors demanding higher interest rates from the 
surviving bank when another has failed, could increase the incentives for joint survival 
and joint failure if the competitive lending margins of diversification are not so high 
(Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008), this effect being specially stronger for smaller banks 
(Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007b).
Acharya’s (2001) work also has implications for the new Basel regulation on capital 
requirements. He recommends that capital requirements should be “correlated based” , 
not only on each individual’s bank risks but also increasing on the correlation with other 
banks’ portfolio returns, in order to take account of systemic issues. The implementation
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of such a policy may be difficult, though, as these correlations are themselves time 
varying.
1.6 Financial Contagion
Given that the failure of a large bank or several small banks can have systemic conse­
quences, no analysis of the banking system would be complete without considering the 
effects th a t contagion has on financial stability.
The empirical literature has provided evidence of contagion in the banking industry. 
For example, Schoenmaker (1996) applies an auto-regressive Poisson model to a data 
set of monthly bank failures during the USA National Banking System -  before the es­
tablishment of the Federal Reserve, in order to abstract from distortions introduced by 
central bank interventions. He shows tha t the risk of contagion among banks is signifi­
cant, as their failures appear to be dependent even after controlling for macroeconomic 
fundamentals.
Schoenmaker (1996) identifies two main channels of contagion: the informational 
channel and the credit channel. The informational channel relates to situations where 
signals of bad performance of one or more banks are interpreted by depositors as valid in­
formation on the solvency of banks with similar characteristics (firm-specific contagion), 
or for the whole banking industry (industry specific or pure contagion). Pure contagion 
can be associated with sunspot equilibriums, unrelated to economic fundamentals and 
affecting depositors’ beliefs in a way tha t turns out to be self-fulfilling (as in Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983). Firm specific contagion is also known as information-based conta­
gion. In this case, when depositors receive a bad signal on the performance of a bank, 
they run on banks with similar characteristic (similar types of business or the same 
geographical area). This type of contagion may be related to macroeconomic shocks, 
for example, a downturn in the business cycle. When depositors receive information 
about an economic downturn affecting a specific sector, they withdraw their deposits 
from those banks tha t are perceived to have a higher exposure, thus precipitating a 
crisis. The credit channel, on the other hand, explains how the failure of a bank can 
spread through the web of linkages between banks in the interbank funding market, the 
payment system and markets for risk transfer.
In principle, contagion through the informational channel could be controlled via 
regulatory measures tha t restore depositors’ confidence (deposit insurance, regulation, 
or a lender of last resort). Contagion through the credit channel, on the other hand, 
requires the analysis of problems in the design of financial systems, which could be
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improved in order to prevent -  or ameliorate the consequences of -  a crisis. Because the 
safety net has already been discussed in section 1 .4 ,1 will concentrate here on contagion 
through the credit channel.
1.6.1 Interbank F unding M arkets
Based on the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) 
observe tha t without aggregate uncertainty and if each bank’s investment in the safe 
asset is publicly observable (capital requirements), an interbank market for loans can 
insure depositors against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Allen and Gale (2000b) build 
on this idea and develop a simple model of contagion through an interbank market 
for deposits in a multi-region economy (more specifically, four economic regions & la 
Diamond and Dybvig). Consumer types continue to be private information but this time 
7r, the fraction of impatient consumers, is modelled as a binomial random variable tha t 
takes values ttjj or itl (^ h  > ^ l ) with equal probability. W ithout aggregate uncertainty, 
and if the representative bank in each region has access to the same technologies, banks 
get full insurance against liquidity risk through cross deposit holdings.
The authors consider two perfectly correlated scenarios: if economy j  has a high 
demand -  7th  ~ in the first scenario, it has a low demand — 7r£, — in the second one 
and vice versa. They show tha t the optimal solution is achieved when every bank 
commits itself to satisfying average demand across scenarios, 7 r = — ~i and deposits 
the difference between the average and actual demand (t t h  — 7r =  7r — 717,) in the bank 
in the adjacent region.
They later introduce aggregate uncertainty, through a zero probability scenario in 
which every region but one faces the average demand. The remaining region, let say A, 
has an excess liquidity demand of size e > 0 (i.e. total demand in A equals 7r +  e). For 
any positive value of e, the whole economy faces a liquidity shortage and the redemption 
of cross deposit holdings only cancel each other, reducing the value of deposits in each 
cancellation. If e were large enough for A not to  be able to meet its obligations, even 
when liquidating all of its long-term assets, when the adjacent bank claimed its deposits 
it would receive less money than it needed and it would face a liquidity shortage as well. 
Hence, a second bank would be forced to liquidate part or all of its long-term assets, even 
though it was perfectly solvent in isolation. In this way, a liquidity shock in one region 
would generate a chain reaction tha t would extend from region to region. The authors 
conclude tha t connectedness is directly proportional to the risk of contagion, while 
completeness (understood as each bank holding cross deposits with all the other banks
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in the economy) is inversely proportional to this risk. When each bank is connected to 
all the others in the economy, all the economy has to cope with the excess demand shock 
but in a smaller proportion than a single bank would do. T hat is, each bank liquidates 
just a small fraction of its long-term assets, and therefore bankruptcy does not occur.
Although appealing, this model has a couple of shortcomings. For example, as 
all banks are essentially solvent, without an aggregate liquidity shock they would never 
fail. Moreover, if interbank deposits were senior to other claims, even under an aggregate 
liquidity shock there would be no contagion, no m atter whether a bank in zone A defaults 
or not.
These problems are a consequence of the common information assumption. Hence, 
as in section 1.2, a natural answer would be to introduce private information. Das- 
gupta (2002) extends Goldstein and Pauzner’s (2000) model to  a two region economy 
and explains contagion as a rational expectation equilibrium in a dynamic setting that, 
contrary to Allen and Gale’s (2000b) prediction, complete markets for interbank de­
posits cannot prevent. He considers two ex-ante identical economies, th a t in the interim 
period experience a negatively correlated, non-aggregate liquidity shock (nh  =  vr +  e, 
7Tl = ir - e ) .  The representative bank in each location insures against this shock by issu­
ing cross deposits of size 7r — t t l  at t = 0. Importantly, interbank deposits are assumed 
to be senior to depositors’ redemptions.
Two technologies are available during the planning period: a safe technology whose 
interest rate is normalised to zero; and a long-term, risky technology, whose return 
depends on a bank-specific fundamental value, 6 j , uniformly distributed in the interval 
[0,1]. Early liquidation is costly, as the technology returns only r < 1 if it is liquidated 
in the interim period.
In the interim period, nature decides which country’s patient depositors play first. 
After interbank claims settle, depositors in the selected bank, j , receive a private non- 
verifiable signal 0 j  = Qj +  £*• (where i stands for depositors, and £*• ^  U [ — e ,  e ]  i.i.d.) and 
choose their optimal strategy. Depositors demanding early withdrawals are paid out 
in this period, provided there are sufficient available resources. After observing region 
j 's  outcome, depositors in the other region, —j , also receive private signals and choose 
their actions. In the final period, interbank claims settle and then residual depositors’ 
claims in the two banks are paid out. Upper and lower dominance regions in each stage 
of the game ensure the existence of a monotonic equilibrium for each sub-game. The 
author proves tha t a unique monotone equilibrium exists for the complete game and, 
interestingly, contagion flows only from the debtor to the creditor bank. Formally, he
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proves tha t when a debtor bank fails, the region of fundamentals for which the creditor 
bank survives shrinks. Moreover, when cross deposit holdings are complete, contagion, 
far from being ruled out, increases with the size of the local liquidity shock (e).
A different approach is taken by Huang and Xu (2000). They describe an economy 
where a financial crisis can develop endogenously in an interbank market with informa­
tional asymmetries, where both liquidity and technological shocks are present. When 
financial institutions cannot commit themselves to the liquidation of bad projects, a 
negative externality affects the interbank market due to the reduction of the average 
portfolio quality of the participating banks. If the interbank market cannot distinguish 
between solvent and insolvent institutions, solvent banks may find it too expensive to 
borrow, so they prefer to liquidate their assets. Having withdrawn from the interbank 
market, the average portfolio quality is further reduced until the market finally collapses.
These authors consider an economy with four periods and M  ex-ante identical banks, 
comprising an interbank market for the trading of liquidity. Banks are risk neutral 
profit maximisers and they have no equity of their own. Instead, they choose to invest 
consumers’ deposits in projects offered to them by entrepreneurs, who have no capital 
to finance themselves. Liquidity risk is modelled, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
by the existence of two types of depositors. Impatient depositors consume at t =  1 and 
patient depositors consume at t = 3, the final period. They are all ex-ante identical 
and realise their type at t  = 1. Depositors’ types are private information, while the 
realisation of the random proportion of early consumers, 7r, is common knowledge.
The projects exhibit constant returns to scale, last for three periods and require a 
positive investment, I t , in every period. Projects can be good or bad. A good project has 
an ex-ante profitable return Y  in the final period and a bad project returns 0. Neither 
the banks nor the entrepreneurs know the type of the project when the investment 
decision is made. All tha t is known is tha t a fraction A of them are good, the remaining 
fraction (1 — A) are bad and the expected return of the pool of projects is positive: 
XY  +  (1 -  X)X - I 1 - I 2 - h > 0 .
By running a project, an entrepreneur learns its type at t = 1. If the project is good 
and it is financed, she receives a private benefit 63 at time t = 3, while the financing 
banks receive Y.  If the project is bad, she can either quit immediately, receiving 61, or 
she can hide this information until period 2, when the project’s type becomes public 
information. At t  = 2 banks have to consider whether to liquidate or to reorganise bad 
projects. If a bad project is liquidated, the entrepreneur receives b2 and the banks receive 
nothing. Reorganisation has a cost F.  If a bad project is reorganised, the entrepreneur
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receives 63 and banks receive a return X  > 0, which is ex-post profitable if F  is small 
enough, i.e. if I 3 + F  < X  < I 2 + I 3 . Private benefits are such tha t 0 <  62 <  &i < £3 < &3-
The commitment problem is introduced through the financing mechanism in opera­
tion. W ith a single-bank financing scheme (each project is financed by only one bank), 
reorganisation costs are negligible and bad projects are never stopped. The interbank 
market is then unable to distinguish among banks, as the only available information is 
the average quality of the pool of projects and they charge the same price for liquidity 
to every bank. Defining by Am the probability tha t an illiquid bank m  is financing a 
good project, and assuming Am >  Am_i for all m  = 1, ...,M , the average quality of the 
interbank market is A =  Ylm=i Let 7rm be the proportion of impatient consumers 
in bank m. If 7rm >  W (the average), the bank is illiquid and issues a bond contingent 
on the realisation of its project at date 3; returning 1 if the project is good and 0 if it is 
bad. The equilibrium bond price must equal the expected probability th a t the bond will 
pay out, tha t is A. Banks, having private information about their liquidity, withdraw 
from the interbank market if they face borrowing costs higher than premature liquida­
tion costs (assumed to be fixed and exogenous). The authors show tha t the marginal
A mborrowing cost is equal to so the higher the quality of the bank, the higher its bor-
A
rowing cost. As the more solvent banks are precisely those which first quit the market, 
the average quality of the pooled portfolio is reduced ( Am_i < Am) and borrowing costs 
increase. When more solvent illiquid banks quit, runs spread, eventually causing the 
collapse of the interbank market for liquidity.
W ith a multi-bank financing scheme (each project is financed by two banks) and 
if reorganisation costs are so high th a t bad projects are always liquidated, illiquid but 
solvent banks can always be differentiated from insolvent ones. Hence, solvent banks 
can obtain credit from the interbank market at a price lower than  the cost of asset 
liquidation. The authors prove tha t, in this scenario, a bank run only occurs when a 
bank faces both severe technological and liquidity shocks and, more interestingly, that 
contagion is always ruled out.
Giannetti (2001) provides another example of how contagion can arise in an eco­
nomy with close bank-firm relationships. Under incomplete information, international 
investors cannot distinguish among banks’ types, raising interest rates and precipitating 
the default of otherwise solvent banks. As borrowing costs become progressively higher, 
contagion spreads throughout the affected country and possibly to countries equally 
rated by international investors. His model considers three types of agents: a continuum 
of mass one of project managers, who have private information about the quality of their
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projects at t — 0; domestic banks, which at t =  1 realise the quality of the projects they 
finance; and international investors, who provide capital by making deposits in domestic 
banks. Projects can be of two types, fast or slow. Fast projects are perfectly solvent 
and are able to repay their loans in every period. Slow projects can be illiquid but 
solvent with positive probability; or insolvent, also with positive probability. At time t , 
international investors announce the minimum interest rate th a t they require to make 
deposits in domestic banks. Given this cost of funds, banks decide whether or not to  
renew the loans of the projects tha t they finance. If previous loans were repaid and 
a project is refinanced, the project manager appropriates net profits at t  +  1. If loans 
have not been repaid, the bank must decide between refinancing and appropriating the 
realised profits.
In this framework, the author shows that, in a small open economy with close bank- 
firm relationships, even if banks commit themselves to stopping bad projects (slow 
insolvent projects), the financial system may be subject to contagion. Incomplete in­
formation generates uniformly low interest rates when a lending boom starts. A later 
increase in interest rates makes insolvent banks default. Illiquid banks (those financing 
temporarily illiquid projects) do not default immediately -  sending a signal of their sol­
vency to the market -  but the temporary increase in interest rates may drive them into 
insolvency, causing their default after a few periods.
The two papers described above emphasise -  although in different fashions -  th a t 
the exposure of the banking sector to given sectors of the real economy, via close bank- 
firm relationships, creates informational problems that make interbank markets for loans 
operate inefficiently. In the first model, it was precisely the more solvent banks tha t 
were forced to quit the interbank market first. In that case, a discount window facility 
would be desirable to avoid the inefficient liquidation of assets. In the second model, 
however, it is not the premature liquidation of assets which makes banks insolvent but 
it is the rise in interest rates which turns illiquid banks into insolvent ones. Hence, the 
failure of the first banks is efficient -  because they are insolvent -  but, after they have 
left the market, an appropriate policy will be needed in order to protect solvent banks.
The gridlock of international interbank markets is explored by Freixas and Holthausen 
(2001), who show tha t with unsecured lending and if cross-country information is noisy, 
an equilibrium with integrated markets need not always exist; a phenomenon tha t could 
explain contagion. Their model involves an economy with two countries, each of them 
modelled a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), but with full deposit insurance, so tha t runs 
are not caused by liquidity shocks alone. Banks can invest in a safe storage asset, in
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government bills or in a long-term risky asset, paying R  > 1 with probability p > \  
(common knowledge at t = 0) and nothing otherwise. This technology is ex-ante effi­
cient (pR > 1) and it can be prematurely liquidated. In the interim period, each bank 
faces a specific shock to its demand deposits, represented by the proportion of impatient 
depositors, 7r, a binomial random variable taking values tth with probability q and ttl 
w ith probability 1 — q. Additionally, there can be country-wide aggregate shocks to de­
mand deposits, depending on the value of q, which is also a binomial random variable 
taking equiprobable values qi, <  qn- Solvency and liquidity shocks are assumed to be 
uncorrelated.
At t =  1, each bank is characterised by a pair of common, non-verifiable domestic 
and foreign signals, (s# , s f ), which can either be good or bad. There is no moral hazard 
because for simplicity the model assumes that banks cannot observe their own solvency 
but only their signals. Banks within a country receive an informative but non-verifiable 
common signal about the performance of their partners.15 Cross-country signals are 
assumed to  be noisy.16 Then, when a bank seeks liquidity in the foreign market this could 
be interpreted either as showing tha t the bank belongs to a liquidity short country, or 
th a t the bank has a bad signal at a domestic level and cannot borrow locally. Depending 
on the probability of these two events, an integrated interbank market may or may not 
exist. The authors show that integrated markets exist only for good levels of cross­
country information and significant liquidity differentials among regions. If not, due to 
persistent interest rate differentials, solvent banks in the liquidity short country may be 
excluded from the market and be forced into liquidation. They also observe that, while 
markets in government bills are efficient in channelling liquidity and reducing interest 
rate spreads, as loans in these instruments are collateralised, monitoring plays no role, 
allowing for inefficient survival.
Among the empirical work showing tha t interbank markets are an effective channel 
of contagion is Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), who test the importance of financial 
contagion through the bank lending channel relative to trade contagion, using data  on 
recent emerging market currency crises.17 They test the hypothesis th a t when banks 
compete intensively for funds from a “common lender” -  a bank highly exposed to a 
crisis country - , adjustments to correct exposure or capital adequacy ratios can lead to a 
reduction in the credit lines offered to other countries. They construct a comprehensive
15In the sense that prob(sD  =  good/R  =  R) — prob(sD =  bad/R  =  0) >  ^.
16In the sense that prob(sF =  g o o d /sd  =  good) =  prob(sF =  bad/sD  — bad) >  Thus, cross 
country signals are informative conditional on the domestic signal but not directly on the return of the 
technology.
17See section 1.3.2 for the connection between banking and currency crises.
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indicator of competition for bank funds, which proves to be robust to the inclusion 
of trade linkages in the regressions for the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises. This 
result is robust to the introduction of Markov switching regimes, which control for pure 
contagion (Fratzscher, 2000).
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) provide a theoretical model explaining contagion due 
to the existence of common lenders. They consider two regions and a continuum of mass 
one depositors, each endowed with 2 units of consumption in the planning period, who 
invest one unit in each location. The rest of the assumptions are the same as in the 
model described in section 1.2 (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2000). In the interim period, 
a signal in location j  is received first and depositors decide their actions. Knowing the 
outcome of their investment in tha t region, they receive a second signal, now on the bank 
in location — j,  and decide their strategies in tha t location. The authors prove that there 
exists a unique range of the fundamentals for the two regions, such th a t if a run occurs in 
the first location the other region fails too; and if the first location survives so does the 
second one. The occurrence of a banking crisis in one region raises the probability of a 
crisis unfolding in another investor-related country, as investors’ welfare is significantly 
reduced after the first run. This happens because, when two regions share the same 
international investors, correlations in investments emerge after one region has failed, 
despite the fact tha t their fundamentals are independent. Hence, a negative externality 
is generated: once an investor diversifies her portfolio, the benefits from diversification 
to other agents are reduced.
1.6.2 T he P aym en t S y stem
In order to make a payment, a payer needs to issue a paper-based (cheque) or electronic 
(plastic card) instruction to the bank where the money to be transferred is held, and 
then tha t bank proceeds to transfer the money to the bank where the payee’s account 
is. A payment system is an arrangement to facilitate these transfers (Latter, 1997).
Payment systems are essential for the efficient functioning of financial markets be­
cause they allow transactions to be completed safely and on time. They have become 
increasingly im portant during recent decades. For example, in 1990 Fedwire in the US 
processed 63 million transactions valued at $200 trillion, against 134 million transactions 
in 2006 valued at $573 trillion. Indeed, both the Fedwire in the US and the Sterling 
CHAPS in the UK, represented more than 4,000 times the countries’ GDP in 2006.18
Nonetheless, as they build on interbank relationships, payment systems can involve
18BIS, Payment System Statistics.
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significant exposure to risk for their members. Indeed, as transactions tend to have 
time-critical settlement deadlines, because they are part of a chain of transactions, a 
domino effect following the failure of a large bank might trigger a crisis.
The BIS19 classifies the risks in payment systems into four main categories:
1. Credit risk: the risk th a t a counterparty will not meet an obligation in full value, 
either when it is due or at any time thereafter.
2. Liquidity risk: the risk tha t a counterparty will not settle an obligation in full 
value when it is due but at some time thereafter.
3. Operational risk: the risk tha t hardware or software problems, human error or 
malicious attack will cause a system to break down or malfunction, giving room 
for financial exposures and possible losses.
4. Legal risk: the risk tha t unexpected interpretations of the law or legal uncertainty 
will leave the payment system, or some of its members, with unforeseen financial 
exposures and possible losses.
The first two types of risks are studied in a paper by Freixas and Parigi (1998). Using 
a cost-benefit analysis, they compare the two main types of large interbank payments 
systems, net and gross, with the aim of determining which one is better in terms of a 
safe and efficient use of liquidity. In gross systems, transactions are settled on a one- 
to-one basis in central bank money. Banks are not linked through intra-day credit but 
they need to hold large reserve balances in order to execute their payments. In net 
systems, intra-day credits are extended among banks, as positions are settled only at 
the end of the day. This exposes them to contagion risk, while significantly economising 
on liquidity.
Their model considers two island-economies a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), each 
with one risk neutral and perfectly competitive representative bank, with access to the 
same two technologies. The storage technology returns 1 unit of consumption per unit 
invested in the previous period. A riskless, perfectly liquid long-term technology returns 
R  > 1 at t = 2 per unit invested at t = 0. If a fraction a  is liquidated in the interim 
period, this technology returns a R  at t = 1 and the remaining (1 — a )R  a t t = 2 . As 
this model does not consider the costs of early liquidation, the only possible runs are 
speculative.
19 See Core Principles for Systematically Important Paym ents Systems, BIS (2000).
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Consumers cannot directly invest in these technologies, but they can invest their 
initial wealth in their own island’s bank. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), consumers 
are of two types, patient or impatient, and this is private information. The number 
of impatient consumers, 7r, is common knowledge. An additional source of uncertainty 
is introduced in this model, by allowing patient consumers to decide where (in which 
island) to consume in the final period. Payments across locations can be made by direct 
transfers of liquidity (patient consumers withdraw early and take their deposits with 
them  to the bank in the other island), or through claims against the bank in the other 
location. The first option models a gross payment system and the second a net payment 
system. A fraction 1 — (3 of patient consumers are “compulsive travellers”, meaning that 
they have to consume in the other island in the final period. The remaining fraction 
are llstrategic travellers” and they decide at t = 1 where to consume at t  = 2. As in 
this model the return of the long-term asset is deterministic, strategic travellers prefer 
to stay in their own island because by doing so they obtain a greater return (C2 > ci).
In a gross payment system, banks always need to liquidate a fraction of their invest­
ment to satisfy compulsive travellers’ excess demand. The implicit cost of this system 
is the foregone investment return, as liquidation occurs before the arrival of incoming 
travellers and then their deposits cannot be used to match those of leaving customers. 
Conversely, with a net payment system, banks are linked by a contract and they extend 
credit lines to each other to  finance the future consumption of travellers, without the 
need to liquidate assets. The obvious conclusion is tha t when returns are certain, a 
net settlement dominates a gross settlement. This result, though, is not robust to the 
introduction of uncertain returns.
Consider the case where the long-term return is random, being high (R  = R h ) with 
probability p n  and low (R  = R i)  with probability p l . Assume th a t these values satisfy 
R l  < 1 < R h  and p h R -h  +  P l R l  > 1, hence the expected return is ex-ante profitable. 
Also assume tha t at t  = 1 patient consumers receive fully revealing signals on the return 
of the risky asset, which are uncorrelated across islands. Then, as in the asymmetric 
information models in section 1.2, bank runs have a disciplinary role in closing insolvent 
institutions.
Ex-ante, both banks offer the same demand deposit contract. Strategic travellers 
have three possible actions: to wait (W) and consume in the same location, to travel 
(T) and consume in the other island, and to run on the bank (R) and take the money 
with them to whatever destination they choose. Clearly, compulsive travellers will always 
choose to run on the bank if strategic travellers decide to do so (as their set of strategies
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is a subset of the set of strategies of strategic travellers). When a high signal is observed, 
the optimal action for strategic travellers is to wait and for compulsive travellers to travel: 
(W,T). Conversely, if a low signal is observed in the native island, optimal strategies 
depend on the signal received about the other island bank’s return. If it is high, all the 
patient depositors will choose to travel (T,T); and if it is low, the best they can do will 
be to  run on the bank (R,R).
As in a gross payment system banks are not linked, they are not exposed to contagion 
but have to make intensive use of liquidity. In a net system, on the other hand, banks 
are exposed to contagion through intra-day credits. The authors prove tha t under the 
la tter scheme two equilibriums are possible:
i. A potential contagion equilibrium ((W,T) or (T,T)), which occurs if and only 
if the equilibrium expected payoff for strategic travellers in the low-signal bank 
exceeds tha t from running. Hence, although there are no runs, banks are exposed 
to contagion.
ii. A contagion-triggered bank run equilibrium (R,R), which occurs if consumers ra­
tionally anticipate the potential effect of contagion on future consumption and 
optimally decide to run on their banks.
The benefits from netting come from the possibility of raising investment in the risky 
technology, allowing travellers to share the higher expected return in the final period. 
Its costs, on the other hand, come from the inefficient survival of low signal banks. By 
comparing the costs and benefits of both systems, the authors conclude th a t a gross 
system should be preferred if the probability of low returns is high, the opportunity cost 
of holding reserves is low and the proportion of consumers tha t will go to consume in 
another allocation is low. Otherwise, a net system is dominant.
While a real time gross settlement system (RTGS) eliminates the risk of conta­
gion, when the central bank provides uncollateralised intraday liquidity to facilitate the 
process of settlement (as the Fed does) it also assumes credit risk. In the European 
Union, as a measure to control this source of risk, central banks are advised to take col­
lateral from members of the system in case of overdraft. A paper by Kahn and Roberds 
(2001), though, advises against this measure. They study the welfare cost of a RTGS 
system using a neoclassical monetary model and derive the cost of this system from the 
cash-in-advance constraints imposed by gross settlements. They show th a t the effect of 
these constraints can be undone if the central bank makes intra-day credit freely avai­
lable and that, if collateral is required against credit, a RTGS will continue to impose a
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liquidity cost.
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) extend their previous model to  N different lo­
cations, each with a representative bank and a continuum of consumers of mass one. 
The focus of this paper, though, is not on the comparison of different payment systems 
but on the study of the potential contagion equilibrium under different configurations 
of interbank markets for liquidity. All consumers are now assumed to be patient, con­
sequently uncertainty is not about when they consume but about where they consume. 
Let (3 E [0,1] be the proportion of traveller depositors (the same for every region), tha t 
is, those depositors in location j  who need to consume in location k ^  j  in the second 
period. This time the remaining fraction of depositors, non-travellers, always consume 
in their home location. To be able to  consume at location k , a traveller in j  can withdraw 
her money at t  —  1, carrying the cash to the following bank (hence losing higher returns 
in the long-term technology if the home bank were solvent), or transfer her deposits to 
region k , for which at t — 0 bank j  extended credit lines to other banks in the system. 
Deposits have a fixed contracted value in the first period (if banks are solvent) equal 
to ci but their value in the second period is endogenously determined in each location 
as an equal share of the remaining assets, assuming tha t all liabilities have the same 
priority in the final period. Finally, the risky technology is only available to banks,20 
it has a random return of Rj  in location j  if held until period 2, and pays r < 1 (the 
same for every region) if liquidated at t = 1. This assumption implies tha t the long-term 
technology is now partially illiquid. Rj  are publicly observable at t =  1 but not verifiable 
until t = 2 and can take only two values, R  > c\ or 0, both with positive probability.
The authors compare the stability of the payment system under two configurations, 
namely a “credit chain interbank funding”, where banks extend clockwise credit lines to 
the bank in the adjacent region;21 and “diversified lending”, where each bank extends 
credit lines of equal size to every other bank in the system. They find th a t when all 
banks are solvent (Rj > c\ for all j ), coordination failure leads to the existence of at least 
two equilibriums in pure strategies: a speculative gridlock equilibrium, where all banks 
are inefficiently liquidated; and a credit line equilibrium, for which the payment system 
works smoothly. The possibility of a speculative gridlock equilibrium justifies central 
bank intervention, as in tha t case all banks are solvent but illiquid. Indeed, credit lines 
guaranteed by the central authority need not be used in equilibrium, implying no cost
20 Which is effectively a participation constraint for consumers.
21 Thinking of the N locations ordered as in Salop’s (1979) circular city model. ( “Monopolistic Com­
petition with Outside Goods.” Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156).
50
for taxpayers.22 Then they move to  consider the case where only one bank is insolvent 
and use the minimum value of deposits in the final period as a measure of the exposure 
of the interbank system to market discipline. Using comparative statics analysis, they 
show tha t the system is more exposed to market discipline under diversified lending than 
under credit chains.
However, as in the model of Allen and Gale (2000b), these results might depend on 
the structure of information th a t depositors have. Indeed, if interbank claims were senior 
to deposits, it is not clear tha t contagion would ever be an equilibrium. If private signals 
on the returns of banks were introduced, while the speculative gridlock equilibrium 
might disappear (or at least shrink), the power of diversified lending to enforce market 
discipline and prevent contagion might also be reduced (see D asgupta’s (2002) model in 
section 1.6.1 and the discussion therein).
1.6 .3  D erivatives M arkets
Markets in risk transfer have been developed as a way of improving the stability and 
efficiency of the financial system. By reducing the concentration of exposure of banks 
and diversifying risk beyond their customer base these instruments should, at least in 
theory, make them less vulnerable to regional, industry specific or market shocks. Among 
the main risk transfer techniques which are used by banks are loan trading, portfolio 
securitisation and derivatives.
Derivatives are instruments which are designed to reduce costs, enhance returns 
and allow investors to hedge positions, exchanging future payments contingent upon 
the future behaviour of a specified variable. In derivatives markets, the taker of credit 
(or protection seller) compensates the counterparty (protection buyer) only when a 
particular “credit event” occurs.
Financial derivatives contracts can be divided into exchange traded and over-the- 
counter (OTC) contracts. Exchange traded contracts are highly standardised and there­
fore easy to trade with any counterparty. They have a low counterparty risk because 
every transaction is cleared via a clearing house (or special purpose vehicle), which takes 
collateral from the counterparties in order to insure its position (daily margining) and 
it is also responsible for the administration of closing out contracts and delivery proce­
dures. However, this comes at the cost of a higher exposure to market risk (compared
22 This property, that the LoLR needs not to be used in equilibrium, is a clear consequence of the 
assumptions of common knowledge and perfect information. As in the model of deposit insurance pro­
posed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), emergency liquidity assistance acts as a mechanism to coordinate 
depositors’ withdrawals, preventing the ‘bad’ equilibrium from occurring (see section 1.4.2).
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to O TC’s), as they do not always allow for a perfect hedge. OTCs, being mainly non­
standardised, better meet the needs of counterparties, but at the same time they expose 
them to higher liquidity and credit risks.
There are three main types of derivatives products, all of which can be standardised 
or non-standardised. These are futures contracts, under which both parties are obliged 
to conduct a transaction at a specified price and on an agreed date; swaps contracts, 
almost exclusively O TC’s, which can be seen as a subset of futures contracts involving 
the exchange of an asset or liability against another at a specified future date;23 and 
option contracts, where the holder has the right but not the obligation to require the 
other party to buy or to sell an underlying asset at the specified price and the agreed 
date. The typical underlying assets are short and long-term loans, foreign currencies and 
equities but more recently they have also included credit risk instruments. Although 
still small compared to  other markets,24 credit derivatives have grown exponentially, 
both in size and complexity, during recent years.25
However attractive, derivatives contracts in general and credit derivatives in par­
ticular open up possibilities for new and unexplored channels of contagion. Although 
under normal circumstances derivatives are more liquid than the underlying cash mar­
ket, without a market maker liquidity is often more easily lost in times of crisis. Indeed, 
the inherent leverage associated with derivative creation may encourage systemic risk 
when information is not available or is delayed. One recent example is the subprime cri­
sis, which started in the USA in 2007, but which spread liquidity and solvency concerns 
over financial institutions throughout the globe; not necessarily because of the direct 
exposure of these institutions to mortgages in this segment of credit, but because they 
held derivates and other complex financial instruments which were structured over these 
credits, whose total exposure to losses could not be easily valued.26
The degree of counterparty risk to which holders of derivatives instruments are ex­
posed to depends on the size of the exposure, the probability of the counterparty default­
ing and the recovery value in the event of default. This risk could be reduced through 
bilateral netting, collateralised margining, guarantees or letters of credit. However, all
23 More precisely, a swap requires exchanging cash flows, based on a notional principal, for a given 
period of time.
24 Outstanding notional amounts of credit derivatives in 2006 were close to US$30 trillion, compared 
to US$292 trillion in interest rate linked instruments.
25Credit derivatives include swaptions, credit default swaps (CDS), CDS index, synthetic collate­
ralised debt obligations (CDO) and credit linked notes (CLN), among others. Between 2004 and 2006 
alone, the notional amounts in CDS contracts were raised almost 5 times (from $6,396 billion to $28,828 
billion), according to BIS figures.
26 The European Central Bank, the New York Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of 
England and the Bank of Japan, are all known to have provided massive direct and indirect liquidity 
assistance to banks in the second half of 2007.
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of these procedures need to be legally enforceable. In the case of OTC derivatives, the 
legal and operational risks are higher, because usually there are no clearing houses for 
these instruments and legal documentation is not standardised. Indeed, when used for 
speculative purposes, derivatives can be very risky because of their high leverage ratio 
and also because their volatility is usually higher than th a t of the underlying instru­
ments. Examples of im portant losses due to fraud or the inappropriate management 
of derivatives are those experienced by the Orange County in the USA in 1994, and 
Barings Pic. and Sumitomo in 1995.27
According to figures from the British Bankers’ Association (2006),28 banks are the 
main players in credit derivatives markets, with a global participation close to  50 per­
cent. More im portant, there is a high concentration of outstanding contracts in a few 
institutions. In the US, for example, at the end of 2006, one single bank held 52 percent 
of those contracts (Echeverria and Opazo, 2007).
New regulation has been sought to control for the risks imposed by derivatives con­
tracts. The 1995 Windsor Declaration (a joint CFTC29/BIS effort, following the failure 
of Barings Pic.) called for greater transparency and cross border information sharing, 
especially regarding large exposures. The new European and BIS capital requirements 
have also tried to take into account market and credit risks, coming from on- and off- 
balance sheet operations, including derivatives.
However, not much work has been done, either theoretical or empirical, to model 
these specific markets. A step in tha t direction might be identifying net settlement 
systems with OTC contracts and gross systems with exchange traded derivatives, in the 
model of Freixas and Parigi (1998) (section 1.6.2), given their similarities in terms of their 
exposure to counterparty risk. In the case of derivatives, though, it is not clear how to 
define (and so compare) the costs of both contracts, an essential step in evaluating their 
relative level of stability. Another possibility would be to  include derivatives contracts 
in the model of Freixas and Holthausen (2001) (described in section 1.6.1), similarly 
to the way they introduced repo markets, in order to evaluate their effect on liquidity 
provision and market discipline.
27The Orange County, a district of California, reported losses of $1.6 billion on interest rate derivatives 
trading and declared bankruptcy in December 1994. Barings, a 223-year-old British merchant bank, 
reported $1 billion losses on equity futures trading on the Simex and Osaka exchanges. In March 1995, 
the bank was purchased by ING Bank for just £1. By the end of 1995, Sumitomo Corporation reported 
about $1.8 billion losses in commodity (cooper) derivatives trading, threatening the stability of US banks 
that had been involved in financing commodity activities.
28British Bankers’ Association (2006). “BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2006", BBA Enterprises Ltd. 
2006.
29 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in the USA.
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1.7 The International Lender of Last Resort
In the same way tha t the risk of contagion in a local economy serves as a justification for 
central banks’ intervention as a LoLR, fears of contagion across economies have given 
support to  the existence of an international lender of last resort.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were 11 as a resu lt o f  
the U N  M o n e ta ry  and F in an cia l C on feren ce ...in  Ju ly 1944 ? Pa rt  ° f  a concerted  effort 
to  finance the rebuilding o f E urope a fte r  the d eva sta tio n  o f  the W orld  W ar I I  and to  
save  the w orld  fro m  econom ic dep ressio n ” (Stiglitz, 2002). The establishment of these 
institutions involved a high degree of confidence in the effectiveness th a t the provision 
of international financial assistance to governments could have on the management of 
losses and risks. The proliferation of similar institutions, such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the Asian Development Bank and many other UN related organisations, are 
evidence of this.
Some authors observe such a close a relationship between international and local 
LoLRs, th a t policy analysis for the former is seen as a direct extension of the powers of 
local central banks. Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001), for example, compare the effectiveness 
of an international LoLR intervening in international financial markets to tha t of a local 
LoLR that uses its resources to back up a domestic safety net. An obvious difference 
between local central banks and an international lender of last resort, though, is that 
the latter has no real access to inflationary money creation and, indeed, the amount of 
liquidity assistance tha t it can provide is usually ex-ante limited by charter. For this 
reason, institutions like the IMF have chosen to act instead as a partial LoLR, in the hope 
tha t their intervention would alleviate the immediate liquidity pressures on borrower 
countries. This would be done by restoring the confidence of international investors, 
whose incentives to run would be reduced; and also through loan conditionality, which 
facilitates the implementation of domestic policies th a t private investors would favour, 
therefore encouraging greater private involvement.30
The idea tha t partial official assistance would promote a complementary involvement 
by the private sector has become known as the “ ca ta ly tic  effec t” of an international LoLR 
funding (most of the time this is associated specifically with IMF lending). However, 
recent empirical evidence (particularly after the collapse of Argentina in 2001-02) sug­
gests a limited effectiveness of the IM F’s catalytic effect. Indeed, rather the opposite 
effect has been observed, as emerging economies increasingly tend to depend on official
30These are what Hovaguimian (2003) calls the “lending” and “policy” channels, respectively.
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lending when market conditions turn  adverse (see Hovaguimian (2003) and Morris and 
Shin (2003) for a survey).
An empirical assessment of the effectiveness of catalytic finance is problematic, 
though, because of the endogeneity of the data. In particular, as was noticed by Morris 
and Shin (2003), comparisons should not focus on net outflows of capital after inter­
vention but on the effect tha t no intervention might have had. Using global games 
techniques, Morris and Shin (2003) build a model of currency crises caused by creditors’ 
coordination failure, to evaluate the effect of an official bailout on moral hazard and 
policy reform. In every period, a debtor country needs to raise funds in order to pay 
outstanding interest on long-term loans (normalised to  zero) and principal on maturing 
short-term debt (normalized to 1), unless short-term creditors decide to  rollover. The 
debtor country can raise funds in an amount 0, a normally distributed random variable, 
whose mean depends linearly on the value of the economy’s fundamentals and the level 
of adjustment effort (policy reform) by the government. A country is said to be funda­
mentally sound if it has enough funds to pay outstanding long-term debt (i.e., if 6  > 0). 
If short-term creditors decline to rollover, the country could be forced to default when 
it has no access to additional liquidity assistance.
After observing the debtor economy’s fundamentals and its level of effort, an interna­
tional LoLR publicly announce a liquidity assistance package for an amount m. Calling 
£ the proportion of short-term creditors who decline to rollover, the debtor country de­
faults if and only if 9 +  m < t. Defining correlated payoffs for the three players of this 
game (debtor country, short-term  creditors and the LoLR) and if the LoLR intervenes 
only when the fundamentals of the debtor country are sound {9 > 0), Morris and Shin 
(2003) prove tha t the success of catalytic finance depends strongly on the spillover effects 
of the LoLR assistance on the decisions of other players. In particular, catalytic finance 
succeeds only when the LoLR decision is a strategic complement both to policy reform 
in the debtor country and to rollover decisions by private creditors. Nonetheless, the 
“window of effectiveness” may be narrow. Over a range of the fundamentals where the 
LoLR lacks the commitment to tough intervention, debtors’ moral hazard (understood 
as a poor commitment to reform by borrower governments) may prevail.
A similar model, also making use of global games techniques, is presented by Corsetti 
et al. (2003). When evaluating the trade-off between official liquidity provision and 
debtors’ moral hazard, they also conclude tha t by introducing incentives for coordination 
among creditors’ expectations and, therefore, raising the number of creditors who are 
willing to extend new loans (or rollover maturing ones), an international LoLR can help
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to  prevent liquidity runs for any given level of fundamentals. In particular, when the 
LoLR becomes better informed, its signal to the market reduces the aggressiveness of 
private speculators, lowering the likelihood of a crisis in a way tha t reinforces government 
incentives to implement “desirable but costly” policies. Conversely, the inability to 
obtain these funds may discourage governments from undertaking reform.
The desirability of the conditionality (policy reform) imposed by the international 
LoLR is another point of conflict.31 The reader may notice the resemblance to the case 
of a local central bank imposing regulatory constraints in the banking system. At an 
international level, though, the problem goes far beyond the simple intrusion into the 
management of a private bank. Fiscal austerity measures are politically unpopular, seri­
ously undermining the commitment of governments to implement them, and even raising 
problems of “ownership” in policy reform. Indeed, it is not even clear th a t international 
creditors always support this conditionality, particularly when it involves rising interest 
rates, which weakens the banking sector and lowers the economy’s expected growth.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
Financial crises, whether stock market crashes, currency, or banking crises, have a nega­
tive impact on the growth and stability of the economies tha t experience them. Banking 
crises are particularly im portant because of the close links between the banking system 
and the productive sector of the real economy. This is especially relevant in emerging 
economies, where alternative markets are less developed, and recent episodes of financial 
distress have been more common.
Throughout this chapter I have analysed the causes of banking crises and the channels 
by which they can spread to the rest of the banking system. Four main groups of 
variables explaining the causes of banking crisis have been identified: macroeconomic 
instability, deficient supervision, inadequate management and operational risks. All of 
these may interact together in igniting or aggravating a crisis.
Models explaining the emergence of banks are intrinsically related to those explaining 
their failure, as it is precisely their ability to transform short-term safe deposits into 
long-term risky loans which justify both their existence and their continuous exposure 
to runs. Models of bank failure can be classified into sunspot and rational expectation 
equilibrium models. In the latter, depositors are able to evaluate the probability of a 
run before making their deposits.
31 See Stiglitz (2002) for a long critique of the policies followed by the IMF during the emerging market 
crisis in the late 1990s.
56
Bank runs are costly to society, not only because they dilute the resources of small 
and uninformed depositors but also because funds are cut off from productive projects, 
eventually reducing the growth path of an economy. For this reason, governments across 
the world have established a safety net for the banking system, consisting of a set of 
regulations and mechanisms designed to enforce an adequate level of risk-taking on 
banks and to increase the confidence of investors in times of distress. The more relevant 
components of the safety net, which are regulation, deposit insurance and the lender of 
last resort policy, were surveyed in this chapter.
The safety net also has a negative aspect, though, because the commitment to insure 
depositors or to bailout “too-big-to-fail” banks induces moral hazard, which in the end 
increases the risk of failure and so the probability of crises. Indeed, prudential regulation 
that does not take account of systemic risk-shifting could increase the risk of collective 
failure, as banks could raise the correlation of their investments in the hope of extracting 
greater regulatory subsidies when they are “too-many-to-fail” .
No analysis of the banking system would be complete without considering the effects 
that contagion has on financial stability. The empirical literature has shed light on the 
evidence of contagion and two main channels have been identified: the informational 
channel and the credit channel. The informational channel refers to situations where 
signals of bad performance of one or more banks are interpreted by depositors as valid 
information on the solvency of banks with similar characteristics, or for the banking 
industry as a whole. Contagion through this channel might be controlled by regulatory 
measures to restore depositors’ confidence, such as those included in the safety net. The 
credit channel, on the other hand, explains how the failure of a single bank can spread 
throughout the web of linkages developed in the interbank funding market, the payment 
system or derivatives markets. In this case, an analysis of the possible problems in the 
design of financial systems is required in order to prevent contagion.
Contagion in the interbank funding market for deposits and loans can arise due to the 
existence of asymmetric information problems, curtailing the access to credit of solvent 
banks, exposing creditor banks to the failure of borrower banks, or exposing borrower 
banks to changes in the welfare of a common creditor. For many models of contagion 
in the interbank markets for loans, asymmetric information arises from close bank-firm 
relationships. Solutions include multi-bank financing schemes and other mechanisms of 
information disclosure.
Contagion through the payment system is explained in models comparing two set­
tlement systems -  net and gross -  and using a cost-benefit analysis. The cost of net
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systems can be modelled by the risk of contagion and the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves. While diversified lending could reduce the risk of contagion in net systems, 
gross systems should be preferred when tha t risk is high because it eliminates the source 
of exposure.
Contagion through derivatives markets remains a largely unexplored area, mainly 
because of the opaqueness and complexity of these instruments. While these contracts 
are attractive because of their off-balance sheet nature, they open up new possibilities 
for contagion, which have only recently begun to be addressed by regulators and tested 
by markets.
In the same way tha t the propagation of a crisis among banks in a local economy 
serves as a justification for central bank intervention as a lender of last resort, fears 
of contagion across economies have given support to the existence of an international 
lender of last resort. An international lender of last resort, however, cannot commit 
itself to unlimited liquidity assistance, as a central bank in theory could do. The idea 
tha t partial official assistance will promote a complementary involvement by the private 
sector has become known as the “catalytic effect” of international funding. Its window 
of effectiveness, though, may be limited, both by the willingness of borrowing govern­
ments to embrace policy reform and the rollover decisions of private creditors. The 
desirability of the reforms imposed by an international lender of last resort is a point of 
conflict in itself. Unpopular economic measures seriously undermine the commitment 
of governments to implement them and it is not even clear tha t international creditors 
always support them.
Much research is still needed in the area of banking, regulation and contagion. 
Sunspot equilibrium models, which are popular because of their tractability, have limited 
capability for use in the analysis of policy design, as a relevant set of players (deposi­
tors) is neglected. For example, models of deposit insurance have concentrated on the 
effect tha t non-risk adjusted premiums have on moral hazard, more than on the direct 
implications tha t the introduction of these types of contracts have on the equilibrium 
behaviour of depositors and banks. The following chapter will return to this point, in­
troducing deposit insurance in a model of information-based bank runs (Goldstein and 
Pauzner, 2000). I will show tha t pure panic based runs could persist when deposits are 
insured and th a t the effect of insurance on moral hazard is proportional to the size of 
the guarantee. Considerations of a lender of last resort and closure policies to limit the 
probability of panic runs and regulation designed to control moral hazard will also be 
addressed.
58
Chapter 2
D eposit Insurance and the Risk  
of Runs
2.1 Introduction
Bank runs cause real economic problems. General activity typically declines substan­
tially during panic runs, as the payment system is suspended and productive investment 
is halted by the unwillingness to make new loans.
Panics runs were fairly common in the United States during the National Banking 
Era (1864-1913) (Miron, 1986). Many authors and policymakers regard the introduction 
of deposit insurance and regulation during the 1930s as one of the main causes of the 
decrease in the rate of bank failures in tha t country (Williamson, 1995).1 Although this 
measures were not im itated outside the USA until the 1960s (initially in India and later 
in Europe), escalating banking crises and concerns over financial stability and consumer 
protection led in the 1980s to the widespread establishment of explicit limited deposit 
guarantees.2
Nevertheless, experience has demonstrated th a t limited insurance is not sufficient to 
protect banks from runs in a weakened financial system. In the past two decades, at 
least twelve countries (Ecuador, Finland, Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Thailand and Turkey) have temporarily extended explicit
1The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was created in 1933 to guarantee checking and 
saving accounts in member institutions. Before its introduction, suspension of convertibility was a 
common practice which generated a strong pressure for monetary and banking reform (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963). Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that the most important reform that followed was 
government deposit insurance.
2 In a survey conducted by the IMF and the World Bank among 85 different systems of deposit 
insurance, 67 countries were offering an explicit and limited deposit guarantee in normal times, with 
varying types of funding (ex-ante, ex-post), membership (compulsory in all but seven countries) and 
mandate across economies (see Demirgug-Kunt and Sobaci, 2000).
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full coverage during times of serious financial distress. Some of them did not even have 
an explicit system of deposit insurance before their crises.3
The success of blanket guarantees in stopping bank runs has been mixed. Funding 
constraints and macroeconomic stability appear to be key limitations to their effective­
ness. In Norway, for example, runs on the banking system started in March 1988, after 
a small commercial bank issued an earnings report warning th a t it had lost all its equity. 
At tha t time, the government had no program for shoring up the capital of troubled 
banks, nor did it sponsor any form of deposit insurance. But the banking industry 
managed its own deposit insurance system -  the Commercial Bank Guarantee Fund 
(CBGF) -  tha t injected capital into troubled banks to  cover depositors’ claims, under 
the guidance of the public Banking, Insurance, and Securities Commission (BISC). By 
the spring of 1990, capital injections from the CBGF and consolidations proposed by 
the BISC appeared to suppress the outbreak of banking insolvency. However, after the 
failure of the three largest banks nearly depleted the capital of the private insurance 
fund, runs were out of control and the government was forced to establish a public in­
surance fund, which controlled about 85 percent of commercial bank assets by the end 
of 1991 (Ongena et al, 2000).
A blanket guarantee was also introduced in Ecuador in December 1999, after runs 
in the largest bank of the country started to spread to other banks. Deposits were 
withdrawn from all banks (those perceived as weak suffering more than banks perceived 
as strong) to be put into US dollars, which were held mainly in cash or transferred 
offshore, despite the guarantee. After a long and painful process of deposit freezing , and 
an international audit process which ended with the State taking over three large banks 
and closing down several others, the blanket guarantee still in place worked for a time, 
until the authorities decided to default on the external debt and unilaterally reschedule 
the domestic debt. It then became clear tha t it would be very difficult to pay the debt 
accumulated to guaranteed depositors from closed banks, plus tha t used to save the 
banks taken over by the State. This prompted a three-pronged debt/currency/banking 
crisis, which no deposit guarantee could have stopped.4
Although deposit insurance is a popular tool among policymakers, even partial pro­
3 Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
4 Several other examples could be mentioned. In Dominican Republic, although the authorities had 
an explicit limited deposit insurance, they decided to guarantee all deposits of one large bank upon its 
intervention in April 2003. However, the bank was not closed and lost over a half of its deposits in 
two weeks. Another example can be found in Uruguay in 2002. After a few banks had their licences 
suspended, depositors in those banks did not receive any protection, but the remaining domestic banks 
got an unlimited guarantee placed on their sight and savings accounts (but not on time deposits). While 
this stopped runs initially, it did not halt them completely and there were subsequent runs. The author 
thanks Steven Seelig, of the IMF’s Systemic Issues Division, for these useful examples.
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tection is a controversial issue among economists. Many authors agree tha t deposit 
insurance is a source of moral hazard, tha t by reducing the incentives of depositors to 
monitor their banks it damages financial stability by encouraging risk-taking. Deposit 
insurance can indeed be very costly, tha t cost being typically born by taxpayers. For 
example, the USA Savings and Loan Crises (1986-1995), the most intense series of insti­
tutional failures in the USA since the 1930s, involved a loss of US$153 billion, of which 
US$124 billion were borne by US taxpayers. Deposit insurance is said to have been 
critical in this case. In the 1980s, the insurance limit was raised from US$40,000 to 
US$100,000 (the current limit), encouraging depositors to continue funding an already 
risky industry (which was reflected on raising interest rates). According to Jameson 
(2003), however, deposit insurance alone was not responsible for this collapse, as loose 
regulation on Savings and Loans activity meant tha t institutions were able to use these 
new funds to gamble their way into profit.5
A successful guarantee must then be accompanied by efficient regulation in order to 
prevent the negative effect of moral hazard on financial stability. In an empirical work 
Demirgug-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) find tha t explicit deposit insurance increases 
the vulnerability of the banking system, particularly when the coverage is more exten­
sive, as its presence tends to make economies more vulnerable to rises in real interest 
rates, exchange rate depreciation and to runs triggered by currency crises.6 However, 
good institutions (used as an estimate of a good regulatory environment) perform an 
im portant role in curbing this negative effect.7
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) were the first to propose deposit insurance as a me­
chanism to stop inefficient runs on solvent banks, in a model with perfect information 
and deterministic returns. Runs in this multiple equilibrium model are a consequence of 
coordination failure among depositors and tu rn  out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. W ith 
the introduction of insurance the “bad” sunspot equilibrium (runs) is always eliminated, 
and the policy becomes costless as it is never used in equilibrium. Since then, and 
despite the limited predictive capability of this model, authors have taken for granted 
the power of deposit insurance as an instrument for eliminating inefficient runs, and
5 Another well known example is the rescue of Credit Lyonnais in France. In November 1992, when 
the bank had become seriously insolvent, the Minister of Finance promised the savings of the bank’s 
8 million depositors would be safe. By 1997, this promise had cost taxpayers about US$17 billion -  
unofficial estimates refer to losses in the rank of US$20 to US$30 billion. But in this case again, losses 
mounted well before full protection was in place, due to severe mismanagement and poor regulation by 
the authorities.
6 Deposit insurance usually guarantees only the domestic value of deposits.
7The authors use a series of indexes, measuring different aspects of the institutional environment 
of a country, that may be positively correlated with the quality of regulation. These indexes include: 
the degree to which the rule of law prevails, the quality of contract enforcement, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the extent of bureaucratic delay and the degree of corruption.
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have concentrated instead on studying the problem of pricing of insurance and its effect 
on banks’ moral hazard (for a survey on this subject see section 1.4.2 in the previous 
chapter).
This chapter will come back to the study of the effects tha t deposit insurance has on 
the equilibrium behaviour of depositors and banks, while abstracting from the problem 
of insurance pricing. In particular, I want to consider whether the empirical findings 
described above can be supported by this model. I will consider Goldstein and Pauzner’s 
(2000) model of information-based bank runs, where private information allows for a 
unique equilibrium. I will show th a t while consumers achieve better risk-sharing in 
a competitive banking system than in autarky, more solvent projects are liquidated 
as uninsured depositors fail to coordinate in a subset of fundamentals, and run on 
banks they know to be solvent. When introducing deposit insurance, I show tha t its 
effectiveness in eliminating panic runs varies with the size of coverage and the degree of 
supervisory involvement of the agency in charge of insurance. Under a narrow mandate 
(when the agency is not involved in the supervision of banks), a deposit insurance 
contract preserving the monitoring role of depositors involves offering less than full 
protection. The trade-off is th a t panic runs cannot be completely eliminated with a 
partial guarantee, although it does reduce the region of fundamentals for which that 
occurs. Under a broad mandate (with a high degree of supervisory involvement), I 
show tha t panic runs tend to disappear for any level of insurance as the regulator’s 
signal becomes more precise, given tha t liquidity assistance is committed to  solvent but 
illiquid banks. Moreover, it is cost efficient never to provide liquidity to insolvent banks. 
However, only extremely insolvent banks are closed, and those with enough funds to 
cover the payment of the final period guarantee are allowed to continue in operation. 
Therefore, the smaller the protection offered to depositors, the higher is forbearance. All 
these results hold, irrespective of the specific values of the guarantee, which in particular 
might imply the social cost of deposit insurance to be lower under a broad mandate. 
Finally, I show tha t deposit insurance increases the equilibrium value of the demand 
deposit contract in the interim period and so the probability of runs, at least for high 
levels of the guarantee, but this effect seems also to be smaller under a broad mandate. 
Limited insurance can contain this externality to some extent, justifying the observed 
conduct of governments across the world in normal times.
Given the combination of these results and the empirical evidence provided by other 
authors, this chapter concludes th a t a preferable scheme would be one in which the 
agency in charge of insurance has more supervisory involvement (broad mandate) or a
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high degree of coordination with the supervisory authority.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the benchmark model of 
information-based deposit runs, as developed by Goldstein and Pauzner (2000). Deposit 
insurance is justified because of the inefficient liquidation of solvent banks in equilibrium. 
Section 2.3 introduces deposit insurance under two possible mandates for the insurer. 
The equilibrium under a narrow mandate is discussed in section 2.4, and tha t under 
a broad mandate, in section 2.5. Section 2.6 compares the optimal demand deposit 
contracts offered under the two mandates. Policy implication and possible extensions 
are discussed in section 2.7. Finally, conclusions are given in section 2.8.
2.2 A M odel o f Information-based Bank Runs
One of the simpler and better known models explaining the inherent fragility asso­
ciated with the banking system belongs to Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The maturity 
mismatch between long-term loans financed with short-term deposits exposes banks to 
the risk of runs. Crucially, public information on the quality of a bank’s investment 
portfolio leads to multiple equilibria, one of which involves coordination failure among 
depositors, who run on a solvent bank solely because they fear other depositors will do 
the same. As a result, the probability of runs is undetermined in this model, seriously 
limiting its usefulness as an instrument to evaluate policies designed to reduce banking 
fragility.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) modify this model, using global games’ techniques.8 
By replacing common knowledge on the bank’s fundamentals by noisy private signals 
received by depositors, a unique equilibrium emerges in which fundamentals act as a 
mechanism to coordinate agents’ beliefs towards a more efficient outcome.
Consider an economy with three periods t £ {0, 1, 2} and a perfectly competitive 
banking industry, where all banks have access to the same two investment technologies 
at the planning period (t = 0). Banks are risk neutral and decide whether to invest in 
a liquid technology, returning 1 unit of consumption at t + 1  per unit invested at £; or 
in a stochastic, long-term, partially illiquid technology, returning 1 if liquidated in the 
interim period (t = 1), and R  if liquidated at t  = 2. The long-term return function, 
R  = R(9 ), is a continuous and increasing function of a random variable 6 , uniformly 
distributed in the interval [0, 1], tha t represents underlying fundamentals of the projects
8 Global games, first studied by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), are games of incomplete information 
where players observe noisy signals of an uncertain underlying economic state or fundamental, which 
determines the payoffs of the game. For a review of the theory see Morris and Shin (2002).
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financed by a bank. After receiving deposits, banks decide which project to invest in. 
Assuming tha t E[R(6)] > 1, investment in the risky project is superior to  storage and, 
therefore, all resources are pulled on it. Because the zero profit condition implies all 
banks will offer exactly the same contract, it is possible to restrict the analysis to one 
representative bank.9
A continuum of mass one consumers receive 1 unit of endowment -  let us say money 
-  at t = 0, tha t they invest in the representative bank which offers a demand deposit 
contract (ci, C2 ) . 10 Depositors are risk averse, with preferences represented by a concave 
and increasing utility function, u(ci,C2), with coefficient of relative risk aversion higher 
than 1. Depositors are uncertain about their time of consumption. W ith probability 
1 — 7r a depositor is patient, meaning she enjoys consumption only at t = 2. W ith com­
plementary probability, 7r, she is impatient and consumes only in the interim period.11 
At t = 1, types are privately realised and all impatient depositors withdraw to consume, 
whereas patient depositors evaluate the expected payoff at the final period, conditional 
on their belief in the response of their counterparts, and decide whether to withdraw or 
to remain.
Let n  be the total number of withdrawals at t  = 1, so n — ir is the number of patient 
depositors withdrawing in the interim period (n E [7r, 1]). If n > 1 /ci, the bank does 
not have enough resources to pay the promised value of deposits, ci, and it is liquidated. 
Thus, each consumer demanding early withdrawal receives 1 /n  and those waiting until 
the second period receive 0. On the other hand, if n  < 1/ci, the bank survives to the 
final period and all depositors demanding early withdrawal receive ci. For simplicity, 
assume tha t the bank is always liquidated at t =  2 and, because there was no equity
in the initial period, remaining customers equally share the value of final assets, i.e.
(1 -n c i)R (0 )  12 
C2(g’") =  (1 — n) •
Naturally, 1 < c\ < 1/-7T, otherwise depositors would prefer not to invest in the bank
(first inequality), or runs would be triggered by the demand of impatient depositors 
alone (second inequality).
9 By assuming that depositors cannot invest in more than one bank, the contract that one bank offers 
does not affect the payoffs of depositors on a different bank.
10 Every bank in this economy is ex-ante identical, therefore it is possible to normalise the size of the 
representative bank to 1 (there is no equity at t  =  0). Limiting the analysis to demand deposit contracts 
is a standard assumption in the literature, not restrictive, because these contracts are effectively observed 
in banks. This assumption, however, implies that this model does not solve for the optimal contractual 
form. For a justification of the use of demand deposit contracts see “A Remark about Demand Deposit 
Contracts” in chapter 1.
11 With no discounting, the utility of impatient agents is u(c\,C2) =  w(ci), while that of patient 
depositors is simply u(ci, C2) — u(c2).
12 This simplification becomes natural under the assumption of perfect competition in an economy 
with a finite planning horizon. In practical terms, it means that in the end the bank actually behaves 
as a mutual fund.
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Patient depositors’ payoffs are summarised in the following table:
n < 1/c i n > 1/c i
t = 1 ci 1 fn
t = 2 c2(0,n) 0
TABLE 2.1: Patient depositors’ payoffs in the game without insurance.
At the beginning of period 1, each depositor receives a private, non-verifiable signal 
on the true value of the fundamentals, 0; =  0 +  where e* are i.i.d. random variables, 
uniformly distributed in the interval [—£, s\. This distributional assumption implies tha t 
signals are equally informative among depositors.13
If a consumer were sure tha t 6  < 6 l  -  where 9 l  is defined as the solution to 
02 (0L)7r) =  ci - 14 withdrawal would be a strictly dominant strategy, irrespective of 
the value of n  (see table 2.1). In the present model, a consumer knows th a t 9 < 9 l  if 
her signal satisfies 9i <  9 l — e , and every consumer receive signals below this level if 
9 < 9 l — 2e. Hence, the interval [0, 9 l — 2s] is the lower dominance region, where all 
patient depositors withdraw independent of the actions of other players. On the other 
hand, if a consumer were sure th a t 9 = 1, she would know the bank’s return to be a t its 
highest possible level and, therefore, she should prefer to remain. By continuity of the 
payoff function, there exists 9 j j  such tha t if 9i > 9u +  e a patient depositor remains, and 
every consumer receive signals above this level if 9 > 9u +  2e. The interval [ 9 j j  +  2e, 1] 
is the upper dominance region, where patient depositors always remain.15
Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) concentrate on “equilibrium on switching strategies’’, 
th a t is, an equilibrium in monotone strategies with threshold 9*, such th a t if 9{ < 9
13 The uniform distributional assumption is consistent with the Laplacian “principle of insufficient 
reason” -th at one should apply a uniform prior to unknown events-, because it implies that around the 
switching point the number of agents remaining or withdrawing are uniformly distributed. Away from 
the switching point the density of n is not uniform (n  has two atoms of probability in {7r, 1}), but the 
strategy motivated by this belief coincides with the equilibrium action. The Laplacian action  turns out 
to be an approximate optimal action in many binary action games. Indeed, as long as the payoff of a 
dominant action is increasing in the true value of the fundamentals (action monotonicity), Morris and 
Shin (2002) show that this action coincides with the equilibrium action. Action monotonicity is satisfied 
by the payoffs of the present model.
14An incentive compatible constraint for patient depositors to wait to the second period is that, at 
least for n  =  ir, E  [ u  (c2 (0 ,7r))] >  u (ci) which, given that the utility function is concave and increasing, 
implies E  [02(6 , 7r)] >  c\. As for very low realizations of 0, 0 2 (0 , 7r) <  ci, there must exist 0 =  Ol such 
that C2 (#l,7t) =  c\.
15 The existence of the upper dominance region is not directly implied by the payoff structure of the 
game, as it was in the case of the lower dominance region. If the signal is very high, patient depositors 
remain, provided that other depositors wait as well and enough of them for the long-term technology not 
to be completely liquidated in the interim period. Alternative explanations could justify this behaviour. 
For example, Dasgupta (2002) proposes that when very high returns are guaranteed, a bank becomes 
an attractive target for potential purchase by a larger, more liquid bank, which would make it optimal 
for patient depositors to wait. Alternatively, for very high signal banks the supervisory authority could 
be willing to act as a Lender of Last Resort (LoLR, an explanation that will become natural later on, 
when studying the case with insurance under a broad mandate), rescuing a solvent bank when facing a 
liquidity shock. Anticipating that, patient depositors should remain.
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patient depositors withdraw, and remain if 9i >  0 . Indeed, this type of solution turns 
out to be the only equilibrium of the game.16
After receiving a signal 6 i , depositor i  knows th a t the true value of 6  lies in the 
interval [max {0* — e, 0} , min {0* +  e, 1}]. W ith incomplete information, depositors must 
condition their beliefs upon their private signals, which are positively correlated with the 
private signals of others. W ith every patient depositor following the same equilibrium 
strategy, a consumer rationally anticipates th a t if Vi 0* < 0*, everybody will withdraw. 
This will be the case for values of 0 < 0* — s. In the same way, a consumer knows that 
all patient depositors will wait if Vi 0j >  0*, which is always the case if 0 > 9* +  s. 
Finally, in the intermediate region, because of the uniform distributional assumption on 
Si, a rational player will assign a uniform distribution to her beliefs on the number of 
patient depositors withdrawing early. Hence, when the equilibrium threshold is 0*, the 
number of early withdrawals, n, will be given by the following non-increasing function 
of 0 (figure 2-1):17
n (0, 0*) =  <
1 i f  9  <  9 *  -  e
1 +  7r (1 — 7 r )  (0 — 9 * )
i f  9 *  — e < 9 < 9 *  + £ (2.1)2e
7T i f  9  >  9 *  + £
In deciding whether to withdraw or to remain, a depositor must evaluate the (con­
ditional) expected utility of these two actions. Denoting by 8 ( 9 , 9 * )  the difference of 
utilities between waiting until t  = 2 and withdrawing at t  =  1 :
8 ( 9 , 9 * )  =  8 ( 9 ,  n (0 ,9 * ) )  = <
u (c2(9,n)) -  u(c{) if n (0 ,0*) < 1/c i 
u(0) — u ( l /n )  if n (0, 0*) > 1/c i
each consumer evaluates:
16 The usual argument to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium builds on the property of strategic com­
plementarity: that the payoff of an agent choosing a determined action is non-decreasing in the number 
of other agents choosing the same action. For games satisfying this property, Carlsson and van Damme 
(1993) and Morris and Shin (2002) demonstrate the existence of a unique strategy profile surviving the 
iterated deletion of dominated strategies (strategy dominance solvability). Nevertheless, this property is 
not satisfied for the present game, as in the region where banks fail (n >  1 /c i) , the payoff of a depositor 
who runs is decreasing in the number of other depositors running. In fact, in this region, actions are 
strategic substitutes. Making strong use of the uniform distributional assumption on the noise, Golds­
tein and Pauzner (2000) show that for any feasible belief n{9), the regions where A(9i,n(9)) <  0 and 
A(0i, n(9)) >  0 are complementary connected intervals, and therefore any equilibrium of the game must 
be monotone. Dasgupta (2002) extends this result to general distributional assumptions on n(9), and 
shows that, for this game, there are no non-monotone equilibria in the set of all feasible beliefs over the 
actions of other agents.
17For n(9,9*) to be well defined, it has to be consistent with the beliefs implied by the existence of 
the dominance regions. If 9 <  9 l  — 2e, everybody will receive signals in the lower dominance region and 
n should be equal to 1. Hence, consistency will require that 9 l  — 2e <  9* — e or simply that 9 l  — £ <  9*. 
Similarly, if 9 >  9u +  2e everybody will receive signals in the upper dominance region and n should be 
equal to 7r. Therefore consistency will require 9* < 9u + £■
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0i+£
This means that upon receiving a signal 9i, if a patient depositor’s conditional ex­
pected utility of remaining is higher than the utility of withdrawing, tha t is if 
A (6i, 9*) > 0, she will wait to withdraw in the final period. Otherwise, if A(0j, 9*) < 0, 
she will quit the bank at t  =  1. Finally, if A (0^,0*) =  0 a depositor will be indifferent 
between the two actions.
T h e o re m  1 (G o ld s te in  a n d  P a u z n e r , 2000) There exists a unique equilibrium thre­
shold 9* in the interval ]9l — e,9jj +  e[ satisfying A(0*,0*) =  0, A (0^,0*) < 0 for all 
9i <  0*, and A(0i,0*) > 0 for all 9i > 9*. Moreover, 9*{c\ ) is increasing on c\.
The equilibrium threshold can be computed as the solution to 18
1/ci 1/ci 1
The existence of the equilibrium comes from the continuity of A(0i,0*) in both 
arguments, the dominance regions, and the monotonicity of A {9i,9f) as a function of 
one variable (see Appendix). That 0*(ci) is increasing on c\ can be intuitively justified. 
If the payment in the interim period increases, more of the risky project has to be 
liquidated to pay early withdrawals. Therefore, the incentive for patient depositors to 
wait should decrease, both because the expected payoff a t t = 2 is lower, and because
each agent assigns a higher probability to the event of a run.
Proposition 2 The probability of a bank run is equal to 9* + ——— (1 +  7r — — V  and
1  -  7T V ci J
it is increasing on the level of risk-sharing offered by the demand deposit contract (c\).
Proof. For any feasible value of c\, there exists a unique equilibrium threshold 0*(ci) 
and, therefore, the function determining the number of early withdrawals, n (0, 0*(ci)),
18Using 6{n) = 6* +  ——— (1 + 7r — 2n), the inverse function of n(6, 0*) in the region [9* — e, 6* +  e]1 — 7T
to change variables, and rearranging terms:
7r 7T 1/ci
(2 .2)
1 / c i 7T
67
is also uniquely defined. A bank goes bankrupt if and only if depositors run on the bank
tha t n (0(ci), 0*(ci)) =  1/c i.
As n  is strictly decreasing on 9 in the region [i0*(ci) — e, 9*(ci) +  e] (or equivalently, for
A higher c\ represents a gain in risk-sharing, as more resources from the final period 
are passed to early consumers. However, it also implies an increase in the probability of 
runs. Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) prove tha t c\ >  1 provided th a t the probability of 
R(9) <  1 is small enough.
2.2 .1  Inefficient L iquidation
Private information allows for the coordination of depositors’ actions, in such a way that 
bank runs are avoided for sufficiently high values of the fundamentals (when 9 > 9* +  e). 
A natural question is then whether the equilibrium behaviour of depositors is desirable 
in terms of financial stability. Is it possible tha t panic runs persist for a region of the 
fundamentals, such tha t solvent banks can be liquidated? I will show in this section 
that depositors will still fail to coordinate in a subset of the fundamentals, and run on 
banks they know to be solvent.
Assume for a moment tha t both the safe and risky technologies are available to 
depositors for direct investment at t = 0. Also assume tha t E[u(R(9))] > u( 1), so tha t 
depositors invest all their resources in the long-term risky project. At t — 1 all impatient 
depositors withdraw. Suppose tha t patient depositors still receive private signals. Risk 
aversion implies tha t if Eoi [u{R{9))] < u (l)  they should liquidate the project at t = 1, 
while if Eoi [u(R(9))] > u ( l)  they should hold it to the final period. Thus, in autarky, 
if a consumer evaluates the project to be solvent she should wait and withdraw in the 
final period.
19Because $ l  — £ <  6* and 2e < 9 l  => £ <  9*. On the other hand, 6* <  9u +  £ and 9u <  1 — 2e => 
9* <  1 - e .
in the interim period, tha t is, if and only if n > \ /c \ .  Define by 9{c\) the value of 9 such
values of n  in between 7r and 1), n(9,9*(ci)) > l / c \  if and only if 9 < 9(c\) (see figure 
2-1). Therefore, prob{n > 1 /c i} =  prob^9 < = 9(ci), given tha t 9 is uniformly
distributed in [0,1]. Using the inverse function of n{9,9*(c.\)),
1  —  7T \  C l  J
2 —
Notice tha t 1 +  7r  < 1  —  7r (see figure 2-1), therefore 0 < 9 * — £ < 9 < 9 *  +  e < 1 ,
ci
and the probability is well defined and non-degenerated.19 Finally, it increases in c\
because
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In an intermediated system, both the definition of solvency and the behaviour of 
depositors will clearly depend on the promised value of deposits a t t =  1.
Definition 3 When a bank offers a demand deposit contract paying c\ > 1 in the in­
terim period, the bank is said to be fu n d a m e n ta lly  so lven t i f  C2 {0 ,n ) > c\, that is, if
9 >  eL.20
A bank is fundamentally solvent if when only impatient consumers withdraw, the 
payoff at t  = 2 is at least as good as the maximum certain payoff at t  = 1. According 
to this definition, solvency is a property tha t cannot be verified in the interim period. 
No player in this game (not even the bank itself) is able to observe the true value of 9 
until t =  2. However, depositors observing signals 9 i>  9 l  + £ can be sure that the bank 
is solvent. Hence, if 9 > 6 l  +  2s, everybody receive signals above 9 l  +  £ and all patient 
depositors know the bank is solvent. Is it then possible for solvent banks to go bankrupt 
in this model? Or put differently, is it possible tha t in equilibrium 9* — s > 9 l  +  2s, so 
that for certain values of 9 all depositors run on a solvent bank?
Notice tha t if c\ =  1, the solvency criteria would be the same as in autarky, and 
if s —► 0 there would be no pure panic runs in equilibrium. Taking limit when s —> 0 
in equation 2.2, we obtain u(R(9*)) = u( 1), which implies th a t 0*(1) =  9j,(l). That is, 
when the noise is negligible and the contract offers the value of liquidation of the project 
at t = 1, pure panic runs are eliminated (indeed, even if the noise were not negligible, 
partial runs do not occur because Vs > 0, 0(1) =  0*(1) —s). However, as no risk-sharing 
is offered, this contract does not improve on the autarkic solution.
For the case c\ > 1, take limit as s goes to zero in equation 2.2:
1/ci 1/ci 1
J  u —— ^i?(0* ) ^ d n =  J  u(c i)dn+  J  {u ( l/n )  — u(0)}dn
7T 7T 1 /Cl >0
If 9* were equal to 9 l  then C2 (9 *,7r) = c\ but, as C2(0, n) is decreasing on n  >  7r, 
9* > 9 l would be needed only to compensate the first term  in the RHS. As the second 
term is strictly positive, 9* needs to increase further, which implies tha t for c\ > 1 and 
s — 0, 9* > 9j_, and pure panic runs occur in this region.
For the case of a strictly positive amount of noise, consider the following numerical 
example: u(c) =  ln(^ +  c) +  1, which is increasing, concave, and has an index of relative
20 The definition of solvency introduces another constraint for the feasible values of c\. While at the 
planning period the value of 6 is not verifiable, a minimum condition for the bank to be allowed to operate 
should be to be solvent at least for the highest realisation of 6 , this is 
. 1 -  7TCi ^ ^ R( 1)
Notice ER(9) >  1 and R(.) increasing, imply that 12(1) >  1.
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risk aversion higher than 1; and R (6 ) =  (0 +  p)2 , which is continuous and increasing on 
6, and satisfies E u  (R(6 )) >  u (l) . Also consider the following values for the parameters: 
7t — 1/3, p — 0.75. Figure 2-2 in the Appendix shows the solvency and equilibrium 
threshold levels (6l and 0*, respectively) for different values of c\ and e. The dotted 
lines represent the levels 6l +  2e and 0* — e, between which pure panic based runs occur. 
For example, if c\ =  1.1 and e = 0.01, Ql  = 0.3261 and 0* = 0.5948 6l , and for
all values of the fundamentals in the interval [6l +  2s, 6* — e[= [0.3461,0.5848[/ 0 , all 
patient depositor run on the bank even though they know it is solvent. Observe tha t 
as ci increases, the region of pure panic runs becomes larger. Moreover, the smaller the 
noise the smaller the value of ci for which panic runs occur.
In conclusion, while a competitive banking system offers better risk-sharing for con­
sumers; more solvent projects are liquidated than in autarky. This is costly to society, 
as output is reduced and jobs are destroyed.
2.3 D eposit Insurance in a M odel of Inform ation-Based  
Bank Runs
For the case of deterministic returns {R(0) = R  > 1 constant), Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) show tha t the introduction of a guarantee on deposits paying the outside option 
or autarkic solution, (1,-R), acts as a mechanism tha t ex-ante eliminates the inefficient 
equilibrium (runs on solvent banks).21 Such a guarantee could be credibly financed by 
a tax on early withdrawals, in an amount depending on n ,22 and it is always effective in 
deterring runs (even when offering only partial coverage), and so it is not used in equi­
librium. In a model with stochastic returns, however, the effectiveness of the insurance 
policy in eliminating panic runs will vary with the size of the guarantee and the degree 
of supervisory involvement of the agency in charge of insurance.
Consider a Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) offering an insurance contract 
(fll > 9 2 ) in case the bank fails. The DIC can operate under a narrow mandate -  common 
in Europe - , acting basically as a pay box to compensate insured depositors of failed
21 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show this result holds for a more general case, where tt is a binomial 
random variable.
22 Considering a sequential servicing constraint, each consumer withdrawing early pays r  =  c\ — 1 in 
taxes, that are immediately deposited back in the bank by the government, to make these resources 
available to pay other depositors. If n  =  t v  the money is returned to depositors for consumption in 
the interim period. However, if n >  n each depositor withdrawing early consumes only 1, and patient 
depositors waiting to the second period receive R. Chari (1989) criticises this solution, arguing that 
depositors could consume their money before paying the tax, therefore making the scheme impossible to 
implement. However, if the government arranged for the tax to be directly paid by banks (as it usually 
happens in economies with well developed tax collection systems), this problem would be solved.
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banks when instructed by the appropriate authority; or under a broad mandate -  com­
mon in Asia and the Americas -  where it also monitors the condition of the banking 
industry and takes responsibility for the resolution of failed insured institutions.
In order to stress the differences between the two systems, I will abstract from the 
presence of a regulatory authority in the case of a narrow mandate DIC. In this case, the 
agency will simply pay the guarantee every time the bank does not have enough resources 
to repay depositors claims, regardless of the bank being insolvent or just illiquid. Under 
a broad mandate, however, the DIC will also have the ability to monitor the bank’s 
activities -  which is modelled by a private signal on 6  -  providing lender of last resort 
(LoLR) assistance to solvent but illiquid banks with positive probability, and resolving 
inefficient banks according to a least-cost criteria.
Under a narrow mandate, the timing of the game with deposit insurance is as follows:
• At t = 0 the DIC announces the level of insurance it is going to offer (01, 02)- 
Depositors receive 1 unit of endowment (money) tha t they invest in the represen­
tative bank, which offers a demand deposit contract (c i,02(0, n)). After receiving 
deposits, the bank invests in the risky asset.
•  At t = 1 all impatient depositors withdraw. Patient depositors observe private 
signals on 0 (6i = 0 -f- £i) and decide whether to withdraw or to remain. The DIC 
observes the realisation of n. If n  > 1/ci, the bank’s assets are liquidated and 
transferred to the DIC for the payment of the guarantee. If n < 1/c i, the bank 
continues in operation until the final period.
•  At t = 2, if the bank is open, remaining patient depositors are paid max {02(0, n), 02}. 
If C2 (9, n ) <  <72 remaining assets are transferred to the DIC for the payment of the 
guarantee. If the bank goes bankrupt at t = 1, remaining depositors receive <72•
On the other hand, when the DIC operates under a broad mandate, the timing of 
the game is as follows:
• At t = 0 the DIC announces the level of insurance it is going to offer (01, 02). 
Depositors receive 1 unit of endowment (money) tha t they invest in the represen­
tative bank, which offers a demand deposit contract (ci, 0 2 (6 , n)). After receiving 
deposits, the bank invests in the risky asset.
• At t = 1 all impatient depositors withdraw. Patient depositors observe private 
signals on 0 (0i = 0 +  £*) and decide whether to withdraw or to  remain. The DIC
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observes the realisation of n  and its own private signal (s = 6 +  £s, £ < s) and 
decides whether to leave the bank open -  sometimes providing liquidity assistance 
-  or to close it and pay the guarantee, in which case all the bank’s assets are passed 
onto the DIC and all depositors claiming early withdrawal are paid out g\.
•  At t =  2, if the bank is open, remaining patient depositors are paid max {02(0, n), #2}; 
if C2(0, n) < g2 remaining assets are transferred to the DIC for the payment of the 
guarantee in the second period. If the bank goes bankrupt at t — 1, remaining 
depositors are paid g2.
Deposit guarantees are usually expressed as a percentage of the principal or nominal 
value of deposits at the time of a bank failure, or as a limit up to which deposits can 
be recovered. Thus, a natural constraint for the value of insurance is g\ — p2 — 9 < ci- 
Indeed, following the definition of solvency, if g were strictly higher than c\ the DIC 
would have to pay the guarantee in the second period to depositors in a solvent bank, 
even if this were not subject to runs in the interim period.
The funding of a deposit insurance system varies from country to country. I con­
sider here an ex-post funded system, getting resources through a government tax  on 
withdrawals, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, as in Goldstein and Pauzner 
(2000), I will drop the “sequential servicing constraint” assumption and allow the bank 
to observe the length of the queue (n) before paying out depositors, so th a t all customers 
withdrawing at a given period receive exactly the same payoff. I assume tha t deposits 
are senior to other claims, so tha t when a bank fails at date £, its assets -  or their li­
quidation value -  are transferred to the DIC for the payment of the deposit guarantee. 
Therefore, the government can directly tax  all early withdrawals at a constant rate equal 
to r  — ci — <7, transferring the revenue to the DIC for the payment of the guarantee in 
the final period.
The following analysis is divided into two phases. First, I study the equilibrium 
behaviour of depositors and the DIC under the two mandates. Second, I study the 
optimal decision problem for the bank. A complete formulation of the game should 
include a payoff function for the DIC, in order to compute the optimal level of insurance 
offered in the planning period. This chapter will not solve for th a t problem but I offer 
a discussion of the ideas th a t should be considered in the concluding section.
In order to be able to make comparisons later, I will denote by 6* the equilibrium 
threshold in the benchmark model without deposit insurance, and by 6* the one obtained 
in the model with insurance.
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2.4 Equilibrium under a Narrow M andate
(Interim  Period Sub-Gam e)
Under a narrow mandate and once the DIC and the bank have announced their 
respective contracts (g and ci), all impatient depositors withdraw in the interim period 
and patient depositors, observing private signals on 9, decide whether to  withdraw or 
to remain. At this stage this is the only relevant decision because the action of the DIC 
is directly determined by the strategies played by patient depositors: the guarantee is 
paid out if and only if n  >  1/c i .23
Figure 2-3.a (in the Appendix) gives a representation of the extended form of this 
sub-game. According to this, patient depositors’ payoffs are given by table 2.2.
n < 1/c i n >  1/c i
t = 1 ci 9
t = 2 m ax{c2(0, n), <7 } 
> 9
9
TABLE 2.2: Patient depositors’ payoffs in the game with insurance under a narrow mandate.
Denote by n(9) a feasible belief (n < n{9) < 1) about the aggregate behaviour 
of patient depositors consistent with the information received, and by 6g(0,n(9)) the 
difference of payoffs between waiting until t = 2 and withdrawing at t =  1, once the 
deposit guarantee g is in place:
6g{d,n{6)) = <
u(m ax{c2(0,n),  <7 }) — u{c\) if n{9) < 1/c i 
0  if n(9) > 1/c i
After receiving a private signal, Oi, each consumer evaluates :
&i+£
A9(0i,n(0)) = n(«))]= /  i«S9(0,n(0))d0,
the conditional expected premium for the action of waiting to withdraw in the second 
period when deposits are insured.
Given tha t c\ >  9 , the lower and upper dominance regions can be defined as in 
the model without insurance. For 6 < 9l , the bottom  left of table 2.2 is always less 
than or equal to ci, hence to withdraw is weakly dominant. For very high levels of the
23Notice that the final period payoff is a result of the actions taken in the interim period, and that no 
relevant decision is made in the last stage of the game.
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fundamentals (9 > 9u), depositors should remain, irrespective of the actions of other 
players.24
If a switching point 9* exists, a belief consistent with the existence of the dominance 
regions and the uniform distribution of the noise is again given by n{9 ,9*), in equation 
2.1. Denote by 5g(9,9*) = Sg(9, n (9 ,9*)) and Ag(9h 9*) = Ag(9i,n(9,9*)).
R e m a rk  4 Notice that i f  g < c\ the function 5g(9 ,9*) has a discontinuity at 9 = 9. 
Nevertheless, the function  Ag(9i,9*) is still continuous in both arguments (see figures 
2-4 and 2-5).
P ro p o s itio n  5 For any given value of the guarantee and as a function of one variable, 
Ag(9*,9*) is strictly increasing.
See proof in the Appendix.
If ci =  g , 5g(9,9*) > 0 for all 9, which implies tha t A g(9i,9*) > 0 for all 9{. Hence, 
patient depositors do not monitor their banks (n{9) =  7r, V0). Such a solution means 
tha t insolvent banks are never liquidated, making the guarantee very expensive for low 
states of the fundamentals. Therefore, I will concentrate on the case ci >  g.
P ro p o s itio n  6 I f  c\ > g, there exists a unique equilibrium in switching strategies, 9*, 
such that a patient consumer withdraws i f  9i <  9* and remains i f  9i > 9*.
P ro o f. Call A g(9*) = A g(9*,9*).
V9 < 9 — e, A g(9) = 0 (see figure 2-5).
e+ e < o L
V0 e]0 - e, 9l -  e], A g(9)= J  £  {u (max {c2 (9, n ),g }) - u ( c 1)}d9 < 0,
6—e
as for any n > n  and 9 < 9l , C2{9, n ) < ci.
Qu+2e
A g(9u+E)= J  ±  {u (max {c2(9 ,n),g}) - u f a ) }  d9 > 0,
0u
as for 9 > 9u , n = tt and C2(0, n ) >  ci.
By continuity, there exists 9jj+£ > 6 g >  9l —e such tha t A g(9*) = 0, and proposition 
5 implies this solution is unique. ■
24 When 6  >  6 l  it is weakly dominant to remain. Nevertheless, as in this region the payoff of a single 
depositor will depend on the strategy chosen by other patient consumers, the existence of an upper 
dominance region will require additional assumptions as in the case without insurance. Consequently, 
assume it will also be given by the interval [Qu +  2e, 1].
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P ro p o s itio n  7 The monotone equilibrium threshold, 9*, defines the unique strategy sur­
viving iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies over the set of all feasible beliefs 
on the actions o f players.
P ro o f. W hatever the value of g , strategies in this game are complementary. In 
the region where n < 1/c i, the payoff to remain is non-decreasing on the number of 
players waiting to  withdraw in the second period. In the region n  > l /c \  the payoff 
is constant, therefore non-decreasing on the number of players withdrawing. Hence, 
the result follows as a direct application of the results in Morris and Shin (2002) for 
binary actions games, with a continuum players, strategic complementarity, and a unique 
monotone equilibrium threshold. ■
Summing up, a unique equilibrium preserving the monitoring role of depositors 
exists in the model with deposit insurance if ci > 9 , and it is such that if a patient 
depositor receives a signal 9{ <  &*, Ag{9i,9*g) < 0 and she withdraws; while if 9i > 6*, 
0 and she remains.
Using tha t n(9 ,9*) is linear in the interval [9* — e, 9* +  e] to change variables and 
rearrange terms, it is possible to see tha t 9* solves:
l /c i  1/ci
J  i i ^ ma x | ^ — — (1 +  7T —2 n ) ^ , g | ^ d n =  J  u(cf)dn  (2.3)
P ro p o s itio n  8 The monotone equilibrium threshold for the game of information-based 
bank runs with insured deposits (c\ > g), satisfies the following properties:
1. 9* increases in c\ iff
1/ci
u{g) > u(ci) -  c\ J  ju'(ci) - i/(c2(n))|^ l{n<n} j dn.
7T
2. 9* is decreasing on g. That is, a higher value o f insurance increases the incentives 
to remain.
See proof in the Appendix.
P ro p o s itio n  9 Under a narrow mandate, a deposit insurance contract preserving the
monitoring role of depositors involves g < c\. Nonetheless, inefficient liquidation of
\
solvent banks (panic runs) will persist for this type o f insurance, the less so the higher 
the guarantee.
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P ro o f. Reconsider equation 2.3 when the signal’s noise vanishes. Taking the limit 
when e —> 0 :
1/ci n 1/ci 1/ci
J  u  (max [ 0 2 ( 0 * ,  f t , ) , #} )  d n  =  J  u  ( c 2 ( 0 * , n ) )  d n  +  J  u ( g ) d n  =  J  u { c \ ) d n ,
7T 7T 7T
with n defined by C 2 ( 0 g , n )  =  g .
Because g  < ci, 0 2 ( 6 l ,  i t )  =  c \  and C2( 0g ,  n )  is decreasing on n; 0* needs to  be higher 
than 6 l  for this equality to hold, which means tha t in equilibrium depositors will still 
run on some solvent banks. Finally, it is clear from this equation tha t the higher g  the 
smaller the region of panic runs. ■
For a strictly positive amount of noise (e.g. e =  0.01) consider the numerical 
example in figure 2-6. For every value of c \  > 1 the equilibrium threshold is above 
0L ,  although the gap is smaller for higher levels of insurance (fewer banks are liqui­
dated). Consider the case g  = 1 and c \  =  1.1. For these parameters, 0 l = 0.3261 
and the equilibrium threshold equals 6* = 0.3928. Hence, for every 9 in the region 
[9l +  2e, 0* — e[= [0.3461,0.3828[^ 0 , all patient depositor continue running on a bank 
they know to be solvent. This region, however, is substantially smaller than the one 
without insurance, on page 70.
Blanket guarantees in times of crisis are usually designed to protect the principal 
value of deposits, in order to enhance market confidence and secure the purchasing power 
of consumers. In this model, a blanket guarantee would translate into g  = 1. However, 
despite the high level of protection, depositors still run on some solvent banks. Notice 
tha t this result it is not in response to a lack of confidence in the deposit insurance 
system or to a macroeconomic shock affecting the economy. It emerges naturally as 
an equilibrium in a model with asymmetric information, where depositors rationally 
anticipate the reaction functions of their counterparts.
2.5 Equilibrium under a Broad M andate
Under a broad mandate, and once the DIC and the bank have announced their respective 
contracts (g and ci), all impatient depositors withdraw in the interim period and patient 
depositors, observing private signals on 0, decide whether to withdraw or to remain. 
The DIC moves after depositors have played, observing the realisation of n  and its own 
private signal s, which comes from the monitoring of the bank’s activities. Based on the 
information revealed by these two variables, the DIC must decide whether to leave the 
bank open -  in which case liquidity assistance may sometimes be required -  or to close
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it and pay the guarantee.
Figure 2-3.b gives a representation of the extended form of the sub-game faced by 
depositors and the DIC in the interim period.
2.5.1 D IC ’s Sub-gam e
In this version of the game, bankruptcy is not determined solely by the actions of depo­
sitors; it can also be the efficient outcome of supervision and prudential regulation. On 
a theoretical level, Repullo (2000) justifies the allocation of supervisory activities to 
the DIC every time withdrawals are large enough to  pose a systemic threat: “deposit 
insurance...institutions have become responsible for dealing with solvency problems, lea­
ving Central Banks with the exclusive role of handling liquidity problems”. As the present 
model does not study the problem of separation of activities between the central bank 
and the banking supervisor, for simplicity, the DIC will be allowed to deal with both 
solvency and liquidity issues.
Hence, as opposed to the case with a narrow mandate, this time the DIC has access 
to private information which can be used to decide a closure rule and a LoLR policy for 
banks. At t = 1 the DIC receives a private, non verifiable signal s =  9 +  £s, where £s 
is uniformly distributed on [—£,£]. Given the supervisory role assigned to this agency, 
preferential access to information will naturally imply th a t £ < e; meaning that, on 
average, the DIC’s signal is more informative than the signals of depositors. Knowing 
the value of s, the DIC corrects the conditional probability distribution of 9 and estimates 
that the true value of 9 follows a uniform distribution in the interval [s — £, s +  £].
Once patient depositors have played, the realisation of n  becomes observable to all 
players, in particular to the DIC. As a function of 9 (which is indeed a 1-1 relationship 
in the region of partial runs), n  also carries information about the true state of the bank. 
For a given value of n, the DIC has the option of closing the bank based on its estimated 
solvency, or leaving it open, in which case liquidity assistance could be provided under 
exceptional circumstances.
The IM F’s code of best practice requires the resolution of a failing bank to be decided 
according to a “least cost” criteria (Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003). Using this idea, I 
define the objective function of the DIC at this stage of the game as tha t of minimising 
the cost of resolution of a bank.25
I will first study the case of perfect information (£ =  0), so th a t s perfectly reveals
25 Although this assumption still allows for very interesting results, a complete welfare analysis would 
require a more general definition of the DIC’s objectives (see section 2.7.1).
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the true value of 9 in the interim period. Later, I will extend these results to  the case 
of a noisy signal (£ >  0).
C losu re  ru le
When the DIC decides to close a bank, the guarantee on deposits must be paid. I am 
assuming deposits are senior to other claims, therefore, when a bank fails, all of its 
assets are passed onto the DIC and the agency has to decide how to manage available 
resources. Suppose the DIC has the option of issuing debt against the future value of 
the bank’s assets, with an expected return of E s[R{0) ] . 26 Of course, the DIC can also 
liquidate the assets in the interim period, obtaining a certain return of 1. Hence, the 
net expected cost of the decision of closing a bank in the interim period equals
g -  max {E s[R(6 )], 1}.
As I am assuming the DIC to have perfect information, the term  £7S[.R(0)] simplifies 
to R(9).
P ro p o s itio n  10 When the D IC has perfect information (£ = 0), it is cost efficient for 
it to close the bank if  remaining assets are insufficient to cover the value o f the guarantee 
in the final period (c2 (9,n) < g), and otherwise to leave it open.
P ro o f. Assume n < 1/ci and compare the costs of the two actions in the interim 
period:27
Close Open
g — max{.R(0), 1} 0 , i f c 2 (0 , n ) > g
(1 — n)g — (1 — nc\)R{9) , i f  not
Closing the bank means the guarantee has to be paid a t a cost equal to 
g — max{i?(0), 1}. If the bank is left open, and remaining assets are enough to pay 
depositors at least the value of the guarantee in the final period, this action has no 
cost to the DIC. However, if funds in the bank are insufficient, the guarantee must be 
honoured at a cost equal to (1 — n)g — (1 — nc\)R{9).
A least cost criteria implies that if c2(0,n) > g it is better to leave the bank open. 
Indeed, this rule is Pareto optimal, even if g — max{.R(0), 1} < 0 (in which case the DIC
26 Debt issuance will require the DIC to provide funds to pay the guarantee in the first period. Nonethe­
less, as the bank’s assets have been transferred to it, the counterpart risk of this loan should be minimal.
27 If n >  l / c \  all assets would be liquidated in the interim period, in which case to allow the bank to 
operate until the second period would not be an option, unless it receives a loan from the central bank. 
However, a bail out would not be efficient in this case, because the bank is insolvent (see propositions 
13, 18 and 19 later in this chapter).
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should be indifferent as to which of the two actions, since its objective is to minimise 
the cost of bank resolution and not to make a profit from this operation). In order to 
see that, look at the welfare of depositors:
Close Open
u ( g ) nu(ci) +  (1 -  n)u(c2(9,n))
Because c\ >  g and C2 (0 ,n ) > 9» depositors are better off if the bank is allowed to 
survive to the final period.
On the other hand, if 02(0, n) < g closure is the least cost solution. Comparing the 
costs of the two actions:
g — max{R(0), 1} <  (1 — n)g — (1 — nc\)R{9) 
ng < max{i?(0), 1} — (1 — nc\)R{9).
By contradiction, assume ng > max{.R(0), 1} — (1 — nc\)R(9).
i. If R{9) > 1 : ng > R(9) — (1 — nc\)R{9) =  nc\R{9) <=> 1 > > R{9) which is a 
contradiction.
ii. If R(9) < 1 : ng > 1 — (1 — nci)R(9) R(9) > >  1? which is again a
contradiction.
■
LoLR policy
According to Bagehot’s doctrine, a LoLR should lend only to solvent banks experiencing 
liquidity problems (see section 1.4.3 in the previous chapter) . In the present framework,
Definition 11 A bank faces a liquidity shock i f  n  > n at t = 1.
i. For a given realisation of n, a bank is liquid in both periods i f  C2(9,n) > c\. Notice
that any liquid bank must also be solvent.
ii. A bank is fundam entally solvent but illiquid i f  9 > 9 l , n > n and C2(0,n) < ci.
Solvency is a property of the bank which cannot be verified until the final period. 
However, and as for the moment I am assuming £ =  0, the DIC can perfectly observe 
the true value of 9 in the interim period.
Clearly, if for a given value of n  a bank were liquid, no assistance would be required. 
If it were fundamentally solvent but illiquid, however, there would be room for a LoLR.
Proposition 12 When the DIC has perfect information (£ — 0), a cost efficient LoLR 
policy is to rescue fundamentally solvent but illiquid banks.
79
P ro o f. Suppose the bank is fundamentally solvent but illiquid.
1 — 7TCi
02(0, tt) = —--------R(9) > c-,<& (1 — 7rci) R (9)— (n — 1r) c\>  (1 — n) c\.1 — 7r
If the DIC provides liquidity assistance for a maximum of (n — 7r) c\ in the interim 
period, the inequality above establishes tha t the residual return when liquidating only 
7rci units in the interim period minus the repayment of the loan -  at zero interest rate 
is enough to secure remaining patient depositors to receive a least c\ at t = 1. In other 
words, lending money to a fundamentally solvent bank has zero cost for the DIC.
Committing liquidity assistance to fundamentally solvent but illiquid banks is indeed 
Pareto optimal, in terms of consumers’ welfare:
i. If C2(0,n) < g it was argued before tha t the bank should be closed. However, 
comparing the welfare of depositors it is possible to see that the bank should be bailed 
out (as this policy has zero cost):
Close LoLR + Open
u(g) < nu{c\) +  (1 — n)u(c^)
where C2 =  C2 (6 , 7r) > c\ >  g
ii. If g < C2(9,n) < c\ it was established before tha t the bank should be allowed to 
survive until the final period. Comparing the welfare of depositors when just leaving 
the bank open against the situation where the DIC also provides liquidity assistance:
Open LoLR + Open
nu(ci) + (1 — n)u(c2 {0 , n)) < nu(c\) +  (1 — n)u(c^ )
where C2 > c\ >  C2 (0 ,n )
Therefore, the DIC should commit liquidity assistance to solvent but illiquid banks, 
and such commitment should be public information in order to deter panic runs. Should 
the DIC, under some circumstances, also commit liquidity to insolvent banks? The 
answer is no, and it will be proved in what follows.
Define by 0 the value of the fundamentals satisfying 0 2 (6 , 7r) =  g. Clearly, as g < ci, 
0 < 9l- Consider the case where the bank is fundamentally insolvent and it is also facing 
a liquidity shock:
n > 7r, C2(0, n) < g and m ax{0,0} < 9 < 9l-
As C2(9,n) < g , the closure rule determines tha t it should be closed. However, as 
9 ^  9, £2 (0 , 1r) >  g and by lending the excess withdrawal at t =  1, the DIC could secure 
a higher return for remaining patient depositors in the final period.
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P ro p o s itio n  13 The DIC should never commit liquidity assistance to fundamentally 
insolvent banks.
P ro o f. Compare the costs of the two policies for the DIC:
Close LoLR + Open
g — max{i?(0), 1} (n -  t t )  C l  -  {(1 -  T T C i )  R(6) -  (1 -  n)g}
The net cost of bailing out the bank equals the cost of the loan minus whatever 
assets can be recovered from the bank in the final period.
Closure is the least cost solution if and only if
g — max{.R(0), 1} < (n — ?r) c\ — {(1 — ttci) R(6) — (1 — n)g} 
ng < (n — tt) c\ +  max{.R(0), 1} — (1 — 7rci) R(9).
By contradiction, assume ng > (to — n) c\ +  max{.R(0), 1} — (1 — 7rci) R(6).
i. If R(6) > 1 : ng > (n — ir) c\ +  R(9) — (1 — ttci)R(0)
0 > n{c\ — g) +  ttc\{R{6 ) — 1) which is a contradiction.
> 0  >0
ii. If R{6) <  1 : ng > (n — n) c\ +  1 — (1 — nci)R (6)
^  (1 — 7rci)(R(0) — 1) >  n(ci — g), which is again a contradiction.
>o <o >o
■
When combining the two policies (closure rule and LoLR) it is possible to conclude 
that, with perfect information, solvent banks are never allowed to fail, and it is only 
when an insolvent bank experiences large withdrawals in the first period -  and large 
enough for remaining assets to be insufficient to cover the payment of the guarantee in 
the final period -  that the bank is closed by the DIC. This result indicates that, despite 
the supervisory role assigned to this agency, depositors retain some monitoring power 
but also tha t the DIC lacks the commitment to close all insolvent banks in the interim 
period (if g < ci). Indeed, the smaller the guarantee, the higher the share of insolvent 
banks tha t might be allowed to survive.
Summarising the previous results:
P ro p o s itio n  14 When the DIC has perfect information (£ =  0), a cost efficient policy 
is to leave a bank open if  it is fundamentally solvent or i f  its remaining assets are enough 
to pay the guarantee on deposits in the final period. Otherwise, the bank should be closed. 
The LoLR should lend only to fundamentally solvent banks facing liquidity shocks (table 
2.3).
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P ro o f. The only part of this proposition th a t has not been proved yet is tha t a 
bank should be closed independent of the actions of consumers if 9 < 0  (provided this 
value is non negative). This result is immediate because 0 2 (6 , ir) < g clearly implies that 
C2 (9 ,n ) < g for all n >  ir. Following propositions 10 and 13, the bank should be closed.
e S econd  p e r io d  
r e tu r n
C lo su re
ru le
L oL R
po licy
O b se rv a tio n s
0  < 0 c2(0, t t )  < g Close No Bank
e < e < eL c2(0,n) < g Close No fundamentally
c2(0,n) > g Open No insolvent
e > e L c2(0,7r) >  ci >  g Open Yes Bank fundamentally solvent, 
lend (n — 7r)ci iff n > 7r and 
ca(0,n) < ci
TABLE 2.3: Closure and LoLR policies with a broad mandate and perfect information.
The assumption tha t the DIC lends at a discounted rate normalised to zero does 
not contradict other assumptions in the model -  the safe technology return was also 
normalised to zero neither is it uncommon in the literature. Allen and Gale (1998), for 
example, study the problem of a central bank providing emergency liquidity assistance in 
a model where early liquidation of assets is costly, and they also normalise the lending 
interest rate to zero. Other authors have argued th a t a LoLR should lend at a high 
penalty rate, in order to stop public funds from being used to finance regular investment 
(see Bagehot (1873) and Repullo (2000)). However, as the present model considers only 
one representative bank, it cannot take into account interbank lending as an alternative 
source of liquidity for solvent banks, as they do.
C ase o f im p e rfe c t in fo rm a tio n  (£ >  0)
Having established these results, moving to the case of imperfect information is simple. 
Considering a positive but small amount of noise, all the previous equations in 6  can be 
rewritten in terms of their conditional expected value, which will allow for computing 
cost efficient closure and LoLR policies.
Define by s l  the value of the signal satisfying E Sl [0 2 (6 , t t ) ]  =  ci, s* = s*(n) such tha t 
E(s*,n) [c2(0,n)] =  g, and s such tha t [c2(0,7r)] = g (if the solution is non-negative, 
and zero otherwise). Notice tha t for any given value of n, these parameters are uniquely 
determined because c2(0,n) is increasing on 6 .
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Proposition 15 For small non-negative values of the D IC ’s signal noise, a cost efficient 
policy is to leave the bank open if  s > s i  or if  s > s*(n), and otherwise to close i t
Proof. Same as above, replacing all expressions by their conditional expected values.
■
The DIC can anticipate tha t a bank is solvent if s > # l + £ 5 and insolvent if s < 9 l ~ £• 
Because C2(9,tt) < c\ if 6 < 0 l , and C2(0,7r) > c\ if 9 > 0 l,  it follows from the definition 
of s l  tha t 0 l  — £ < s l  < 9 l  +  £• Indeed, when s > s l  the expected value of C2(9,7t) 
is computed for larger values of 0, and because C2 (0 , t t) is increasing on 0 this implies 
tha t E s [c2(0, 7t)] >  c\. The opposite is true when s < s l . Therefore, conditional upon 
its private information, the DIC estimates a bank to be solvent if s > s l , and insolvent 
if s < s l  .
Proposition 16 For small non-negative values of £, the DIC should commit liquidity 
assistance to a bank facing runs i f  and only i f  s > s l  and E s [c2(0,n)] <  c\.
Corollary 17 limsjr,(ci) =  9l{c \ )• That is, when the information gathered by the DIC  
becomes extremely precise, only insolvent banks are allowed to fail.
These results justify the principle of "creative ambiguity”: depositors cannot an­
ticipate if the LoLR will provide liquidity assistance for a subset of the fundamentals 
(9 €]9l — €,9l + £[)• Nevertheless, this is not a consequence of the LoLR randomising 
over its set of actions (playing an equilibrium in mixed strategies, as in Freixas et al. 
(1999)). The DIC’s strategy is perfectly determined and rational but it is not observed 
by consumers due to asymmetric information.
Indeed, two kind of errors are possible when £ > 0. W ith positive probability the 
DIC can mistakenly allow a solvent bank to fail (by refusing liquidity assistance), or 
else bail out an insolvent bank. However, the information contained in n{0) has not yet 
been taken into account. If a monotone equilibrium threshold for depositors 0*g exists, 
n  can be expressed as an invertible function of 0 in the region of partial runs (that is, 
where tt < n < 1).
Proposition 18 I f  0 L  I 5^ 'a(<9,9g} ^ reveals the true value of 0  at t — 1. In 
this case, no matter what the value of £ is, the DIC determines its closure and LoLR 
policies as in the case of perfect information (proposition 14)- I f  9*g > 9 l  ~  £> the DIC  
also gets perfect information in the region of no runs (n(0,0*) = ix).
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n — <
P ro o f. Assume a monotone equilibrium threshold 0* existed, such that 
eL -  e < e*g < 0L +  e. A value of n(0) consistent with this equilibrium is given by 
equation 2.1. Hence,
7T if Oi ^  0g  for all %, if 0 ^  0g  I £ ^  0£ j , the bank is solvent
E]7r, 1[ if 0*g — e < 0 < 0* +  e, n  fully reveals 0
1 if 0i < 0* for a lii ,  if 0 < 0* — £ < 0 l ,  the bank is insolvent
■
The next step is to determine tha t a monotone equilibrium does indeed exists for 
depositors.
2.5 .2  P a tien t D ep o sito r s’ Sub-gam e
Once a patient depositor has received a private signal on 0, she will construct beliefs 
about the behaviour of other players, the value of the last period return, and the action 
chosen by the DIC, upon which she will derive her optimal strategy.
Dominance regions: W hatever the relationship between the first and second period 
guarantee, an upper dominance region does exist for this game. Formally, a depositor 
can be sure th a t the bank is solvent if 0i > # £  +  £ >  +  £. Because sl  < 0l +  £, she
also knows tha t the bank will be bailed out if facing runs. All patient depositors receive 
signals above this value if 0 >  0 l  +  2 £ ,  and anticipating tha t c^ =  C2 { 0 , tt)  >  c\ whatever 
the value of n, they wait until the final period.28 Hence, the upper dominance region 
for this game is given by [0l 4- 2e, l ].29
If 0 exists (c2(0,7r) = g), R(.) increasing implies tha t 0 — £ < s < 0 + If the 
DIC’s signal is below s the bank will be closed. Therefore, if Vz 0i < 0 — e, a depositor 
knows the bank will be closed no m atter what strategies are played by other players. All 
depositors will receive signals below this level if 0 < 0 — 2e. Hence, if 0 > 2e the optimal 
reaction of depositors in this region will be to run, in which case a lower dominance 
region exists.30
In the intermediate region ([0 — 2e, 0l +  2e]), only sufficiently illiquid insolvent banks 
will be closed, tha t is, those for which s < s*(n). In this region, depositors’ payoffs will 
depend upon their actions in the following way:31
28The upper index “L ” in C2 stands for the “liquidity” assistance by the LoLR.
29 In the game without insurance, additional assumptions were required for depositors to uncondi­
tionally remain for higher realisations of 6. With the DIC operating under a broad mandate, these 
assumptions are endogenised by means of the commitment of liquidity to solvent but illiquid banks.
30 For low values of the guarantee, 6 might well not exist. However, if coordination induces 9l — £ <  9*, 
this should not be a problem (because 9l >  2e) and indeed, as previously established, it will provide the 
DIC with high quality information to assess the solvency of banks through the information contained in 
n(9,9*g).
31n >  1 /c i = »  s <  s*(n). If s >  s*(n) the bank will remain open and the depositors’ final payoff will
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™ >  1/c i n < 1/c i
s < s*{n) s > s*(n)
t = 1 9 9 ci
t  = 2 9 9 m ax{c2(n ,0),c/}
TABLE 2.4: Patient depositors’ payoffs in the game with insurance under a broad mandate.
Consistent with the dominance regions, n  =  7r i f 0 > 0£ +  2e and n  =  1 if 9 < 9 — 2e. 
In the intermediate region, the action taken by the DIC will be directly determined by 
the behaviour of patient depositors, which payoffs are described in table 2.4. The entry 
in the bottom  right corner satisfies E s [c2(n, 9)] > g.
Once again, n(9,0*) in equation 2.1 defines a belief consistent with these dominance 
regions and the uniform distribution of the noise.
As in the case with a narrow mandate, it is possible to prove that:
Proposition 19 When the DIC operates under a broad mandate and offers insurance 
g < c\ in both periods, there exists a unique equilibrium threshold 0*, such that depositors 
remain if  9{ > 9* and otherwise withdraw. This threshold satisfies 6 — s < 9*g < 9 l  + e.
Proof. Similar to proposition 6.
■
Corollary 20 lim0*(ci) <  9 l(c i)> which says that as the noise of depositors’ signals £—►0 y
vanishes, they run only on insolvent banks.
As £ < e, when e tends to zero £ must go to zero as well, and the outcome of the game
with a broad mandate insurance agency achieves a social optimum, in the sense tha t
liquidity assistance is targeted exclusively to solvent banks (lim s^  — 9l ) but is not
used in equilibrium as they do not experience runs (lim0*(ci) < 0l {ci))- Extremely
£—>0 y
insolvent banks are closed ( lim s = 9), and those with enough funds to cover the payment 
of the final period guarantee are allowed to continue operating. All these results hold 
irrespective of the specific values of insurance provided, which in particular might imply 
the insurance policy to be less expensive under a broad mandate.
be higher than g. Anticipating that, depositors should wait, so n <  1 /c i, which is a contradiction.
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2.6 Dem and D eposit Contract w ith  Insurance
(B ank’s P lanning  Period  Sub-G am e)
The previous sections solved for the equilibrium strategy of depositors and the DIC 
taking as given the value of c\ , and without considering the effect tha t deposit insurance 
may have on the value of the demand deposit contract. Too generous a protection could 
generate moral hazard if, because of limited liability, banks choose excessively high values 
of ci, making them fundamentally insolvent for most realisation of 6  and so increasing 
the probability of runs (at least for high levels of the guarantee). If insurance were 
sufficiently generous for depositors to be willing to accept this contract, the DIC would 
most likely end up paying the guarantee in the interim period.
This section will derive a condition for the optimal value of ci under both mandates. 
Because the equations become intractable for positive values of the noise, I will solve for 
the limit case when e tends to zero. An analytical solution is possible when abstracting 
from the effect tha t changes in c\ have on the equilibrium threshold. In th a t case, it 
is possible to show tha t the effect of deposit insurance is to reduce the level of risk- 
sharing, this effect being stronger under a broad mandate. However, when considering 
the impact of changes in c\ on the equilibrium threshold, comparative statics show tha t 
the net effect of insurance is to increase the value of c\. Limited insurance can contain 
this effect up to a certain level, justifying the observed conduct of governments across the 
world who offer only partial insurance on deposits in normal times in order to encourage 
depositors to keep monitoring their banks.
2.6.1 N arrow  M an d ate  D IC
At the planning stage, the bank calculates the value of c\ tha t maximises the ex-ante 
expected utility of consumers:
l
6*g+ e
0g+£ ^
+  J  | n ( 0, 0 *g)u(ci) +  (1 -  n(fl, 0 *))u ^max j ^  #}) } d9
&9
+ j  u(g) dO 
o
For 6  > 9* +  e all depositors remain and receive max{c2(0, 7r), c/}. W hen 0 < 9* — e, 
all withdraw, the bank goes bankrupt and depositors are paid the guarantee. In the 
intermediate region, depositors’ withdrawals are decreasing on the value of the funda­
m ax£/u(ci) =  J  /t tu (c i)  +  (1 — 7r)u f m a x / - y —
—  7T
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mentals according to the formula of n(9 ,9*), and the guarantee is paid each time the 
bank’s resources are insufficient to cover demanded deposits (i.e. when 9 < 9g).
When e —> 0 the region [6 * — e, 9* +  e] converges on { ^ } ,  and as payoffs in this 
region are discontinuous at 9g — ► 9*, the problem reduces to:
l
m axEu(ci)  = /  {iru(ci) +  (1 — 7r)u (max {c2 (9,7r) ,g})}d9  
ci J
&g(Cl)
+  lim {n(9,9*)u(c!) +  (1 -  n(9,9*))u(max{c 2 (9*,n(9,9*)) ,#})}
£—>•0+
6*a ( c i )
~  {n(0, 9*)u{g) +  (1 -  n (0, 9*))u(g)} +  J  u(g)d9
o
It was established before tha t when e —> 0, 9*(ci) > 0 l (c i ), hence the term  under 
the first integral max{c2(0, 7r), g) = C2(0, 7t) >  c\ >  g. Also, lim n (0 ,0*) = n  and 
lim n (0, 9*) = 1, and the previous expression becomes:
£ — >0+  '  ' 9)
£ —►O-
I
:Eu(ci) = J  ( 7 r u ( c i )  +  ( 1  -  7t ) u ( c 2  ( 0 , 7 r ) ) }m axEu( I {i —n  i 9,  \ d9Cl
O'g(ci)
+iru(ci) +  (1 -  7t ) u ( c 2  (9*g, 7r)) -  u ( p )  +  J  u(g)d9
0
A sufficient condition for the value of c\ maximising this function is given by equation
2.4:
l
7r 
• /
J  { « ' ( c x )  -  ( c 2 ( 0 ,  t t ) ) }  +  TT { u ' ( C j )  -  R(e'g (c x) ) u  ( c 2 ( 0 * ( c j ) ,  t t ) )  }  =
9ci
j t u ( c j )  +  ( 1  -  i r ) u  ( c 2 ( 0 * ( c i ) , 7 r ) )  - ( 1  -  i r c 1 ) H ' ( 0 * ( c 1 ) ) u '  ( c 2 ( 0 ' ( c i ) ,  t t ) )  — u ( g )
(2 .4 )
Hence, the marginal gain from risk-sharing due to the transfer of consumption from 
patient to impatient depositors (LHS) equals the positive marginal cost associated with 
the increase in the probability of runs (RHS).
P ro p o s itio n  21 When abstracting from the effect that changes in the demand deposit
contract have on the equilibrium threshold of depositors ( —7?—— =  ^  (Cl) _  q \^ }
V dci dci J
introduction of deposit insurance reduces the level of risk-sharing offered by banks: 
c? < c^ . 32
32 cf stands for the equilibrium value of the demand deposit contract in the interim period in the model 
with insurance, and c f9 for the one without insurance.
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See proof in the Appendix.
Given tha t the bank’s portfolio has not changed, the reduction in the interest paid
on deposits could be explained as the bank “free riding” on the reduction of risk on
deposits that results from the DIC’s guarantee.
The effect of c \  on the equilibrium threshold, however, is not nil. For the case
dQ* (c  1without insurance, theorem 1 established tha t *—^ — - >  0. For the case with insurance
O C \
under a narrow mandate, proposition 8 showed tha t 0*g {c \)  is increasing on c \  if and 
only if
1/ci
u{g)  > u(ci) - c? J  ju'(ci) - u \ c 2( n ) ) ^ ^ n< ^ d n .
>0
This inequality is clearly resolved when g  = c \  then, by continuity, the result extends
to a small neighbourhood of values of g < c \.  For the parameters of my numerical
d0*(ci)
example, simulations for different values of g  show tha t indeed —|   >  0 (see figure
O C \
2-7).
Define by 4/(ci, g) =  0 the equation implicitly defined by the optimal condition 
of this problem, equation 2.4. Notice tha t Eu{c\) is quasi-concave on ci, as it is the 
composition of monotonic and concave functions. Therefore, given th a t c? maximises
Eula),  —  (4) = s o c ( 4 )  <  0.
d^f 06* (cj)
Partial differentiation of equation 2.4 with respect to g  gives -p—= —^------u '(g ) >  0.
09 oc\
dV
dc9Hence, by the implicit function theorem =  - >  0, which justifies the in-
dg
tuitive idea that as g  < ci, the higher the protection to depositors the less liable are
banks for losses, and the higher the interest rate they offer (higher ci).
Under a narrow mandate, as in the benchmark model, the probability of failure in 
the interim period is given by
p = prob{n > 1/c i}  =  9* +  ^  +  * ~
d0*cHence, if g  is sufficiently high for -7—^  >  0, the probability of failure in the interim
dci
period is increasing on c \  :
^  =  g S  +  _ _ g i - > 0
d c i  d c \  (1  -  7r) c\
On the other hand, for small values of g  (limited protection) proposition 8 could
d9* dc?
be violated, so that <  0 in which case < 0 and the probability of runs could 
d c i  dg
decrease with the level of insurance:
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dp = ^ l  2e n
dg dg (1 — 7r) cj dg 
These results can be summarised in the following proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  22 High levels of deposit insurance increase the equilibrium level of risk- 
sharing offered by banks, cf >  cf9, and therefore the probability of runs. Partial insur­
ance can limit this effect
Figure 2-8 plot the FOC for the determination of the optimal demand deposit con­
tract, as described by equations 2.4 and 2.5 (in the Appendix). W ithout insurance, the
level of risk-sharing offered is very small and actually very close to 1. When offering 
full principal insurance (g = 1), the F O C  is positive and decreasing for the values of c\ 
considered in this simulation, implying the optimal level of risk-sharing will be higher.
Limited liability and a high level of insurance increase the incentives for the bank 
to offer higher values of ci, rising the probability of failure. This result is consistent 
with empirical evidence showing tha t an increase in the volume of insured funds is 
usually accompanied by a sharp rise in interest rates (e.g. in the Savings and Loan 
crisis). Partial insurance can limit this effect, as seen in figure 2-9, while improving on 
intertemporal risk-sharing compared to the non-insurance case.
2 .6 .2  B road M an d ate  D IC
Consider again e —> 0, which implies tha t £ also vanishes.
From section 2.5, lims£,(ci) =  Ol (ci), lim s(ci) =  0(ci) and 9 < lim0*(ci) <  9l {c\).
£->0 f  —>0 £->0 y
Thus, in the region 0(ci) < 9 <  Ql {c\), as lim n (9 ,6*) = ir and lim n(9,9*) =  1, the
£-*•0+  y £ - > o ~  y
closure of insolvent banks is strictly determined by the actions of depositors.
The problem faced by the bank in the planning period is the same as before:
l
m axjFu(ci) =  J  {7m (ci) -1- (1 — 7r)u (c2 (9,7r))} d9
^(ci)
-I- TTit(ci) +  (1 -  tt)u{c2 (9*,tt)) -  u(g) -I- J  u(g)d9,
o
and a sufficient condition for the optimal value of c\ is given by equation 2.4.
As mentioned in section 2.2.1, when e equals zero inefficient liquidation (panic 
runs) occurs in the model without insurance for any value of c\ >  1. Therefore, 
9*(ci) > 0L(a) > 9*g(Cl).
Knowing this relationship, when abstracting from the effect tha t changes in the de­
mand deposit contract have on the equilibrium threshold of depositors
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g( 1) _  dO (ci) _  q i introduction of a deposit guarantee reduces the level
dc\ dc\
of risk-sharing offered by banks: c™9 > cf. However, the shifting is stronger in this 
case.33
Hence, the effect of deposit insurance on the optimal demand deposit contract can
dO*
be decomposed in two factors. When 7—^  =  0 its effect is to reduce the level of risk-
dc\
sharing offered by banks with respect to the case without an explicit guarantee. When 
the impact of changes in ci on the probability of runs is included, the opposite effect is 
observed and cf increases in an amount related to the level of the promised protection. 
In the case of a broad mandate, the net effect of insurance is expected to be a rise in cf, 
albeit smaller than in the case of a narrow mandate, as the first factor (a shift to the 
left of cfg) is stronger.
2.7 R obustness
I now go on to discuss some policy implication arising from the model, and how the 
results might change under alternative specifications and assumptions.
2 .7 .1  D ep o sit  Insurance C ontract (D IC ’s P lan n in g  P eriod  Sub-gam e)
The choice of the optimal amount of coverage is a relevant issue not discussed in this 
model, as the value of g was considered an exogenous param eter influencing the outcome 
of the game. The IMF typically suggests the world average of per capita GDP as a rough 
rule of thumb for adequate coverage. In practice, however, coverage limits vary widely 
from country to country. For example, the percentage of the value of deposits covered 
is almost negligible in Sri Lanka and Estonia, and only about 10 percent in Brazil and 
Tanzania; but above 65 percent in the USA, and more than 70 percent in Norway, India 
and Japan (see statistical Appendix in Garcia (2000)).
A complete definition of the game (and therefore a full welfare analysis of deposit 
insurance) would need to specify a payoff function for the DIC, in order to determine the 
optimal level of insurance offered at the planning period. Such a function should include 
the effect tha t a deposit guarantee has on both the depositors’ equilibrium threshold 
and the demand deposit contract offered by banks.
33Denote by 9 ^ ( a )  the equilibrium threshold under a narrow mandate and by 9 f  (ci), the one under 
a broad mandate. Because 9 ^ (ci) >  9 l{c \ )  >  9g(ci) ,  from the proof of proposition 21 in the appendix 
it can be seen that the integration region in LH S(2A){c\) is larger in the latter case and includes smaller 
values of 9, where the function vj(9, c i) is negative. Hence, an even smaller value of c\ is needed in order 
to make LH S(2A){c9\)  =  0.
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The objectives of deposit insurance usually include the protection of depositors and 
financial stability concerns. Garcia (2000) argues tha t because many deposit insurance 
schemes include all deposit-taking institutions, consumer protection is a number one 
concern. Financial stability, in his opinion, would be the main concern if membership 
were confined only to systemically im portant banks. Taking this author’s point of view, 
the DIC should determine g in order to maximise the ex-ante expected utility of con­
sumers, while considering a funding constraint (money raised through an ex-post tax, 
in the case of this model), and the effect th a t deposit insurance has on the risk of runs 
and on moral hazard. On the other hand, Rochet (1999) notices th a t prudential autho­
rities themselves tend to insist more on the prevention of systemic risks as the main 
issue. Under this view, g should be chosen in order to minimise the probability of joint 
failure of systemic institutions.
Coverage limits are in practice determined by very complex political processes. In the 
USA, for example, it has been discussed whether deposit insurance should be indexed to 
living costs.34 Indeed, the choice of the limit coverage could become time-inconsistent 
when facing systemic crises (the ex-ante chosen value of the guarantee could become 
ex-post inefficient), particularly so if the insurer has a narrow mandate or if its signal 
is too noisy under a broad mandate. In either case, some solvent banks would go 
bankrupt, weakening even more the financial system. The authorities could then decide 
to temporarily increase the guarantee in order to contain runs, however hard reducing 
it later to  contain moral hazard (Garcia, 2000).
2 .7 .2  C red ib ility  and B lank et G uarantees
Blanket guarantees are usually designed in times of crisis to  protect the principal value 
of deposits, in order to enhance market confidence and secure the purchasing power of 
consumers. When g = c\ runs are completely eliminated but so is market discipline. 
This is why deposit guarantees usually cover the principal value of deposits and not the 
interest accrued on them. The results in this chapter show, however, tha t if g <  c\ 
and the agency in charge of insurance does not get involved in the supervision of banks, 
depositors will still run on some solvent banks, the more so the lower the guarantee. 
This result is not in response to  a lack of confidence in the insurance scheme, nor to a 
macroeconomic shock affecting the economy but it emerges naturally as an equilibrium 
in a model with asymmetric information, where depositors rationally anticipate the
34 See Alan Greenspan: Deposit Insurance. Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 26 February 2003. BIS Review 10/2003.
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reactions of their counterparts.
For a deposit guarantee scheme to be credible and operational, initial funding is 
required. The IMF code of best practice establishes th a t the funding of a deposit 
insurance scheme should be adequate and perceived as sufficient to maintain public 
confidence and that, upon failure, legal priority over assets should be given to the DIC 
on behalf of depositors, as this model assumes.
Some countries run schemes with an ex-ante funding, charging participant institu­
tions an insurance premium. Others, as in this model, run ex-post funded systems. 
W hatever scheme is applied, and given the scope of the losses involved when a bank 
fails, for insurance to be credible government backing may be needed. Indeed, in the 
m ajority of countries with explicit systems, while deposit insurance is privately funded 
by their member institutions, some implicit or explicit government backing always exists.
2 .7 .3  M acroecon om ic Shocks
If, in the interim period, depositors were uncertain about the available funds for the 
payment of the guarantee in the subsequent period, they could precipitate a run. Con­
sider g < ci, the value of the guarantee in the interim period, and gi < Q its expected 
value in the final period. It is not difficult to  prove tha t a monotonic equilibrium exists 
for this game, and tha t the equilibrium threshold is decreasing on g2. Therefore, the 
smaller the expected insurance in the final period, the more banks would be suffering 
from runs. Such a situation could arise because of fears of asset depletion (corruption), 
macroeconomic shocks, or an attack on the currency.
If the economy experienced a macroeconomic shock in the interim period, reducing 
future returns from R{6) to, let us say, R(6) — k , the effect would be twofold. First, 
the solvency threshold would move upwards, increasing the probability of runs. W ith 
more banks suddenly becoming insolvent, the DIC might not have enough resources to 
cover the payment of the guarantee and, if this were anticipated, more patient depositors 
would withdraw. Second, the promise of liquidity assistance by a lender of last resort 
would probably not be enough to overcome this effect, as fewer bank would be bailed 
out in a model with a broad mandate because expected returns are lower.
2.7 .4  T w in  crisis
The present model considers only one representative bank, therefore, a run on the bank 
could be identified with a run on the currency. If not enough funds can be readily 
available for the payment of deposit insurance, its expected value in the last period (p2?
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as in section 2.7.3) might be reduced, raising the equilibrium threshold and therefore 
runs. Increasing pressure to cover guaranteed deposits could force the government into 
devaluation, in which case the value of the guarantee in the final period would be further 
reduced, generating a spiral reaction.
Devaluation could be introduced in this model as in Repullo (2000), where the go­
vernment provides liquidity assistance (broad mandate) in the form of bonds tha t can be 
traded for consumption goods in the interim period, which determines their equilibrium 
price level. Doubts tha t the guarantee could be paid in the final period would precipitate 
a collapse in the price of these bonds, which could be interpreted as a currency crisis. 
Devaluation could also be modelled as in Chang and Velasco (1999), by linking the 
equilibrium exchange rate of the economy to the same fundamentals of the bank.
2.7 .5  M oral H azard
Many authors agree tha t deposit insurance induces moral hazard. In fact, a guarantee on 
deposits can be seen as a callable put option on the agency offering insurance (Merton, 
1977; Acharya and Dreyfus, 1989), which value increases monotonically in the volatility 
of the investment portfolio, and then is maximised at the highest possible level of risk.
In the model introduced in this chapter is not possible to study moral hazard as 
commonly understood, tha t is, a risk shifting in the bank investment strategies. Given 
tha t by assumption there is only one dominant risky technology, banks cannot shift to 
riskier investment projects as a result of the introduction of insurance, simply because 
these projects are not available.
A different source of moral hazard is proposed by Bond and Crocker (1993), linking 
deposit insurance to the level of capitalisation of banks. Their model concentrates on the 
effect tha t insurance pricing has on the level of optimal reserves. In the present model 
banks do not hold reserves because of the assumptions about the risky technology (that 
its return in the interim period equals that of the safe asset). One possibility for studying 
this phenomenon would be to consider higher costs of early liquidation, in the sense tha t 
only a fraction fj, < 1 of the original investment could be recovered at t  — 1. As in tha t 
case banks would need to keep reserves to pay impatient depositors withdrawals in the 
interim period, it would be possible to study how the introduction of a guarantee on 
deposits would shift the composition of the investment portfolio.
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2 .7 .6  C losure R u le
Strictly speaking, closure is only one of the possible options for dealing with failed banks. 
Other options involve the intervention or takeover of the institution (transferring the 
control of the bank to the DIC), the merger or sale of the bank to a stronger institution, 
purchase an assumption, or a bridge bank for the administration of good assets. In the 
present model with a single representative bank, many of these options are not viable.
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007a,b) show tha t the acquisition of failed banks by 
stronger institutions can be welfare improving, and even make systemic crisis less likely 
by reducing the correlation between banks’ portfolios. The present model could be 
extended to study this type of policy in the following way. Consider two ex-ante identical 
banks tha t ex-post differ only on the realization of 9. If one bank became insolvent (Bad) 
while the other is solvent (Good), the DIC (broad mandate) could consider merging both 
if their combined return were enough to pay patient depositors in both banks at least 
ci in the final period:
^ 51,52 [(1 -  7TCl)R(eG) +  R(0B)] > 7TC1 +  2(1 -  7r)ci,
where Sj is the DIC’s private signal on bank j.
This would require the DIC to provide liquidity assistance to the stronger institution, 
in order to satisfy patient depositors’ redemptions in the failed bank. This would be 
a different form of LoLR assistance from the one proposed in Acharya and Yorulmazer 
(2007a,b). Given the banks have no equity; the “purchase” would effectively be a transfer 
of assets from the failed bank to the solvent one (if viable).
The equilibrium for the depositors’ sub-game will depend on the structure of the 
signals they receive. If they obtained two equally informative signals (for example, 
if they held deposits in both banks), anticipating the merger patient depositors in the 
insolvent institution would prefer to wait. On the other hand, if depositors could monitor 
only one bank the equilibrium would depend on the order of the game, tha t is, which 
bank nature chooses to play first, as in Dasgupta (2002). Otherwise, the DIC would need 
to act pre-emptively, based solely on its signals and therefore missing the information 
contained in the number of runs on each bank.
2 .7 .7  O ther E xten sion s
Deposit guarantees are designed to protect small and usually uninformed depositors. 
This gives a trade-off because more sophisticated depositors tend not to be covered, and 
could exercise monitoring power independent of the DIC. Including this type of players
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in the game could provide an additional explanation for the failure of blanket guarantees 
sometimes.
Finally, it would be interesting to compare ex-ante versus ex-post funded systems. I 
have chosen to discuss an ex-post tax  funded system, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
In practice, some countries do run ex-post funded systems, charging a fee to surviving 
institutions participating in the scheme (e.g. in the U.K.). If an ex-ante premium were 
charged to  the bank, the equations of the model would be modified. I expect, however, 
th a t the main results would not change.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have introduced deposit insurance in a model of information-based 
bank runs. The model has a unique equilibrium, which allows for a proper evaluation 
of the effects of insurance on the behaviour of depositors, banks and the insurer. I have 
shown tha t, while consumers achieve better risk-sharing in a competitive banking sys­
tem  than in autarky, more solvent projects are liquidated as uninsured depositors fail 
to coordinate in a subset of fundamentals and run on banks they know to be solvent. 
While deposit insurance may prevent panic runs up to some extent, its effectiveness 
varies with the size of coverage and the degree of supervisory involvement of the agency 
in charge of insurance. I have considered two possible mandates. Under a narrow man­
date, and abstracting from the presence of any other regulatory authority, the insurer’s 
main objective is to pay the guarantee every time a bank has insufficient resources to 
cope with withdrawals. Under a broad mandate, the insurer also has responsibility for 
the resolution of insolvent and/or illiquid banks, and the ability to  provide emergency 
liquidity assistance as a lender of last resort.
Under a narrow mandate, a deposit insurance contract preserving the monitoring 
role of depositors involves offering less than full protection. The trade-off is tha t panic 
runs cannot be completely eliminated with a partial guarantee, although it does reduce 
the region of fundamentals for which th a t occurs. Under a broad mandate, I showed 
tha t panic runs tend to disappear for any level of insurance as the regulator’s signal 
becomes more precise. Given th a t liquidity assistance is committed to  solvent but illiquid 
institutions, depositors do not run on solvent banks. Moreover, it is cost efficient for 
the authority never to provide liquidity to insolvent banks. However, only extremely 
insolvent banks are closed, and those with enough funds to cover the payment of the 
final period guarantee are allowed to continue in operation. Therefore, the smaller 
the protection offered to depositors, the higher is forbearance. All these results hold
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irrespective of the specific values of the guarantee, which in particular might imply that 
the social cost of deposit insurance is lower under a broad mandate.
Finally, I showed tha t deposit insurance increases the equilibrium value of c\ and so 
the probability of runs, at least for high levels of the guarantee, but this effect seems also 
to be smaller under a broad mandate. Limited insurance could contain this externality 
up to some level, justifying the observed conduct of governments across the world in 
normal times.
Under a narrow mandate, pure panic runs persist even when depositors’ signals 
become very precise, the more so the lower the guarantee. Under a broad mandate, on 
the other hand, panic runs can be eliminated even with partial insurance but forbearance 
increases. Which one should be preferred?
Both mandates are equally popular among economies. In their survey, Demirgug- 
Kunt and Detragiache (1999) report tha t 34 out of 67 deposit insurance systems have 
a narrow constitution but they also show tha t the negative externalities imposed by 
deposit insurance on financial stability can be curbed by effective regulation, a result 
in line with the main conclusions of this chapter. Indeed, during recent years some 
countries (e.g. France) have started to move from narrow to broad mandate schemes 
(Garcia, 2000). Moreover, the costs of forbearance need to be compared to the benefits 
of a more stable financial system when panic runs threaten it.
Therefore, a scheme where the DIC has more supervisory involvement (broad man­
date), or else a high degree of coordination with the authority in charge of supervision, 
should be preferred.
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2.9 A ppendix
2.9 .1  P r o o f o f  th e  ex isten ce  o f  a  un ique m on oton e  equ ilibrium  in  th e  
case w ith ou t insurance
Proof.
This follows an easier version of the proof, proposed by Dasgupta (2002). Notice 
tha t A (6i,6*), being the composition of continuos functions in 9i and 6*, is continuous 
in both arguments.
Take 9{ = 9l — e :
&L
A {eL - e , e L - E ) =  j  ±s(8,0i)do.
0 l - 2 e
Notice tha t this integral is well defined as 0l — 2e >  0.
Ql  0 l
A (9 l  -  e ,0 l  ~  e) = J  i M O )  - u { l / n ) } d 0  + J  ± { u ( c 2(0,n)) - u ( c i ) } d 0 ,
0 l -  2e e L
where 9l is such tha t n(0L,0L — e) = l / c \ .  The first integral is clearly negative. The
second one is also negative, simply notice tha t 0l < 9 < 9l implies tha t n  >  7r and then
C2{0, n) < ci. Hence, A (9l -  e, 9l ~  t )  <  0.
Now take 9i = 9jj +  e :
Qjj 0 u + 2 e
A(0u  +  £ ,%  +  £) =  J  £  {u(0) - u ( l / n ) } d 0 +  J  £  {u (c2(0,n)) -  u(ci)}d9,
°u 6u
well defined given tha t 0 u  +  2 e  < 1.
The first integral is again negative but I have assumed tha t for 9 > 0u the return of the 
risky technology is extremely high, therefore the second integral should overcome the 
first one (n <  1/c i when 9 > 9jj) to make A (0jj +  e, 9jj +  e) > 0.
Hence, by continuity there exists 9* $z]9l — £,9u + e[ such th a t A(0*, 0*) = 0.
This equality establishes tha t the positive and negative parts of the integral exactly 
offset each other. Therefore, raising 0i above 9* increases the positive part, so tha t 
A{9i,9*) > 0 i£ 6 i  > 9*\ while lowering 9{ below 9* increases the negative part, and then 
A (9i,0*) <  0 if 0i < 0*.
That A(9i,9i)  is monotonic increasing can be proved by total differentiation with 
respect to 9j, and this property determines the uniqueness of the equilibrium. ■
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2.9.2 P roof o f proposition 5
Proof.
Consider 01, 92 E [0,1] such tha t 01 < 02. I want to prove tha t
A gie1^ 1) < A g{62,62).
A g(V,V) = j  {u{g)-u{cl ) }d e +  j  { " ( ~u^  \  d9' j  = 1'2’
0J 6°
where 9* is defined by n ( 0 \  9^) = l / c \  and satisfies +  ——— f 1 +  7r  J ; and
L -  tt \  C \ J
ff* is such th a t C2(0J',n (0J', 0J')) =  g, O'* < 9* < 9  ^ +  s.
9* is uniquely defined, as in the interval [0J — e:,#7 +  e], C2(0, n(0 ,0J)) is strictly
~i ^2 ~2
increasing on 0. For the same reason it is true tha t 0 0 > 0  — 0 , as when 0J is
higher a relatively smaller value of 6? is required for C2(0J , n ( ^ ,  0J )) =  g.
Finally, notice tha t from the definition of n(0,0J), if 9 E [01 — £,0l +  e],
9' E [02 — e, 02 +  e], and 9 — 01 = 9’ — 02 then n (0 ,01) =  n(0/, 02). This basically 
establishes tha t over the intervals [9J, 9  ^+e] j  =  1, 2, the functions n(9 , 0J ) take exactly 
the same values.
This information is sufficient to conclude th a t the function Ag(0*,9*) is increa­
sing. Although the first integral is higher for j  = 1 (because the function is cons­
tan t and the integration region is larger), the argument under the second integral is 
increasing on 0 -  remember tha t n  takes the same values in both regions -  and the 
integration region is larger and covers higher values of the fundamentals for j  = 2. 
Hence, the loss in the former is compensated by the gain in the la tter when j  = 2 
(c2(0, n(0 , 02)) > C2(0, n(9 , 01)) > g), implying th a t A g(02, 02) >  A g(91191). m
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2.9.3 P roof o f proposition 8
Proof.
Define
l /c i
$(9*g,c i,g )  =  J  {u (c2{ n ) ) - u ( c i ) } d n +  J  {u (g) -  u{ci)} dn =  0 ,
7r n
1  —  TiC\  ^
where C2(n) — —--------R{6(n))  and C2 (n ) =  g.
1 — n
L W  =  j  U' ^ n^ ( \  — ~n )  R'(0(n))dn
7T
+  W  ^  ^  ”  u C^l^  ~~ W  ^  ^  > ° ’
because by assumption u(.) and R(.) are increasing.
n
I ? .  =  /  | w'(c2( n ) ) | ^  -  . '( c i ) }  dn +  { .  (p) -  .(c i)}
7T
i/ei ^
-  J  u'(ci)dn  +  {n (^) _  u {ci)} -  {u (g) -  .(c i)}  ,
n
dc2 —n  
dc\ 
Simplifying,
where —— —  ------R{0{n)) < 0.
o i 1 — n
n l/c\ 2
^ - =  J u'{c2{ n ) ) ^ d n -  J  u '(Cl) d n + ^ i }  { .( c ^  -  u(g)} .
By the Implicit Function theorem,
l /c i
<£> u(g) > u(ci) -  c\ J  j . ' ( c i )  -  . '( c 2( n ) ) |^ l l {n<fi}}dn,
7r ^
where !{„<„} =
‘ 0
>o
1 i f  n  < n
2' ^  = ^ M s ) - U(ci)}+ J  u ' { g ) d n - ^ { u ( g ) - u ( c 1)}
n
xx. 1/Cr At)*
^ ^  =  / “' { s ) d n > 0 ^ ^  =  - § < 0  ■
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2.9.4 P roof o f proposition 21
Proof.
I want to compare the equilibrium condition for ci under a narrow m andate against the 
one obtained by Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) in the model without insurance:
* I  { u '(ci ) -  R (e)u ' { \  n~ R w\ 1 - T r
dQ
dc\ 7Tu(Ci) +  (1 -  7T)U ~ UW
(2.5)
Take —— ^  (ci) =  0. I will prove tha t c? < c?5 (where the c?5 stands for 
oci oci
the equilibrium without insurance, and cf for the one with insurance).
Define w(Q,c\) = u '(ci) — R{0)u' f  ^ —— -^.R(0) j . The following result is required.
R e su lt 1. zu(0,ci) is increasing on 6 and decreasing on c\.
P ro o f. In order to see th a t vj{0, .) is increasing on 9, notice th a t vj(9, .) is differen­
tiable and
^  =  - R ' ( 0 ) u ' ( c 2 (O, i t ) )  -  R ( $ ) u "  (c2(0,7T)) R ' ( 8 )
= —R'(6){u' (c2{9, 7r)) 4- u" (c2(9, 7r)) c2(0, tt)}
R'{Q)
u'(c2)
1 c2u"(c2)
u'(c2)
-  V"“
< - 1
<0
► > 0,
because by assumption u(.) index of relative risk aversion is higher than 1.
In the same way, is differentiable and
£  =  “ " to )  + 1 3 ^  t o ( M ) )  < 0,
because u(.) is concave.■
c™5 is the solution to
7T J  -  R(8)u' R (8)) |  d8 =  0,
e*(c"s)
the LHS of equation 2.5 (FOC without insurance).
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Evaluating the LHS of equation 2.4 (FOC with insurance) in c™5: 
1
LHS{2 .4 )(c?9) = 7T J  ju'(cys) -  R{8)u' } de
a*(„n9\0*{c{g)
=0
+ J  ju^c?9) -  R(8)u' )  dS
W )
{u'(ef) -  f i(^ (c ? 9) K  (l-l^fl(0;(c?9))) J+ 7 T
R e su lt 2 . For c\ given, 9*(ci) < 9*(ci).
Proof. Proposition 8 can be generalised for different values of the insurance offered 
in each period. It is easy to prove (by implicit differentiation) tha t 6* is decreasing on 
the gap gi — g2. As the case without insurance can be described as a particular case 
where pi =  1 /n  and g2 = 0, 0*(ci) <  0*(ci) Vpi =  p2. ■
R e su lt 3. zu(9, ci) increasing on 6 implies w(9*(ci9), c™9) < -07(0*(c™5), c™9) <  0.
1
m (d,c7l g)dd =  0 and - ^ r  > 0, implies tha t the function w (.,c™5) 
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e*(ci*)
is not constant and must change sign in the interval [#*(c™9), 1]. Being increasing, this 
means it has to be positive for high values of 0, and negative for small values of 6. In 
particular, m(9*(cl9), c”9) < 0. ■
From result 3, it follows th a t L i75(2.4)(ci 9) < 0. Hence, as w (9 ,c i)  is decreasing on 
ci, and ^ (9 ,  c l9) is negative over the region [9*g(ci9), 0*(cj5)], L H S( 2 . 4 ) (c?) =  0 if and 
only if cf < c^ 9.
691(d) 69* (c\)
Remember I have assumed —^----- =  ——■-—- =  0, and then a change in ci does not
6c\ 6c\
change the limits of integration in the equations. ■
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Figure 2-1: Number of total early withdrawals.
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Figure 2-2: Equilibrium and solvency thresholds without insurance.
Nature
Nature
Patient
depositors
Patient , a , 
depositors 1
n < 1 /c. n > 1/c,
n < l/c ,
n > 1/c. DIC (n,s)
(c1lmax{c2(0,n).g2}) (g1 ,g2) (c, ,max{c2(0,n),g2}) (g1 ,g2)
Figure 2-3: Extended form of the game in the interim period, when the DIC operates 
under (a) a narrow mandate and (b) a broad mandate.
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u(0) - u(l)
u(0) - u(c
Figure 2-4: Premium to wait to withdraw in the final period (a) without deposit insu­
rance and (b) with deposit insurance.
Figure 2-5: Expected premium to wait to withdraw in the final period with deposit 
insurance.
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Figure 2-6: Equilibrium and solvency thresholds with and w ithout insurance.
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Figure 2-7: Equilibrium threshold with insurance, as a function of C \  and g .
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Figure 2-8: Optimal value of c\ without insurance and with g = 1.
FOCto,): Partial Insurance
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Figure 2-9: Optimal value of c\ with partial insurance.
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Chapter 3
Market D iscipline and th e Safety  
N et
3.1 Introduction
Basel II is based on three pillars, one of which is market discipline. Market discipline 
is broadly interpreted on the basis that private sector agents (stockholders, security 
holders) face costs th a t are positively correlated with risk and react in accordance with 
these costs when pricing banks’ instruments (Levy-Yeyati et al, 2004).
The literature identifies two types of market discipline. Indirect market discipline 
refers to the ability of investors and other market participants to evaluate the risk of 
the banks through pricing information of traded securities, both in the primary and 
secondary markets. Direct market discipline refers to the responsiveness of bank ma­
nagers to tha t evaluation because increasing risk leads to increasing costs of funding, 
thus constraining a bank’s risk-taking (Bliss and Flannery, 2000).
One of the purposes of including market discipline in Basel II was to complement the 
supervisory review process (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). There is 
more than one instrument, though, tha t could be used to implement market discipline. 
For example, Basel II proposes a set of disclosure recommendations in three broad areas, 
capital, risk exposure and capital adequacy, which are intended to reveal the financial 
strength of banks. On the other hand, several academic authors and central bankers have 
suggested the introduction of a subordinated debt requirement, on a regular basis, in 
order to have a widespread, comparable instrument to evaluate the risk level of different 
institutions.1
1See Kwast et al. (1999) for a summary of subdebt proposals and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999 for a policymakers’ view on the topic.
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Subordinated debt requirements require banks to issue bonds th a t are senior to 
equity but junior to  all insured claims and thus uncovered by any kind of explicit or 
implicit guarantee.2 Behind this proposal is the idea tha t subordinated debt could 
allow regulators to require banks to  have a bigger share of private funds at risk without 
harming their competitiveness, increasing the cushion for absorbing losses and saving 
tax-payer’ money in the event of failure. Because of limited liability, equity holders tend 
to demand more risk than is socially efficient (see Chapter 4). Being junior claimants, 
subordinated debt holders should have the appropriate incentives to monitor the risk 
taken by the bank in order to reduce the probability of default, bringing it closer to 
socially efficient levels.3
If correctly priced, subordinated debt yields, with longer m aturity and a junior 
status to other liabilities, should be informative about the risk preferences of banks 
because rational uninsured investors would demand higher risk premiums from riskier 
banks. Indeed, many empirical papers have found a positive and significant relationship 
between the interest rates paid on bank’s liabilities and various forms of measuring risk 
(see Flannery and Nikolova (2003) for evidence in the U.S., Sironi (2003) for evidence 
in Europe, Demirgug-Kant and Huizinga (2004) for evidence in a sample of developing 
countries and Evanoff and Wall (2000) for a survey). Hence, the price of debt should 
provide, both to the market and to  supervisors, a low cost signal of the bank riskiness 
(Berger, Davies and Flannery, 1999).
W ithout an explicit requirement for issuing subordinated debt, there may be a se­
lection bias problem, where banks with riskier assets may simply refrain from issuing 
bonds. Moreover, as the price of this type of securities may reflect liquidity risk, as 
well as default risk, Covitz et al. (2004) argue tha t a policy of mandating the regular 
issuance of subdebt would reduce the endogeneity of liquidity premiums, improving the 
information content of primary and secondary markets’ debt spreads.
In principle, the more frequently the bank approaches the market, the stronger will be 
the discipline. This comes not only through the continuous pricing of debt on a market 
basis but because the failure to rollover could also be a signal of trouble. However, while 
this mechanism may operate correctly in normal times, it may generate new sources of 
instability in situations of financial distress. The accumulation of short-term  debt is
2 Subordinated debt was already present in Basel I, not as a requirement but as an inferior form of 
equity, limited to 50% of tier 1 capital and counted as an element of tier 2.
3 This line of argumentation has been criticized by Bliss (2001), because assuming no separation 
between equity holders and bank managers neglects a basic aspect of corporate governance, agency 
problems, downplaying the role of equity holders in enhancing market discipline. He argues that bond 
yield spreads provide a poor noisy predictor of risk and therefore that information should be comple­
mented with equity prices as well as any accounting information that is publicly available.
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a concern for regulators because it puts at risk the stability of the financial system. 
In times of financial distress prices usually depart from the underlying fundamentals 
and the ratings of private agencies may be delayed or may neglect relevant information, 
even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Coordination of private lenders might fail 
to provide liquidity even to solvent banks, ultimately triggering contagion (Rochet and 
Tirole, 1996).
Some theoretical research has borrowed tools from the corporate finance literature 
in order to  combine market discipline with the other pillars of Basel II. In these models, 
capital requirements are seen as intervention thresholds for regulators, so they focus on 
how market discipline modifies these thresholds (Decamps et al, 2004; Bhattacharya et 
al, 2002). Other authors have studied how market discipline affects the agency pro­
blem between equity holders and managers, through changes in the level of monitoring 
effort put in by the latter, which indirectly induces a given level of risk (Hortala-Vallve, 
2002). This chapter will use a variation on the three-period, imperfect information model 
introduced in Chapter 2, where uninformed insured depositors, informed uninsured so­
phisticated investors (equity holders and bond holders) and the regulator interact in the 
market, in order to study and compare the effects tha t disclosure requirements alone, 
and in combination with a subordinated debt requirement, have on the equilibrium 
probability of insolvency of the bank and on the regulator’s closure policy. I also study 
how the m aturity of the debt modifies these results.
W ith a disclosure requirement, I prove tha t the regulator uses a fully financed closure 
rule tha t avoids inefficient survival but involves an inefficient liquidation of assets in a 
region of the bank’s fundamentals. Although the probability of insolvency is higher than 
the first best, it converges on it as the manager’s signal noise goes to zero. When, on 
top of the disclosure requirement, the bank is asked to issue a zero coupon bond with 
long maturity, the probability of insolvency is further reduced. The regulator’s closure 
policy in this case forces fewer banks into liquidation, given the subsidy from bond 
holders to deposit holders when the bank becomes fundamentally unprofitable. Finally, 
when debt can be rolled over in the interim period and so bond holders do monitor the 
bank, this period sub-game equilibrium provides very useful information that, in some 
cases, can completely eliminate inefficient liquidation of assets because the regulator 
can perfectly observe the bank’s fundamentals. However, this will come at the cost of a 
higher probability of insolvency than in the non-rollover case.
The results in this chapter allow us to conclude that a subordinated debt requirement, 
when issued at a long maturity, is able to reduce the probability of insolvency for any size
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of noise. Indeed, intuition suggests th a t when the manager’s signal noise is expected to 
be high, an appropriately high subordinated debt requirement could restore the first best. 
On the other hand, a subordinated bond issued with a short m aturity can substantially 
improve on the quality of information (by reducing the noise). Therefore, a subordinated 
debt requirement can be used to complement disclosure requirements, providing a new 
set of information which is useful to the regulator.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the model and provides a 
solution for the first best. Section 3.3 discusses the regulator’s optimal closure policy and 
the equilibrium interest rate when the manager is required to disclose her information. 
Section 3.4 develops the new equilibrium when, in addition to disclosure, the bank issues 
a subordinated bond with different maturities. A discussion of the main results and 
possible extensions is presented in section 3.5 and the conclusions are given in section 
3.6.
3.2 The M odel
Consider a competitive economy tha t lasts for three periods t G {0,1,2}, where all banks 
have access to  the same two investment technologies at the planning period (t = 0). 
For simplicity, I will focus on a representative bank which is liquidated at t  =  2. The 
bank manager must decide whether to invest in a liquid technology (storage), returning 
1 unit of consumption at t 4- 1 per unit invested at t\ or in a stochastic, long-term, 
partially illiquid technology, returning 1 if liquidated in the interim period (t = 1) and 
R  if liquidated at t =  2. The long-term return function, R  = R{6), is continuous and 
increasing on 0, a random variable uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], which 
represents the underlying fundamentals of the projects financed by the bank. 0 is not 
verifiable until t = 2.
A continuum of mass 1 consumers receive 1 unit of endowment at t = 0. There 
exist three types of consumers: depositors (Do)? investors (Bo) and equity holders (Wo); 
where 0 < Wo < Bo < Bo and Do +  Bo +  Wo =  1. Equity holders are risk neutral, 
consume at t = 2 and deposit their money in the bank in exchange for future profits. 
Investors are also risk neutral and consume at t = 2 but can decide whether to invest 
their money in deposits or in bonds issued by the bank. Depositors are uncertain about 
their time of consumption. W ith probability 1 — tt a depositor is patient, meaning 
tha t she enjoys consumption only at t = 2. W ith complementary probability, 7r, she 
is impatient and consumes only in the interim period. At t  = 1, types are privately 
realised and all impatient depositors withdraw to consume. Depositors are risk averse,
110
with preferences represented by a concave and increasing utility function u(ct),  where 
ct is the effective payoff in period t.
The bank offers a constant interest rate r  on deposits in each period. Agents holding 
deposits until t  = 2 receive (1 +  r ) 2 if the bank is profitable and a residual payoff 
C2 (6 , r ) if the bank fails. Hence, they evaluate their expected payoff in the final period, 
conditional on their beliefs about the response of their counterparts, and decide whether 
to withdraw or to wait.
I will assume that all agents have access to  the storage technology but only the bank 
can invest in the risky project. I will also assume tha t the bank manager is one of the 
risk neutral equity holders, so she acts in the perfect interest of this group (no agency 
problems). After raising funds (equity, deposits and bonds), the bank manager decides 
which project to invest in. Assuming tha t E q[R(6)\ > 1, the risky project is superior 
to storage and, therefore, all resources are invested on it. Therefore, the bank’s only 
decision is the interest rate offered on deposits.
3.2 .1  B enchm ark M odel: P erfect In form ation
Assume first tha t the bank does not issue debt, so tha t investors can only make deposits. 
In this case, there are Do +  Bo units of deposits in the bank and the residual payoff 
function when the bank is unprofitable is given by C2(0,r) = R(6)■
Notice tha t because Do +  Bo <  1, if the bank fails at t = 1 each deposit holder 
could receive at most jyQ\ Bo >  1, at the expense of the loss of equity holders. Assume 
7tDq (1 +  r) <  1 r < 1~ ^ ?Q ^  , otherwise runs would be triggered by the demand 
of impatient depositors alone. If (Do +  Bo) (1 +  r) <  1, because of the assumptions 
about the long-term technology, the bank will always be liquid in the interim period, 
even if all deposit holders run on it. This would be more likely to  happen when the 
bank is well capitalised (W o high). In such a case, when the bank is fundamentally 
insolvent (see below for a definition), it would be a Pareto superior outcome for patient 
deposit holders to run because their payoffs would be higher. Indeed, equity holders 
would even be able to obtain some small pay back, giving private incentives for the 
manager to disclose her information when the bank’s fundamentals are low, without the 
need for the intervention of a regulator. Therefore, I will work under the assumption 
that (Do +  H o ) ( l  +  r) >  1 r > , which is likely to hold when the bank is
highly leveraged (D o  +  B q W o ), so tha t a run does indeed cause the bank to fail.4
4 Because depositors are risk averse, they will require a strictly positive compensation for deposits 
(r >  0). Hence, the inequality is trivially satisfied for Wo =  0 (or Do +  Bo =  1). By continuity, this 
should also be true in a neighbourhood of Wo =  0. L  =  D°^B° is the leverage of the bank, and as
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Let 0i(r) be the values of the fundamental satisfying C2(9i,r) = (1 +  r )1, for i =  1, 2.
D efin itio n  23 A bank is said to be fundamentally solvent i f  9 > 9 \  (r ).
The spirit of this definition is the same as in the previous chapter. This is, if patient 
deposit holders are able to monitor the bank, knowing 9 > 9 \  (r ), they should optimally 
decide to wait until t = 2 because C2(0, r) >  (1 +  r ) .
Notice tha t the distributional assumption on 9 implies tha t prob[9 < 0X] = 9X. Hence, 
ex-ante, a bank offering a demand deposit contract with interest rate r  is solvent with 
probability 1 — 9\ ( r ) .
Implicit differentiation of 0i with respect to r  gives
d9i   ( 1—ir)Do+Bo j-.
dr ~  (l-7rDo(l+r))*i?'(0i) ^
P ro p o s itio n  24 The higher the interest rate paid on deposits, the higher the probability 
of the bank being insolvent.
D efin itio n  25 A bank is said to be fundamentally profitable i f  0 > 02 (r )*
Whenever 9 > 9 2 ( r ) , the bank makes profits tha t are shared among equity holders, 
which happens with probability 1 — 02 (?), deceasing in r. This comes from the implicit 
differentiation of 0 2  with respect to r :
d02 _  R(9i)(2-nD0 (l+r)) n 
dr ~  (l-7r£>o(l+r))fl#(02) ^
Assume for a moment tha t 9 is perfectly observable for all agents at t = 1. If 
9 < 91 ( r ) , each patient depositor would anticipate a payoff of 1 +  r  if she runs but 
everybody else waits and C2(0, r) < 1 +  r  if she waits and everybody else also waits. 
So she runs. Now, the optimal response when all the other patient depositors decide to 
run is also to run because tha t action gives a payoff of Dq^ Bq , while waiting gives 0. 
Therefore, she optimally decides to run (table 3.1).
Conversely, if 9 > 9\ ( r ) , each patient deposit holder would know the bank to be 
solvent and would anticipate a payoff of 1 4- r  if she runs but everybody else waits and 
of C2(0,r)  >  1 +  r  if she waits and everybody else also waits, so she would prefer to
Do + Bo + Wo = 1, Do + Bo Wo is equivalent to very high values of L. Another way of achieving this 
outcome would be for the liquidation of the long term technology to be costly. If the liquidation value 
of assets in the interim period were low enough, it would be possible for the run of impatient depositors 
to cause the bank to fail. While the qualitative results should be the same, the algebra would be more 
complicated with this assumption.
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wait. However, the optimal response when all other patient deposit holders decide to 
run is also to run because tha t action gives a payoff of while waiting gives 0.
In this case two equilibriums exist, one in which all patient deposit holders wait and 
the bank survives to the final period; and one where all withdraw and the bank goes 
bankrupt in the interim period, despite the fact th a t the bank is solvent. This is known 
as “coordination failure” , a classical result in games with common knowledge.
wait run
t =  1 1 +  r lDq+Bo
t  = 2 c2(0,r) 0
TABLE 3.1: Patient deposit holders’ payoffs in the game with common knowledge and no 
insurance.
D ep o s it h o ld e rs ’ p a r tic ip a tio n  c o n s tra in t: Ex-ante, in the absence of coordination
failure, depositors optimally decide to invest in the bank if E  [u(r)j =  E  [u(ci, C2)] >  u, 
where u is the reservation utility coming from the industry zero profit constraint and ct 
is the effective payoff in period t , which depends on r and the strategy played by other 
deposit holders. Similarly, the risk neutral investors decide to take deposits in the bank 
if E  ['u(r)] =  E  [v(ci, C2)] >  v, where v(.) is the identity function.
E q u ity  h o ld e rs ’ payoff: In the absence of coordination failure, if the bank were
profitable (0 > 6 2  (r)), the final period profit would be given by
w 2(0, r)  =  (1 -  nDo (1 +  r)) R(6) -  ((1 - i t  ) D 0 + Bo)  (1 +  r f .
Otherwise, because of limited liability: W 2 (0 , r ) =  0.
Hence, the manager maximises
E [W 2{B,t)\ = f  h l - T D o (l  + r ) ) R ( 0 ) - ( ( l - T T ) D o + B o) ( l  + r)2}d$
« j(r ) 1 1
1
=  (1 — ttD q (1 4- r)) f  {R{6) -  R(02)} de > 0.
0 2  (r)
Notice tha t the objective function is decreasing on r. In fact, differentiating with
respect to r  :
& E [ W 2(6,r)} =  - ttD o f  {R (0 )  -  R (6 2) j  M
M r)
— (1 — nDo (1 +  r)) /  /  # ( * 2) ^ d 9  +  [H(92) _ J i ( e 2) ] 2 g ! i l
l»2(r) J
1
= - ttD 0 f  R ( 0 ) d 0 - 2 ( l - 0 2(r ) ) [ ( l -7 r )D o  + B o] ( l  + r) <  0.
02 (r )
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Benchmark Case Interest Rate: First Best
In order to compute the first best, assume tha t there are no inefficient runs, tha t is, 
patient deposit holders’ only withdraw their money from insolvent banks. Therefore, 
the bank manager solves the following problem:
(Po) min r 
st.
(3.1) E [ u ( r ) \> u
(3.2) E  ['u(r)] > v
(3-3) r > i  
(3-4) r < i = g a
Denote by r° the optimal solution to this problem.
3.2 .2  Im p erfect Inform ation
The usual argument in favour of the safety net is the protection of dispersed uninformed 
depositors. In fact, in general, 0 will be imperfectly observable only to  the manager. Let 
me assume tha t depositors are unable (because of their lack of expertise, or because it is 
too costly for them) to monitor the bank, so tha t the game is one of “common absence 
of knowledge” . Hence, two equilibriums persist: either all run or all wait, irrespective 
of the value of the fundamentals.
Let me introduce one additional player in this game, a regulator, tha t offers a deposit 
insurance contract g\ =  1 if the bank is closed in the interim period and <72 — 1 +  r if 
the bank goes bankrupt in the last period.5
wait run
t - 1 1 +  r 1D o+ B q
t = 2 f (l +  r )2 ,
y max{c2 ( 0 ,r ) , 1 +  r},
if 0 >  02 
if 0 <  02
max{c2 (0, r ) , 1 +  r}
TABLE 3.2: Patient depositors’ payoffs in the game with common absence of knowledge 
and deposit insurance.
It is clear that, with these payoffs, waiting is the only dominant strategy. If all 
patient depositors wait:
5 <72 is set equal to 1 +  r in order to eliminate runs (see Chapter 2) but this chapter does 
not discuss whether the chosen guarantee is optimal. Moreover, remember that we are assuming 
( D o+ B q) (1 +  r) >  1. If ( D o + B 0) (1 +  r) <  1, insurance in the second period would need to be j)0+ g0 
in order to prevent inefficient runs. Therefore, the compensation for patient depositors would be higher 
than the capital invested in the interim period, making the insurance system more expensive. In this 
case, however, the manager would have market driven incentives to declare her information on the 
quality of the bank’s assets in the interim period.
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K a itnt M r >9)] = I  u(max{c2 (6, r ) , 1 +  r})dO +  /  u (( l +  r )2)d(9 
0 02
> 02^(1 +  r) +  (1 — 02) w((l +  r )2)
If all run:
E?Snent [u (r,sr)l =
[«*(r,9)l -  E & r*  [u(r,s)] >  (1 -  62) (u (( l + r ) 2) -  « ( ^ ) )  >  0.
Investors are risk neutral, so waiting is clearly an optimal strategy for them when 
the risk averse patient depositors have chosen to do so. Then, with common absence 
of knowledge and the guarantee on deposits, it is never optimal for deposit holders to 
withdraw early, even if the bank is insolvent.
P a r tic ip a tio n  c o n s tra in ts : If the regulator does not intervene in the case of insolvent
banks, given tha t patient depositors will always wait until the final period, ex-ante they 
will optimally decide to invest in the bank if 
E  [u(r , #)] =  7ru (1 +  r) +  (1 — ir) 6\u  (1 +  r)
+  (1 — 7r) u ^min | c 2 (9 , r ) , (1 +  r )2} )  dQ >u.
In this case, investors are also covered by the guarantee on deposits, which requires 
that E[v(r, g)] > v. Equity holders’ expected payoff is the same as in the benchmark 
case.
W ithout monitoring, and if the regulator did not intervene in the case of insolvent 
banks, the bank manager would free ride on deposit insurance, offering a suboptimal 
interest rate (see Appendix). This is intuitive, given the probability of runs is zero and 
deposit holders’ payoffs are higher V0 < 9 \ .
Therefore, in the game where the bank issues only insured deposits, market discipline 
can only be exerted by the regulator, which needs to get information about the bank.
This can be done through disclosure requirements, available market information, or by
the combination of these and other instruments. Assume tha t the regulator has a broad 
mandate, which means tha t she has the obligation to pay deposit holders the guarantee 
but can also take over the bank’s assets if it becomes insolvent and manage them in order 
to pay investors according to their seniority. This implies paying first the guarantee to 
deposit holders, then liquidating the assets of the bank to repay the insurance contract 
(plus any fees due) and finally, provided any funds remain, allocating them  to creditors 
according to their seniority, in the following order: deposit holders, bond holders and 
equity holders.
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3.3 Disclosure
Disclosure requires the manager to reveal her signal, 9, to the regulator. Assume 
6  = 6  4- £, and e ~  U [ —£m ,£m]-  Hence, given a signal 6 , she knows the true value
of 9 to be in the interval max j#  -  Em, 0 j  , min j 9 +  em, l j j  .
• 9 < 9\ — em implies 9 < 9\, so the bank is insolvent and should be liquidated at 
t  =  1.
• 9 > 9\ +  £m implies 9 > 9±, so the bank is solvent and should be allowed to survive 
until the final period.
• When 91 — em < 9 < 9\ +  em it is not possible to distinguish between a solvent or 
an insolvent bank, though it is possible to assign probabilities to these events.6
3.3 .1  C losure P o licy
If the bank were closed and liquidated at t = 1, the regulator would have to pay D q + B q 
(one unit of consumption per depositor) with a cost equal to
max {Do +  B q — 1,0} =  0.
If the regulator assumed control of the bank at t = 1 but closed it at t = 2, she
would have to pay ((1 — 7r) Do 4- Do) (1 +  r) with a cost equal to
max {((1 -  7r) D 0 +  Do) (1 +  r) -  (1 -  7tD0 (1 +  r)) R  (9 ) , 0} .
Hence, when the regulator observes a signal 9, she closes the bank in the interim
period if
/ \
C \9 )  = f  m ax{((l — 7r) Do +  Do) (1 +  r) — (1 — 7tDo (1 +  r)) R  (9 ) , 0} d9 > 0.
0 Em
Notice tha t because R  (9) is increasing on 9, C  ^9  ^ is decreasing on 9. In fact, for 
high values of the signal  ^9 >  9\ 4- C {9^j = 0, while for low values ^9 < 9\
C  ( 9 )  > 0.
The IMF and BIS codes of best practices requires the resolution of a failing bank to 
be decided according to a “least cost” criterion (Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003 and Basel
6 In the absence of deposit insurance, disclosure of the manager’s information should trigger depositors 
to run on insolvent banks with signals in the region [0 , Q\ — em], but multiple equilibriums will persist 
in the region [6 1 £m, 1 ].
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Committee on Banking Supervision, 2002). Hence, define by 6 c  =  min j 6 : C  (o'j = 0 j . 
6c  determines the closure rule of the bank, in the following way: V 6 < 6c  the bank is 
closed and V 6 > 6c  the bank is left open.
P ro p o s itio n  26 When the manager discloses her signal to the regulator, it is cost ef­
ficient for the latter to close the bank in the interim period when 6 < 6c = 6 1 + £m and 
leave it open otherwise.
P ro o f. It only remains to prove tha t 6c  — 6\ +  £m. By definition, for all signals
6 > 6 1 +Em, c f e )  = o.
Consider 6 = &\ +  em — 5, with <5 > 0. 7
/ \ 0i+2em—6
C \0 )  = I  m ax{((l -  tt) D o +  Bo) (1 +  r) -  (1 -  ttD q (1 +  r)) R  (6) , 0}d6
v J 0i-5
0i
=  /  {((1 — ti") Do +  Bo) (1 +  r) — (1 — 7rDo (1 +  r)) R  (0)} dd >  0, V5 > 0. 
0!-S
Therefore, 6c = 6\ +  Em. ■
The proposed guarantee is then fully financed, without the need to resort to taxes 
because, for signals below 6c  (i.e., for 6 < 6\), banks are closed in the interim period and 
depositors receive , which is higher than the promised guarantee in tha t period
fol =  I)-
P ro p o s itio n  27 With the previous closure rule there is no inefficient survival, although 
inefficient liquidation of assets might persist for a region of the fundamentals.
P ro o f. Notice tha t if 6 <  0i, the signal would necessarily be smaller than 6c, hence 
all insolvent banks are liquidated. When 6 > 6\ +  2em the signal is above 6c  and solvent 
banks in tha t region survive. However, in the interval [6\, 0i +  2em] inefficient liquidation 
of assets might persist. ■
In te re s t r a te  w ith  in su ran ce  a n d  d isc lo su re
Given the closure rule, the manager solves 
(Pd ) min r 
st.
(3-9) E $ c  [u (r i g)\
(3.10) E$c [v(r,g)] > v
(3-H)
(3.12) r < i ^
7The proof assumes 8 < 2Em, but the result follows directly if 8 >  2em.
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P ro p o s itio n  28 The probability of insolvency is higher in the case with deposit insur­
ance and disclosure than in the first best Nevertheless, it converges on the benchmark 
solution as the noise goes to zero.
P ro o f. See Appendix. ■
The proof is intuitive. Patient deposit holders’ payoffs are the same under the 
benchmark case as with disclosure and intervention, except in the shaded area of figure 
3-1. In this region, their payoff in the benchmark case is higher:
c2 (0, r) > prob{6 < 6C) Dq\ Bq + prob{9 > 6c )c2 (0, r ) .
Therefore, in order to meet the participation constraints, the equilibrium interest 
rate must be higher.
So far, I have implicitly assumed tha t the manager voluntarily tells the tru th  to the 
regulator and reveals her signal but a more likely outcome is tha t the regulator obtains 
this information by direct on-site monitoring, which is costly. Being this a sunk cost, 
however, it will not modify the regulator’s policy in any relevant way. For simplicity, 
throughout the rest of this chapter I will assume monitoring costs to be nil for all agents, 
although an extension of the results for positive values of these costs will be discussed 
in section 3.5.
In any case, the regulator might decide not to rely exclusively on the signal declared 
by the manager but also on other available market information and instruments, such 
as subordinated debt, which is the topic of the next section.
3.4 Subordinated D ebt
Assume now that the bank issues a subordinated bond in the initial period, which implies 
tha t bond holders will be junior to depositors but senior to equity holders, in case the 
bank defaults on its obligations.
I am going to study two cases: one with a zero coupon bond with m aturity at t = 2 
and one where the bond can be rolled over at t — 1.
3.4 .1  Zero C oup on  B on d  w ith  M a tu r ity  at t = 2
Consider the case of a zero coupon bond returning b2 (r , so) units of consumption at 
maturity per unit invested at t =  0. That is, the return demanded by investors depends 
both on the number of subordinated bonds issued and the interest rate paid on deposits.
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The bank is required to issue so units of this bond at t  = 0. For each value of r and 
6, the profit of the bank at t = 2 is given by
W 2(0, r) =  (1 -  7tD q (1 +  r)) R  (0) -  [(1 -  n) D0 +  B 0 -  s0] (1 +  r )2 -  s0b2 (r, s0)
=  (1 -  wD0 (1 +  r)) R  (0) -  [(1 -  tt) D 0+ B 0] (1 +  r )2 - s 0 ( h  (r, s0) -  (1 +  r ) 2)  , 
where so < B q. Naturally, b2 (r, so) must be higher than (1 +  r )2 in order to attract 
investors away from deposits.
This time, the bank is profitable if 0 > 0$-, where W 2(6s,r) = 0 or equivalently 
c2 V s ,  r) = (1 +  r ) 2 +  s0
Notice tha t because c2 (6, r) is increasing on 0, Os(r) > 02(r) and 0s(r) is increasing 
on r.
Define by 6{ the value of the fundamentals satisfying
(1 -  ttD q (1 +  r)) R  (0~) -  [(1 -  7r) D q +  B q — so] (1 +  r)* =  0, 2 =  1,2
c2 (SI, r) =  (1 + r)' -  <  (1 +  r)‘ 
Clearly, 0* (r) <  6 i (r ) for i = 1,2.
Players’ payoffs:
When the bank’s assets are liquidated in the interim period, given the form of the 
guarantee, each deposit holder receives min j Do+g— - ^ , 1 +  r  j units of consumption, 
bondholders receive max j 1~(1+T’)[^ )o+Bo-go]  ^q j  an(^ because of limited liability, equity 
holders receive nothing.
When the bank is open in the final period and 6  > Os, deposit holders receive 
(1 +  r )2 , bondholders b2 (r, so) and equity holders share profits and obtain each.
Otherwise, if 02 < 6 < Os : deposit holders receive (1 +  r ) 2 , bond holders obtain a 
residual payoff and, because of limited liability, equity holders receive nothing.8
When 0 < 02 the regulator takes over on the bank’s assets and players other than 
deposit holders receive nothing. If 9\ < 6  depositors receive C2(0, r) > 1 +  r  and if 0 < 6 1  
they receive 1 +  r, the guaranteed value of deposits in tha t period.
Ex-ante, bond holders optimally decide to invest in the bank’s bond instead of de­
posits if E~b [v(bt)] > E~b [u(r, g, so)] • Given tha t they cannot hquidate their assets 
0c 9c
in the interim period (there is no secondary market in this model), the only relevant 
information for them is the ex-ante information. In particular, they need to anticipate
8 It is important that bond holders are senior to equity holders, otherwise the latter will get a subsidy 
in default.
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the regulator’s closure rule, which is incorporated in the required compensation for the 
bond, ?>2 (r, so), increasing on r (see the Appendix).9 Hence, once again, the only in­
formation tha t the regulator can recover in the interim period is tha t disclosed by the 
bank manager.
C lo su re  po licy  w ith  d isc lo su re  a n d  a  long  m a tu r i ty  s u b o rd in a te d  b o n d
If the bank is closed and liquidated at t = 1, the regulator has to pay D q with a cost 
equal to max {D q +  Bo — so — 1,0} =  0.
If the bank is intervened at t = 2, the regulator has to pay [(1 — n) D q+ B q—sq] (1 -H r ) 
with a cost equal to
max {[(1 -  7r) D q +  B 0 -  s0] (1 +  r) -  (1 -  7tD q (1 +  0 )  R  W  > °} •
Hence if the regulator observes a signal 0, she closes the bank in the interim period
if
/ \
C  (0J = f  m ax{[(l -  7t) D 0 +  B 0 -  so] (1 +  r) -  (1 -  7tD q (1 +  r)) R (9) ,0}d6 > 0
® Em
Notice the function under the integral is decreasing on 9. For high values of the signal 
(o >  $1 +  £rnj C  ^0^ =  0, while for low values (^ 0 < 0i — C  ^0^ > 0.
Define by 0^ =  min |0  : C  ^0^ =  0 j . 0^ determines the closure rule of the regulator
when the bank issues a long term  subordinated bond and the manager discloses her
~ ~b ~  ~b
information, in the following way: V 0 < 9C the bank is closed and V 0 > 9C the bank
is left open until t = 2.
P ro p o s itio n  29 When the bank issues a long-term zero coupon subordinated bond and
the manager discloses her signal to the regulator, it is cost efficient for the latter to close
~  ~b —
the bank in the interim period when 9 < 9C =  9\ +  £m and leave it open otherwise. 
P ro o f. As in proposition 26 ■
Notice tha t if 0 < 0i, then 0 < 0^ and the bank is closed. On the other hand, for all 
0 > 01 -j- 2£m it is necessary true that 0 > 0C and the bank is allowed to survive until the 
final period. Once again, this rule promotes no inefficient survival, although inefficient 
liquidation of assets might persist in a region of the fundamentals [0i,0i +  2em].
9 Being both the market for deposits and the market for subdebt competitive, in equilibrium investors 
demand a return 6 2  (r, so) so that they break even, i.e., so that the participation constraint is satisfied 
with equality. This assures that any amount of subdebt so <  Bo can be issued and will meet the demand 
of risk neutral investors.
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O p tim a l in te re s t r a te
Given the payoffs described above, the bank manager maximises
E e [W2(9,r)} = ( l - 7 r D 0 ( l + r ) )  f  {R(9) -  R(9S (r))} d0,
M r)
which is again a decreasing function of r.
Hence, she solves:
(Pb ) min r  
st.
(3.13) E~b [u(r,g,s0) ] > u  
(3-1.4) E~b [v(r,g,s0) ] > v  
(3.15) E~b [v{bt) \>  E~b [v{r,g,s0)]
vc
(3 -16)
(3.17) r < l ^
P ro p o s itio n  30 Under deposit insurance and disclosure, both the interest rate offered 
by the bank and the probability of insolvency are lower in the presence of subordinated 
debt
P ro o f. See Appendix, section 3.7.5. ■
An intuitive proof of this result can be seen in figure 3-2. Patient depositors’ payoffs 
are the same only when 0 < 9\. For all other values of 9, the payoffs with subdebt and 
disclosure are higher than or equal to those in the case without subdebt, which means 
that the compensation required to make the depositors’ participation constraint binding 
must be lower.
D efin ing  th e  re q u ire m e n t
The subordinated debt requirement was introduced in this model as an obligation to issue 
a minimum amount of a subordinated bond (Calomiris, 1997). Different possibilities for 
the implementation of this requirement have been discussed in the literature (see Kwast 
et al, 1999), which can be broadly summarised as:
(i) a minimum issuance of a fraction a  of equity: so >  aWijj 0 < a  < 1.
(ii) a minimum issuance of a fraction a  of deposits or to tal liabilities: so >  Oi (Do +  D o),
0 < a <  1.
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(iii) a minimum issuance of a fraction a  of risk weighted assets, I o: so >  olI q-, 0 < a  < 1. 
In the model as stated, I q = Wo +  Do +  Bo, therefore this type of requirement 
would be a linear combination of cases (i) and (ii).
The demand for bonds is constrained above by Bo , the number of investor type of 
consumers, all endowed with one unit of consumption. Hence, under the model’s assump­
tions, any value of 0 <  a  < 1 will generate a risk reduction in case (i) (aWo < so < Bo) 
but only small values will be feasible under schemes (ii) and (iii) (because by assumption 
Do > Bo).
Notice tha t for the long-term subordinated bond to reduce the bank’s probability 
of insolvency, in this model, the choice of so is not crucial provided, of course, that 
it is strictly positive. This may seem to contradict the results obtained in Niu (2008), 
where a minimum issuance is required in order to affect the banks’ risk-taking. However, 
his model explicitly allows for the manager to choose between two risky technologies, 
whereas here I am focusing on an indirect indicator, which is the bank’s probability of 
insolvency. Anyway, I will show later (proposition 32) th a t the incentives of investors 
to  take the bond instead of deposits may be enhanced when the requirement is above a 
given threshold.
The introduction of "more sophisticated" agents, unprotected by the guarantee on 
deposits and senior to equity holders, has modified the behaviour of the bank manager; 
achieving in equilibrium a lower probability of insolvency, even when bond holders do 
not monitor the bank in the interim period.
C o ro lla ry  31 In the model with deposit insurance, zero noise disclosure and subordi­
nated debt, both the interest rate chosen by the bank and the probability of insolvency 
are lower than in the benchmark case.
P roo f. The result in proposition 30 holds for all values of £m, in particular for
£m =  0. ■
W hether this outcome is efficient depends on where the social optimum lies with 
respect to the first best. If the social optimum implies a lower interest rate than the 
private optimum (as seen in Chapter 4), then subordinated debt could help in achieving 
tha t goal.
Another corollary of proposition 30 is tha t the closure threshold in this case is smaller: 
@C (r B ) < ( rD) , V sq > 0. Therefore, fewer banks are liquidated in the interim period
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because there is a subsidy from bond holders to deposit holders in a region of (low) 
fundamentals.
From the proof of proposition 28 in the Appendix it can be seen tha t for small values
of
$ ( r D,e rn)& 2 £ Tn01 u (1 + rD) -  u i p ^ )
Hence, at least in a small neighbourhood of zero, the higher em the wider the gap 
between r D and r°, i.e., the interest rate increases with the noise. On the other hand, 
when so —» 0, the equilibrium interest rate with subdebt converges on r D. Therefore, 
at least in a small neighbourhood of zero, r B is decreasing on so- If these results were 
sustained for all values of em and so, it would follow tha t the higher the noise, the higher 
the subdebt requirement necessary to restore the benchmark equilibrium.
Intuitively, the more numerous the participants in the market for subordinated 
bonds, the higher their final payoff, given that the pool of money subsidising depo­
sitors is higher in case the bank’s fundamental falls below 6 s- However, because the 
partial derivative of 6 2  with respect to so is negative, this should be consistent with 
a lower value for this threshold. Indeed, from figure 3-3 it is clear th a t the lower 6 2  
with respect to 6 1, the higher the residual payoff of the bond in the default region. The 
following proposition defines the set of values of so for which this is the case.
P ro p o s itio n  32 In the region where the bank is fundamentally unprofitable, bond hol-
r
ders’ payoffs are higher i f  sq > [(1 — 7r) D o +  Bo] ------- .
1 +  r
P ro o f. See Appendix, section 3.7.6. ■
3.4 .2  R oll-over at t = l
This time the bond has the following structure: it can be redeemed at t  =  1 at a value 
K  — 1, or held until t = 2 in exchange for 62 (r, so) units of consumption. If bond 
holders decide not to redeem their bonds in the interim period, I interpret this as a 
rollover decision.
Define by 6  k  the value of 0  such tha t bond holders’ payoff in the final period is equal 
to K  = 1. Clearly, 0 k  < 6 s  (figure 3-3). Therefore, and because for all 6  < &s bond 
holders receive only a residual payoff, 6 k  is the solution to
(1 -  7tDq (1 +  r)) R  ( 6 k )  ~  [(1 -  7r) Do +  B 0 -  s0] (1 +  r )2 =  s0 •
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Bond holders are now sophisticated, informed investors, which through monitoring 
receive a private signal
9% —  9 +  £ { , Ei  ~  [ / [ — £ { , ,  £ { > ].
They use this information to evaluate whether to rollover or to redeem the bond in 
the interim period. As in Chapter 2, and following Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), I 
will concentrate here on equilibriums on "switching strategies”, th a t is, an equilibrium 
in monotone strategies with threshold 9*, such tha t if 0i <  9* bond holders redeem the 
bond at t  = 1, and roll it over if 9i >  9 .
After receiving a non verifiable signal 9i at t  = 1, bond holder i knows that the 
true value of 9 lies in the interval [max {9i — Eb, 0} , min {9i +  £&, 1}]. W ith incomplete 
information, they must condition their beliefs upon their private signals, which are 
known to be positively correlated with the signals of others. Define by 0 < n  < so the 
number of bond holders redeeming their bonds at t = 1. Naturally, if 9 < 92(r) — 2Eb, all 
will receive a signal 9i <C 02 (r) — £&5 where the payoff is zero and therefore each one will 
redeem the bond irrespective of what the other players do. This is known as the lower 
dominance region, where n  equals so- Similarly, if 9 > 9s(r) + 2Eb all debt holders receive 
signals 9i > 9s{r) + Eb, and so will find themselves in the upper dominance region, where 
the payoff is 62 and everyone rolls over, regardless of the actions of other players.
W ith all bond holders following the same equilibrium strategy, each one will ratio­
nally anticipate tha t if Vi 9i < 9*, everybody will liquidate the bond at t = 1. This 
will be the case for values of 9 < 9* — Eb- In the same way, everybody will rollover if 
Vi 9i > 9*, which is always the case if 9 > 9* +  Eb- Finally, and because of the uniform 
distributional assumption on Ei, in the intermediate region a rational player will assign 
a uniform distribution to  her belief about the number of bond holders liquidating the 
bond at t  = 1, n(9,9*), th a t will be given by the following non-increasing function of 9 
(figure 3-4):
n (0 ,9*) =  <
s0 i f  9 <9* -  Eb
—— i f  9* -  E b < 9 < 9* +  E b
lEb
0 i f  9 > 9* + £b
Notice tha t for n(9,9*) to  be well defined, it has to be consistent with the beliefs 
implied by the existence of the dominance regions. Hence, 02(^) — 2Eb < 9* — Eb and 
9* +Eb < 9s(r) +  2Eb, which implies 02(r) -  Eb < 9* < 9s(r) +  £&•
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In deciding whether to redeem the bond at t =  1 or to roll it over, bond holders must 
compare the conditional expected utility of these two actions. Denoting by 6(6,6*) the 
difference of utilities between waiting until t = 2 and redeeming the bond at t — 1 :
6(6,6*) = 6(6, n (6 ,6*))
f  . f  \ l - n ( O r ) - * D 0(l+r)]R(e)-[( l -Tr)D0+ B 0-so}( l+r )2 u ( n \  u
=  m ax |m m  j *------------------9 k - n ( e r ) --------------------------- ' b2 <r’ s o ) |  ’ 0 j  _ 6 i ’
where b\ < 1 is the effective payoff at t = 1 when redeeming the bond in th a t period.10
Upon receiving a signal 6i each bond holder evaluates:
6i +£b
A( 6 iX )  =  E9im n ] =  f  £-b6(6,6*)M.
Qi-£b
If a bond holder’s conditional expected utility of rolling over is higher than the utility 
of redeeming the bond in the interim period, tha t is if A (6i,6*) > 0, she will rollover.
Otherwise, if A (6i,6*) <  0, she will quit at t = 1. Finally, if A (6i,6*) = 0 she will be
indifferent between the two actions, so I assume tha t she rolls over.
Using the continuity of A (6i, 6*) in both arguments11, the existence of the dominance 
regions, and the monotonicity12 of A (6i, 6{), it is easy to  prove tha t there exists a unique 
equilibrium threshold, satisfying 6* €]02(O — £&? 0s(O  +  and such th a t:13
• A(6*,6*) =  0,
• A (&i,6*) <  0 for all &i < 6* and
• A (6i, 6*) >  0 for all 6i > 6*.
Making a strong use of the uniform distributional assumption on the noise, Gold­
stein and Pauzner (2000) show tha t for any feasible belief n(6), the regions where 
A (6i,n(6)) < 0 and A (6i,n(6)) >  0 are complementary connected intervals and, there­
fore, any equilibrium of the game must be monotone. T hat is to  say, the strategy 
previously defined is the unique equilibrium of this game.
Finally, from the definition of A (6i,6*) (figure 3-5) it is possible to see th a t
10 If the bank survives until t  — 2, bond holders receive b\ = 1. If the bank is closed by the regulator 
in the interim period, the effective payoff of debt holders is b\ = max |  i - (1+r.)[^ >o+go-so]  ^q j, < ^
115(9,9*) is discontinuous only at one point (where bi jumps to 1) but this discontinuity disappears 
when integrating over 0 (figure 3-5).
12Notice R(.) and —n(., 0*) are monotonically increasing in 0 G [0i — £b, 0i +  £b] for 0* — 0i. Although 
the property may fail for values of 0i in the neighbourhood of the point where b\ jumps (well below 
02(r) — 2£b if £b is small enough), at that point A(0i,0i) is non-positive and monotonically increasing 
afterwards (see figure 3-5).
13 The proof is standard and can be found in the Appendix of Chapter 2. In case 
b i  =  max 1 ^  q j. _  seCond condition could be generalised to A (0i,0*) <  0
for all 0i < 0*. The equilibrium will still be unique, because other values of 0i satisfying A(0i,0i)  =  0 
will be outside the interval ]02(r) — £b, 02(r ) +  e&[.
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@K
6 (6 , 6 *) < O ' i 0 < 0 K => J  6(0,0*)d0 = A ( 0 K - £ b,0*)<O,
&K~^b 
0JC+2 Sb
6(0,0*) > O V 0 > 0 K => f  6(0,0*)d0 = A ( 0 K + £b,0*) > 0 .
6k
P ro p o s itio n  33 0* 6 ]6 k  ~  + £b[- Therefore, the bond holders’ equilibrium in the
game with rollover is close to the point where they break even.
C lo su re  po licy
The regulator does not observe the bond holders’ signals but, from the managers’ dis­
closure and direct monitoring, can observe 6  and n, and can also compute the value of 
6 *. Define by &i (n) the value of 6  satisfying
(1 -  n -  7tD0 (1 + r ) )R (¥ i  (n)) = [(1 -  ir) D0 +  B 0 -  s0] (1 +  r )1.
Notice &i (n) —*■ 6 i and 6 i < 6 i (n) for i = 1,2.71—>0
Given all the available information, the regulator decides to close the bank in the 
interim period if the expected cost of leaving it open is strictly positive, which gives the 
following rule:
- If 0 < n < so, using the inverse function of n( 6 , 6 *) in the region [6 * — eb, 6 * +  £b\,
the regulator can infer the true value of 0 (n) = 6 * +  — (so — 2n) and can evaluate,
so __
without any noise, whether to leave the bank open (if 6 (n) > 6 \ (n)) or close it in the 
interim period (if 0 (n) <  6 \ (n)).
- If n = 0 : 0 2  (0) =  6 2  and 6  > 6 * +  eb >  6 2 ■ Therefore, it is cost-efficient for the 
regulator and welfare improving for consumers to leave the bank open.
- If n = so : 6 < 6* — eb < 6k  but it is not clear if 6 is higher or lower than 6\ (so ). 
Therefore, the regulator will need to resort to  the bank manager’s signal and the closure 
policy will be similar to the one described in section 3.3.
P ro p o s itio n  34 The closure rule when the bank issues a subordinated bond which can be
rolled over in the interim period, is such that the regulator closes the bank at 
 ££ _
t = 1 if  6 < 0C — 6 1  (n) +  £ (n) and leaves it open otherwise; where
( 0  0 < n < s0
£ (n) = <
I £771 n = sq
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Whenever n < so, the information coming from bond holders’ behaviour eliminates 
the noise on the bank’s signal. In particular, inefficient liquidation of assets is com­
pletely ruled out because the regulator can perfectly observe the value of the bank’s 
fundamentals.14 When n =  so , inefficient liquidation of assets persists if £m >  0.
A classical result for global games applies here, th a t public disclosure would not 
improve on the equilibrium of the game. If, on the contrary, either the manager or 
any bond holder publicly declared her signal to the market, tha t information would be­
come common knowledge, breaking bond holders’ coordination and prompting multiple 
equilibrium in the interim period sub-game, outside of the dominance regions.
A final remark regarding the interest rate equilibrium in this case: given
6i (r) < 0 i{r ,n ) for all r, n  and i E {1,2}; the expected subsidy from bond holders 
to deposit holders would be lower, so the equilibrium interest rate offered by the ma­
nager, r R, will be higher than r B, the optimal solution under disclosure and a long-term 
subordinated bond.
Also, if the fraction of impatient depositors is low (so tha t m D o  <  Wo), 
0i {r, n) < 0i (r) and then 0\ (r B) <  6\ ( rR) < 0\ (r R , n) < 0\ (r R) <  Q\ (r D) , im­
plying tha t the probability of insolvency will be higher than in the non-rollover case 
but lower than in the disclosure only case. The following proposition summarises these 
results.
P ro p o s itio n  35 Rollover increases the quality of information but at the cost of also 
increasing interest rates and the probability of insolvency of the bank, with respect to the 
non-rollover case.
3.5 Discussion
3.5 .1  D iversify in g  th e  b ank’s tech n o lo g y  choice
In this chapter, I have studied how the probability of insolvency of the bank and the 
regulator’s closure policy change when using and combining different instruments of 
market discipline.
A bank’s probability of insolvency can be regarded as an indirect means of evaluating 
its risk-taking. The assumption on the technology choice of the bank made here can 
be limiting, although it considerably simplifies the algebra and allows for im portant 
conclusions to be drawn. In fact, by constraining the bank to place all its funds in
14 When n  =  0, 6 is not perfectly observable but it is known to be higher than 62 >  6 \.
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one risky asset, the model does not allow for studying assets substitution. A possible 
extension might be to introduce two risky technologies, defined over the same support 
[0,1] but such tha t R 2 (0) R \  (0), R 2 (1) »  R \  (1), and E  [R2 (0)] =  E  [R\ (0)] (figure 
3-6).
Given the guarantee on deposits and because of limited liability, the bank manager 
will adopt the riskier technology (R 2 (6 )). The aim of the model will then be to study 
whether disclosure or subordinated debt requirements could modify the risk choice of 
the bank towards the less risky asset (R\ (9)). For that, it will be necessary to  modify 
the first stage of the game in the spirit of Niu’s (2008) work. In the initial period, the 
manager will have to commit to a technology before offering deposits and the subordi­
nated bond. Bond holders will move first, demanding an appropriate compensation for 
the bond, and then the rest of the consumers will take deposits. It is not clear what 
the equilibrium of this game will be. On the one hand, the solvency and profitability 
thresholds (Q\ and 6 2 , respectively) could be smaller under the riskier technology (figure 
3-6) but, on the other hand, this technology will generate a higher payoff demanded by 
bond holders. Moreover, any result will be subject to the credibility of the manager’s 
commitment to invest in the declared technology (Blum, 2000).15
3.5 .2  M on itorin g  co sts
I have assumed the manager’s monitoring costs to be nil. However, as in Hortala-Vallve 
(2002) the size of the noise could be inversely proportional to the manager’s monitoring 
effort, so tha t the smaller the noise the higher the disutility of monitoring experienced 
by her. This could push in the direction of more noise (a higher £m) and higher interest 
rates, reducing equity holders’ expected payoff and increasing the closure rule, so more 
solvent banks could be inefficiently liquidated in the interim period.
The monitoring role of equity holders was overlooked in this exercise by assuming 
tha t there were no agency problems between them and the manager. An obvious exten­
sion will then be to lift this assumption, by assuming the manager’s monitoring costs to 
be non-nil and allowing equity holders to observe the manager’s signal.
3.5 .3  O ther ex ten sion s
Capital requirements could be introduced in this framework, in order to  study the com­
bined effects of these policies on the regulator’s closure rule and the probability of
15In Blum (2000), market discipline reduces risk taking when a bank can credibly commit to a given 
level of risk before setting interest rates on deposits.
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insolvency of the bank.
In this model, it is very im portant tha t bond holders are senior to equity holders, 
otherwise the latter will get a subsidy in default (in the region [6 2 , #s[), increasing moral 
hazard. Also, the model assumed that any funds on top of the guarantee tha t could 
be recovered from the liquidation of the banks’ assets would be allocated to  deposit 
holders, in order to  compensate them for foregone interests (the guarantee covers only 
capital). Another option might be to prorate these funds equally between deposit holders 
and bond holders. On the one hand, this might increase bond holders’ moral hazard, 
reducing monitoring (in the rollover case). On the other hand, their future payoff might 
rise, making less likely their withdrawal in the interim period, and so diminishing the 
probability of insolvency.
I modelled the rollover decision by giving bond holders the option of redeeming 
the bond in the interim period at no loss (K  = 1). If a loss were made (K  <  1) a 
rollover would be more likely, not only because the interim period payoff is lower but 
also because the withdrawal of one bond holder will increase the others’ future payoff. 
Another possibility would be to introduce a secondary market for bonds in the interim 
period. In tha t case a new signal, the price of the bond, would be available from the 
market even if bonds could not be redeemed at t = 1.
Systemic risk considerations (too big or too many to fail) would affect the closure 
rule, possibly reducing this threshold if the social cost of the failure of a systemically 
im portant institution were included in the objective function of the regulator. Too big 
to fail problems could be addressed here by studying, for example, how the closure 
thresholds and equilibrium interest rates change with the exogenous parameters Wo, D o 
and Bo .
Demand driven liquidity shocks were eliminated by the introduction of deposit in­
surance. However, the market for the liquidation of the bank’s asset in the interim 
period could suffer an exogenous liquidity shock, so th a t instead of obtaining one unit 
of consumption per unit of investment liquidated, the return could be lower. In tha t 
scenario, it would be interesting to study the role of the regulator as a “lender of last 
resort” or as a “market maker of last resort” .
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have studied how the bank’s probability of insolvency and the regu­
lator’s closure policy change when using and combining different instruments of market 
discipline. Given tha t depositors are dispersed and uninformed, the regulator needs
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to introduce deposit insurance in order to rule out sunspot equilibriums involving in­
efficient liquidation of assets (runs when the bank is solvent). Moral hazard forces the 
regulator to supervise the bank and the market, in order to get information allowing her 
to decide, in a cost efficient manner, whether to permit a bank to continue in operation 
or to suspend its licence, liquidate its assets and pay out to the depositors the guarantee 
in the interim period.
W ith a disclosure requirement, I prove tha t the regulator uses a fully financed closure 
rule tha t avoids inefficient survival but involves inefficient liquidation of assets in a region 
of the bank’s fundamentals. Although the probability of insolvency is higher than the 
first best, it converges on it as the manager’s signal noise goes to zero.
When on top of the disclosure requirement the bank is asked to issue a zero coupon 
bond with long maturity, even in a very small amount, the probability of insolvency 
is further reduced. The regulator’s closure policy in this case forces fewer banks into 
liquidation, given the subsidy from bond holders to  deposit holders when the bank 
becomes fundamentally unprofitable.
Finally, when debt can be rolled over in the interim period, and so bond holders do 
monitor the bank, this period sub-game equilibrium provides very useful information 
that, in some cases, can completely eliminate inefficient liquidation of assets because 
the regulator can perfectly observe the bank’s fundamental. However, this will come at 
the cost of a higher probability of insolvency than in the non-rollover case.
The results in this chapter allow us to conclude tha t a subordinated debt requirement, 
when issued with long maturity, is able to reduce the probability of insolvency for 
any size of noise. Indeed, intuition suggests tha t when the manager’s signal noise is 
expected to be high, an appropriately high subordinated debt requirement could restore 
the first best. On the other hand, a subordinated bond issued with a short maturity can 
substantially improve on the quality of information (by reducing the noise). Therefore, 
a subordinated debt requirement can be used to complement disclosure requirements, 
providing a new set of information which is useful to the regulator.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 D en sity  fu n ction  o f  6
9 — 6 +  e is the sum of two independent uniformly distributed random variables, 
6 ~  C/[0,1] and e ~  U[—£m,£m\. Therefore, its density of probability is equal to the 
convolution of
, 1 a; € [0,1] 
fe(x)  =  { and f E(x) -  {
0 ~
the density of probability of 9 and e, respectively. Notice 9 may take values in
[ Emi 1 "b ^m]  •
l+£m
/?(*) =  I  f o { y ) f e ( z - y ) d y
E m
0  1  l + £ r n
=  I  f ( M f e { x - y ) d y  + f f ( M f e { z - y ) d y +  f  M v ) M z - y ) d y
£ m  0  0  1  1  0  
Using the following change of variable: u =  z — y => du = —dy, u(0) =  z, u (l) =  z —1.
' m i n { 2, e m }
f  2 h du i f  Z -  1 ~  £m
— E m  
m i n { z , e m }
f  2 ^ du i f  Z > 1 ~ £m
z—1
M Z) = I  fe{u)du = <
2  —  1
h i* )  = ’ 2£t
2^  (min{2, £m} +  £m) i f  z < 1  -  £m
2^  (min{z, £m} -  z +  1) i f  z >  I - £ m
This function is depicted in figure 3-7. Hence, the probability tha t a signal is below 
the closure rule can be w ritten as (taking the case of a small noise signal, such that 
^1 "b £m £m):
prob 9 < 9c
9i +£t
I  2L ( ™ n { z , £ m } + £ m ) d z
E m
E m 9 i + e T
=  f  2 h ( z + £m )d z+  f  dz
£m
= 1 22 
2£m 2
— 9\ +  £r
Finally, notice tha t lim prob
E m  > 0
-b £m + 9i
9 < 6 C] = «i.l
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3.7.2 In terest rate w ith  d ep osit insurance and  no m on itorin g
Denote by r° the optimal interest rate in problem (Po)> and by r 1 the solution to:
(Pi) min r 
st.
(3.5) E  [u(r, g)\ > u
(3.6) E[v(r,g)] > v  
(3 '7 )
(3.8) r < i = ^
W ith deposit insurance there are no runs, hence the bank can only go bankrupt in 
the second period. Notice problems (Po) and (Pi) are identical, except for the incentive 
compatibility constraints of deposit holders. In the optimum, these must be satisfied 
with equality, so P [u (r7,p)] = u = E[u(r0)].
£ [u (r7, g)} = 0lU ~  ° lU { dE+be)  + 71" i 1 ~  * i ) u (1 +  r ) _7r (1 “  0i ) u (1 +  r )
+7xu (1 +  r) +  (1 -  7r) 9\u  (1 +  r) +  (1 -  7r) u ^min | c 2 (9, r ) , (1 +  t1)2} ) dO
P[w(r7, p)] =  E[u(r! )\ +  9i <
>o
E l ^ r 1)] < E[u(r0)] =>  r1 < r°.
► = E[u(r0)]
The same result arises when looking at the incentive compatibility constraint of 
investors. ■
3.7 .3  P r o o f o f  p rop osition  28
Denote by r° the optimal interest rate in the benchmark case and by rD the one ob­
tained with deposit insurance and disclosure. In equilibrium, the manager will choose 
an interest rate such that the participation constraints of deposit holders bind. For the 
case of the risk averse depositor type consumers:
E  [ii(r0)] =  E~Qc [u(rD,g)] = u
Consider the case 9\(r) +  2em < #2(r) (so tha t taking limit when em —* 0 has sense). 
Denote by p (9, em) = prob j9 < 9c j :
( 0i(r) . . 0 i(r )+ 2em
^ cKr>s)] = »s /  u ( - D z m ) d 9 +  I  p ( 9^ m ) u \ ^ ^ \ d e
V 0 '  7 # i(r )  V '
0 i(r )+ 2em 1 'j
+  f  (1 - p ( 9 , £ m) ) u ( l  + r )d 9 +  f  u ( l  + r)d9>
0l ( r )  8 i ( r ) + 2 £ m J
f  #i(r) , v 8i{r)+2em (  .
-h (1 71-) < /  U ) d9  +  J  p(9 ,£m) U ( Dq\ Bq )
{  0 8i(r)
d9
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0 i ( r ) +2 £m  02 (r)
+  /  ( 1 - p ( 0 ,£ m))'u (c2(0 ,r))d0  +  f  u (c2(0,r))d0
01 (r) 0 i(r-)+2em
+  /  u ( ( l  +  r ) 2) ^ l
02(r) V '  J
^ f c [WM ) ]  — 0i(r)u  (s^TSo) + 7 r ( l - 0 i ( r ) ) u ( l  +  r)
f ^2(r) 1 / \ 1
+  ( l - 7 r ) <  f  u(c2(0,r))d0 +  f  u ( ( l  + r)2)d0>
[ 0 1 (r) 02(r) J
0 i(r )+ 2 e m
/  [™(1 +  O +  ( 1 - ^ ) w(c2 ( 0 , O ) - m (;dS + ^ )
01 (r)
0 l(r )+ 2 e r
+  /  (1 -  P (0, £m)) \™  (1 +  r) +  (1 -  tt) u (c2(0, r)) -  u de
01 (r) L \  / j
^ c K ^ p )] =  0 i(r)u  ( s ^ i s b )  + 7 r ( l - 0 i ( r ) ) u ( l  +  r)
f  02 (>") 1 /  v 'j
+  ( l - 7 r ) <  f  u(c2(0, r))d0 +  /  u [ ( l  +  r )2] ^ >
^0i(r )  02 (r) J
0 i(r )+ 2 e r
/  p(0 ,£m) [7r7/(l +  r) +  ( l - 7 r ) u ( c 2( 0 , r ) ) - u ( ^ ^ )
0i 00
d<9
0 i(r )+ 2 e m
Define $ (r, em) =  /  p (0 ,em)
01 (r)
7TU (1 +  r )  +  (1 -  t t )  u  (c2(0, r)) - u  ( 53^ - ) d0.
> 0
Notice Vr : $ (r , em) > 0 if sm > 0 and <&(rD, em) = 0 if em =  0.
In the benchmark model (without deposit insurance and ruling out inefficient runs): 
f 0 i M  1 )
E [u(r)]=  ttI J  u { p ± ^ ) d 0 +  f  n ( l +  r)d0V 
I  0 0 ! (r) J
( 61 ^  1 °2^  1 /  *A 1
+  (1 ~ ^ ) s  5 U(D^+B^)d 9 + I  u(c2(0 ,r))d0+  f  u ( ( l  + r) J d 0 \
I  0 0x{r) 02 (r) V J J
=  0 i(r M z U  +  ^  (* “  0i( r ) ) u (1 +  r )
[ °2^  1 /  o\+  ( l - 7 r ) <  f  u(c2(0,r))d0 + f  u ( ( l  + r) J
[ 0 1 (r) 02(r)
d0
Then
E qc [u(rD,gj\ = E  [u{rD)\ -  $ (r ,e m) = u
E  [u(r0)] =  u
E  [•u(rD)] -  $ ( r ,e m) -  E  [u(r0)] =  0 
=» E  [u(rD)] -  E  [u(r0)] =  $ ( r D,£m) > 0
Given tha t u(.) is increasing, this inequality implies r D > r° for all £m >  0 and
~d  ^.0 as e7 0. A similar result can be obtained for investors holding deposits,
replacing u(.) by the identity function in all equations and the competitive reservation 
utility by v. Finally, given tha t d9^ p  >  0, 0\ (rD) > 0\ (r°) .■
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3 .7 .4  b2 (r, so) increasing on  r
Denote by p ( 0 , £ m ) = prob[9 <  Qc \, uj = max 1 1~(1+r)[A)+Bo-5o] ^qj an(j
a  =  m i n | ,^o+^—5Q, 1 +  r}  . Recalling 0^ =  0i +  em :
Oi{r) 6 \ (r )+ 2 em 0 i(r )+ 2 e m
E ~ b [ v ( b t )\ = J  udO + J  p ( 6 , £ m ) u j d 0 +  J  C1 “  P ( M m ) )  'OdO
°  0 9i (r )  01(r)
+  0f r) Od0 +  ° f r) |  (1~^A)(l+r))fl(g)-[(l--7r)A)+go-soKl+r-)2 J dg
0 i(r )+ 2 e m 02(r)
1
+  f  b2 (r , s 0) dO
9 s i r )
9i ( r )  9i (r )+ 2 em
E nb [M >0>so)] =  f  <?d0+ f  p(0,Em)(Td0
0 _  *T(r)
0 i(r )+ 2 e m
+  _ /  (1 ~  P {6, em)) {c2 (fl, r)  +  (1_ ^ O0 j B„ }
02fr) - ^
"*■_ /  | c 2 (0, r) +  (i -1 \d0+Bo } ^
0 i(r )+ 2 e m
0s(r) o 1 o
+  _ /  ( l + r ) 2 d0 +  /  ( l +  r ) 2 d0 
02 (r) 9s ( r )
In order to switch from deposits to bonds, investors require E~b [v (bt)] >  E~b [v (r, g , s0)]
9c  9C
01 (r) 0 i(r )+ 2 e m
^6_ [v (bt)} —E~b [v (r, g , s0)] =  f  (w -  a)dO +  /  p (<9, em) (a; -  a)d0
<o
0 i(r )+ 2 e r
_/
01 (r)
01 (r) 
50 (1 +  r) }
<0
>0
( 1  -  7r) D o  +  D o
W ) -  M 1 + r ) 2
0l(r)+ 2£m
02 (r)
/
0 i(r )+ 2 e m
M0
>0
^  V^p.'ta "   '
>0
+  "sp  |  (1 -  ttDq (1 +  r)) R  (9) -  [(1 -  x) £>0 +  Bg -  s0] (1 +  r )2 _  
02 (r) j^ y 50
(1 +  r) }d0
+(1 -  9s {r)) (fo (r, s0) -  (1 +  r )2)
>0
A = ( l - 7 r ) D o + B 0so
< o 02(r) <  0 <  02(r) 
> 0 02(r) < 0 <  0s(r)
(c2 (0, r) -  (1 +  r )2)  <
Therefore, for investors to be willing to buy the subordinated bond, b2 (r , sq) will
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need to be sufficiently higher than (1 +  r )2; and as 02(0  and 0s(r) are both increasing 
on r, so must be 62 (r, so ). ■
3.7 .5  P r o o f o f  p rop osition  30
Denote by r D the optimal interest rate with deposit insurance and disclosure and by 
r B the one obtained when adding a long-term subordinated bond issued in an amount 
so >  0 .  In equilibrium, the additional equation in program (Pb ) (equation 3.15) will be 
satisfied with equality, defining 62 as a function of r. Given the previous result (section 
3.7.4), the manager will have an additional incentive for reducing r  because tha t would 
reduce the payoff demanded by bondholders, increasing her final profit. However, deposit 
holders’ participation constraints (equations 3.13 and 3.14) have also changed.
We know tha t in equilibrium E~b [u(rB ,g,so)] = E qc [u(rD,g)\ = u. Consider the 
case of a small noise, so that 9\{r) +  2sm < 02( 0  and 0i(r)  -I- 2em < 02(r), denote by 
P (0, em) =  prob\9 < closure rule] and by a = min j  Dq+^ q_sq , 1 +  r}  > Dq\ b ~-
{01 (r) 9\ (r)+2emf  u (a) d9+  J  p {9 ,£m )u(a )d9° #T(r)
0i(r)+2em 1
+  f  (1 -  p (9 ,em) ) u ( l +  r)d9 + f  u ( l  + r)d9
9i(r) 0i(r)+2em
{0x(r) 0i(r)+2eTnf  u (a )d 9 +  f  p (0, £m) u (a) d90 Oi{r)
¥[{r)+2em , r i . \ \
+  _ /  (1 -  P (0. £m)) U f c2(0, r) +  {1l l {)t,0% 0 )  d9
01 (r)
02 (r) / \  1 / \
+ _  /  « (c2(fl,r) +  ( i Z f o o + B o )  d6 + _ /  « ( ( l  +  r)2W
9i{r)+2£m 02 {r)
E~b [u(r,g, s0)] =  9\{r)u (a) +  n  ( l  -  0 i(r)) u ( l  +  r) 
vc
02(0 , \ 1 /
+  ( l - * M j  u  ( c2 (9,r) +  (i-J^fno+Bo)  de + _ f  u ( ( l  + r)2^d 9
01 (r) 02(r)
0i(r-)+2em
-  f  p(9 ,£m) [ttu(1 +  r) - u ( a ) ] d 9
91(r)
9^(r)+2em . \
-  J  P (0, £m) (1 -  tt) u (c2(0, r) +  d9
01 (r)
Replacing p (0, £m) by its formula in each case (section 3.7.1), and using E^c [u(r , g)] 
from section 3.7.3:
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E qc M r,g)] -  E~t, [u(r,g,s0)]
< (0i(r) -  6l{r)) u (sSTBb) “  ™  (1 +  r ) (0i( r ) “  0iM )
,2(0  02 (r) f  \
f  u(c2( 0 , r ) ) d 0 - _ f  u (c2(0 ,r) +  {1Z ) d0+Bo)  d9+  ( 1  -  7 r )  <
0 1  (r) 6i (r )
+  ( 1 — 7 r ) |  f  u  ^ (1 +  r ) 2^ d 9  -  f  u ^ ( l  +  r ) 2 ^ d 0  >
0 l(r )+ 2 e m _ /  \ 1
f  (0l(r)+£m) 7ru(1 + r) - u [ D ^ J \ d0
01 (r)
0 l(r )+ 2 e m   _ /  M
+  _ /  (0l W  +  £m) rf6>
0 i(r )
0l ( r)+2Em
f  (O i(r)+  £Tn) [ ( l - 7 r ) u ( c 2{0,r))]d0
01 (r)
^i(’")+2em   p .. . . v -1
+  _ /  (fr M  +  gm) (1 ~  n) u fc2(0, r) +  dO
01 (r)
f a i r )  , \  02(r)
By definition, J u  (c2(0 ,r) +  h_s° L  ) d0 = J u(c2(0,r))d0. So
5 T(r) V 7 fli(r)
M r,g)] -  E-b  ^ [u (r ,g , s0)]
<  - 7 r u ( l  +  r) (0 i(r) - 0 i ( r ) )
— (1 — 7r) (02(r) -  02(7-)) u ((1 +  r )2)
-2 e m (0i (r) -  01 (r)) ttu (1 +  r) -  u ( ^ T ^ ) ]
  0 i(r )+ 2 e m
-  (01 (r) ~  01 (r)) /  ( 1 -7 r)u (c2 (0 ,r))d 0
01 (r)
Notice
C2 ( 0 2 , r )  - c 2 ( 6 2 , r )  =  >  ( i - T f f / j a ,  =  c 2 { 8 i , r )  -  c 2 { 6 u r )
s q ( 1 + t- )  _
which implies 02 — 02 >  0i — 0i.
Hence
Egc [“(»•, ff)] -  Etf [«(»•, ff,*o)]
< (fli(r) -5T(r)) {(1 -  2em) [u — iru (1 + r)j
0i(r)+2em 'I
-  /  (1- 7 r )u ( c 2(0 ,r))d0  >
01(r) J
-  (0i (r) -  0 i(r)) ( 1 - 7 r) it ((1 +  r)2)
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< (0i(r) -  0 i(r)) {(1 -  2 em) [u ™  (1 +  r)
-  (1 -  2£m) (1 -  7r) u  (1 +  r)}
=  (01W  -  01 (r)) (1 -  2 £m) [iI (dZ+bz) -  u { I+  r) < 0
Define
- $ ( r , e m) = (0i(r) - 0 i ( r ) )  (1 -  2em) [n - u ( l  +  r) < 0
Therefore
E dc +  $ ( r B,£m) < Epc [u{rB ,g ,s 0)] = u  = ErQc [u{rD,g)}
=» [u(rs ,#)] < E$c [u(rD,g)\ => r D > r B for all £m > 0.
A similar result can be obtained for investors holding deposits, replacing u(.) by the 
identity function in all equations and the competitive reservation utility by v.
Finally, the probability of insolvency is smaller because
01 (rB) <  01 ( rB) < 0i ( rD) .■
3 .7 .6  P r o o f  o f  p r o p o s i t io n  32
Recall
(1 -  ttDq (1 +  r)) R  (6 2 ) = [(1 ~  tt) Do +  D0 -  s0] (1 +  r)‘
and
Then
(1 -  7rD 0 (1 +  r)) R  (0i) =  [(1 -  7r) D 0 +  D0] (1 +  r ) .
R&) _  [ ( l - 7 r ) . P o + g o - s o 1 ( l + r )  .  .
R(61) ~  ( l - n ) D 0+ B 0 -  1
O  [(1 -  7r) Do +  Do -  So] (1 +  r) < (1 -  7r) D 0 +  D0
<=> [ ( 1  -  7r) D 0 +  D0] — < s0 1 4- r
-<=>■ R  (0 2 ) ^  D (0l) ^  02 5: 01-H
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Figure 3-3: Bond holders’ payoffs.
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Figure 3-4: Number of bond holders redeeming the bond in the interim period.
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Figure 3-5: Bond holders’ conditional expected utility: redemption versus rollover.
Figure 3-6: Example of two risky technologies with the same mean and different va­
riances.
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Figure 3-7: Density function of 6  : case £m < \-
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Chapter 4
Capital R egulation and Bank  
Risk-Taking. Com pleting B lum ’s 
Picture
4.1 Introduction
The Basel Committee was established at the end of 1974 by the central bank governors 
of the Group of Ten countries, with the aim of gathering central bankers and bank su­
pervisors and regulators to discuss issues related to prudential banking supervision. As 
a result of these talks, in 1988 emerged the first version of the Basel Capital Accord, 
introducing a common minimum 8 percent risk-weighted capital to asset ratio for inter­
nationally active G-10 banks, which in the earliest version only considered credit risk. 
Although some countries had adopted minimum requirements before the agreement (the 
USA and the UK in 1981, for example), it was only after the agreement tha t capital 
requirements became common ground for the banking industry worldwide.1
The objective of this form of regulation is said to be to strengthen the soundness 
and stability of the international banking system, and to reduce competitive inequalities 
across markets. However, some theoretical results suggest tha t banks have found ways 
of overcoming the limitations tha t fixed capital requirements impose on their risk-taking 
relative to capital, either through asset substitution (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim 
and Santomero, 1988; Flannery, 1989; Rochet, 1992), the reduction of monitoring incen­
1993 all commercial banks in the European union were subject to a common solvency requirement. 
By 1999 the Basel capital accord was being implemented in about 100 countries. Indeed, since the 
introduction of the capital accord, risk weighted capital ratios in developed countries have increased 
significantly. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether this responds to regulation itself or to increased 
market discipline (Jackson, 1999).
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tives (Besanko and Kanatas, 1993; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993) or through substantial 
volumes of securitisation (Jones, 2000).
The empirical evidence as to whether capital requirements reduce the probability of 
default or induce banks to increase risk-taking in some periods is not conclusive. In a 
study for 98 USA banks over the period 1975-1986, Furlong (1988) inverts the Black 
and Scholes (1973) pricing formula to infer the volatility of the portfolio assets of banks. 
He concludes tha t volatility was higher after the introduction of capital requirements in 
1981, though it grew both for badly and well capitalised banks. In a different study over 
219 G-10 banks in the period 1987-1994, Sheldon (1996) finds tha t while the volatility 
of US banks increased in the period, independent of the level of the capital requirement, 
tha t of Japanese banks fell as capital ratios rose.
On the theoretical side the picture is blurry too. The work of Kahane (1977), Kareken 
and Wallace (1978) and Sharpe (1978), justifies the use of capital requirements to con­
trol the solvency of banks whose asset allocation is distorted by the presence of deposit 
insurance, but both assume complete markets. Under an incomplete market approach, 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988), using a mean variance 
portfolio model with fixed liabilities, prove that in the absence of a solvency requirement 
and abstracting from the limited liability clause, the probability of bank failure is a de­
creasing function of its capital ratio, which is independent of the (non-negative) weights 
used in the computation of the ratio. However, the introduction of capital requirements 
changes the asset allocation of the bank, so tha t while the volume of the risky portfolio 
decreases (because the bank shifts to those assets within a lower weight category), its 
composition is distorted in the direction of more risk (inside the chosen weight category), 
increasing the probability of failure. As a way of correcting this problem, they propose 
the introduction of risk weights proportional to the systemic risk of assets.
Since then, the literature has given a lot of attention to market based refinements 
on risk weights.2 For example, Thakor (1996) shows how a bad selection of risk weights 
could have a negative impact on the real sector through credit crunches, given tha t 
the asset allocation of a bank can be distorted by the difference between market and 
regulatory assessments of asset risks. Furfine (2001) uses a panel of large US banks 
between 1990 and 1997, and a structural dynamic model of bank behaviour to show 
that the credit crunch in the USA in the 1990s could be explained by increasing non- 
market based risk weighted capital requirements and excessive regulatory monitoring,
2Compare the great deal of attention devoted to it in the last release of Basel II (BIS, 2006). More 
than a half of the document goes about the way of calculating appropriate risk weighted capital ratios 
(Pillar I), both in a standardized and non-standardized fashion.
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instead of pure demand effects.
However, when limited liability is taken into account, Rochet (1992) shows that, even 
with the correct weights, capital requirements are not enough to control for moral hazard 
and tha t additional requirements, in the form of minimum levels of capital independent 
of the size of the assets, may be needed.
Furlong and Keeley (1989) advocate capital requirements, arguing tha t when limited 
liability and the option value of (flat) deposit insurance are properly taken into account, 
a bank tha t maximises the value of its stock, and therefore diversifies its portfolio, will 
always reduce risk with more stringent capital requirements. The same result is obtained 
by Santos (1999), in a model tha t considers asymmetric information between the bank 
and the borrowing firm, and the distortions induced by the presence of deposit insurance 
on the optimal funding contract. More stringent capital requirements make the bank 
ask for a (larger) equity stake in the firm, which in turn  induces the firm to lower its 
risk, reducing the bank’s probability of default.
Nonetheless, a static framework fails to capture im portant intertem poral effects tha t 
capital requirements might have on the behaviour of banks. One of the first theoretical 
models studying the intertemporal effects of capital constraints is given by Blum (1999). 
In a discrete time model he studies the incentives for asset substitution coming from the 
reduction in expected profits imposed by the requirement. In order to raise the amount 
of equity in the following period, a bank may find it optimal to  increase risk today, in 
which case strengthening the requirement would have the opposite effect for which it 
was designed, to curb bank risk-taking.
In this chapter I will build on Blum’s model to obtain some im portant lessons ne­
glected in his original work.3 I will develop threshold values for which capital regulation 
becomes binding in each period, and study how the regulated equilibrium is compared 
to the unregulated solution and to the social optimum, the effects of regulation over 
financial intermediation, and its impact on the distribution of risk among banks.
This model has the advantage of allowing for the study of asset substitution in a 
much simpler fashion than it could have been done in the Diamond and Dybig (1983) 
setup used in the previous chapters: the bank manager can choose among different 
returns of the portfolio, which have associated a  unique probability of default. Also, 
and unlike in the previous chapters, here I assume common knowledge, so tha t deposit 
insurance completely eliminates runs. Liquidity shocks are excluded, because it is ex-
3This is why the chapter is subtitled "completing Blum’s picture". It is not a new model, but it 
brings into the scene some important pieces overlooked in the original paper.
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ante known tha t in each period all deposits will be withdrawn for consumption and, 
finally, thanks to the assumption of universal risk neutrality, the risk choice of the bank 
becomes completely isolated from any other decision in the game.
I show tha t for unregulated banks risk-taking is decreasing on the level of initial 
equity, and converges on the social optimum when equity is sufficiently high. When in­
troducing capital requirements, I show there exist critical threshold values in each period 
for which regulation starts binding. When the requirement binds in the initial period 
only, risk can be reduced below the unregulated solution -  even to  the social optimum 
for sufficiently tight regulation - , but fewer deposits are taken, which reduces financial 
intermediation. Moreover, capital requirements are not sufficient to  control moral ha­
zard because, among the binding banks, the better capitalised ones raise relatively more 
insured deposits and take on relatively more risk. When the requirement binds only in 
the interim period, bank risk-taking increases, most likely above the unregulated solu­
tion for all values of the requirement. In tha t case, risk would be decreasing on equity, 
making risk-taking even more aggressive for poorly capitalised banks. Therefore, in­
terim period binding capital requirements will not only worsen the risk choice of banks, 
but make smaller banks weaker. When a constant capital requirement binds in both 
periods, the tighter the regulation the fewer deposits are taken from the public, though 
better capitalised banks raise relatively more deposits. The dynamic of risk in this case 
depends strongly on the relationship between the threshold values of the requirement 
in each period, which in turn  depend on the level of initial equity of the bank. Finally, 
a policy recommendation discussed here is to combine a small capital requirement, in 
order to build a buffer against financial shocks, with a minimum equity requirement, 
which has the advantage of reducing risk-taking with a smaller welfare loss in terms of 
financial intermediation.
These results are of extreme interest in the current situation, where the crisis in the 
international financial markets has called for tighter regulation in the banking industry. 
The discussion in this chapter shows tha t an anticipated increase in capital requirements 
in the next period, combined with a shock reducing the expected return of the risky 
technology, increases the likelihood of a more aggressive risk-taking response by banks. 
In the light of these results, any amendment to the current regulatory framework should 
be carefully analysed.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the basic three period’s model 
for a regulated bank, and establishes an upper bound for the social optimum level of risk. 
Section 4.3 studies the equilibrium when capital requirements are slack, and compute
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threshold values for which they start binding. Section 4.4 studies the equilibrium when 
capital requirements bind in one or two periods. A discussion of the main results and 
policy implications are given in section 4.5, and conclusions and possible extensions are 
provided in section 4.6.
4.2 The M odel
Consider a bank operating in an economy over three periods t  € {0, 1, 2}, with an 
exogenous initial equity of Wq. The bank manager is risk neutral and acts perfectly 
in the interest of shareholders (no agency problems), maximising the expected value of 
equity.
A safe asset is available in periods 0 and 1, which gross rate of return is normalised to 
one. That is, for each unit of consumption invested at t , this technology returns 1 unit at 
t+ l.  At t = 0 there is also a risky portfolio, which risk-return structure can be influenced 
by the bank, tha t with probability p (R ) returns R  units at t = 1 per unit invested at 
t =  0, and zero otherwise. The probability function, p(.), is strictly decreasing and 
concave for all R  > 1, and satisfies p (l) =  1. The safe asset is (weakly) dominated by 
this technology if, in accordance with finance theory, there is a range of values (though 
eventually small) where a positive trade-off exists between risk and expected returns.4 
W ith the assumptions above, the expected return of the risky portfolio, p(R )R , is strictly 
concave for R  > 1, and corner solutions with infinite risk are ruled-out. The unique level 
of risk tha t maximises this expected return function is given by
pf{R*)R*+ p(R*) = 0,
where R* > 1 iffp '( l)  + p ( l )  >  0.
For the sake of tractability, at t = 1 only one "risky" project is available, returning 
R  > 1 with probability 1. Even though it would be desirable to replicate period 0 struc­
ture of the risky asset in the intermediate period, the model would become analytically 
intractable. While this simplification eliminates the incentive for asset substitution in 
the intermediate period, it also allows concentrating on the risk choice of the bank in the 
initial period. Moreover, it is realistic to  assume tha t at t = 0 the bank manager does 
not know the full spectrum of investment possibilities available to  her in the following 
period, though she might have an idea of their average return, R , which is what I assume 
here.
4 Clearly, all projects with R <  1 are dominated by the safe asset.
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Finally, assume the bank is able to raise fully insured deposits Dt in any amount 
at period t , at a cost C(Dt) > Dt at t +  1, a strictly increasing and convex function 
satisfying (7(0) =  0 and <7'(0) bounded; which can be justified by incomplete compe­
tition arguments.5 The assumption of full deposit insurance, in a model of complete 
information, makes the demand for deposits independent of the level of risk chosen by 
the bank. In other words, depositors are risk neutral. The assumption of universal risk 
neutrality is useful here to separate risk effects due to risk choice from those due to risk 
aversion of agents.
4.2 .1  F irst B est
Given the assumption of universal risk neutrality, without loss of generality assume 
the utility function of the representative agent is U (y) =  y. Assume consumption is 
postponed until t — 2, and in each period there is an endowment of Mt, which needs 
to be allocated between the risk free and risky technologies. Let me call xq < Mo, the 
amount invested in the risky asset at t = 0. If the project succeeds, which happens with 
probability p (R ), society will have a wealth of (Mo — xo) +  xqR  at t = 1; while if the 
project failed, with probability 1 — p(R ), the wealth of society will only be Mo — xo-
A new endowment of M i is realised at t = 1, which is fully invested in R  > 1 (because 
this technology is dominant in tha t period). Hence with probability p (R ), society will 
have a wealth of [(Mo — xo) +  xqR  -I- Mi] R  at t = 2, and with probability 1 — p{R), a 
final wealth of [Mo — xo +  Mi] R  for consumption.
A risk neutral social planner then maximises
maxp (R )  [(Mb -  x0) +  x0R  +  Mi] R  +  (1 -  p(R)) [M0 -  x0 +  Mi] R
x0,R
st. xo < Mo 
or equivalently
maxxo-R \p(R)R  -  1] +  [Mo +  Mi] R
xo ,R
st. xo < Mo
For the region where the risky technology is dominant (p(R )R  > 1) this function is 
increasing on xo, then at the optimum xo =  Mo. Hence, the first order condition for this
5 Blum (1999) assumes horizontal differentiation. Another view could be that banks are ex-ante 
competitive, but due to high searching and switching costs they become ex-post monopolistic (see 
Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2006; Gondat-Larralde and Nier, 2006). The cost function C(.)  can be thought 
of as the gross interest rate paid on deposits in each period. Assuming it to be equal in both periods 
may be a strong simplification, given that in this model the risk borne by depositors is higher in the 
initial period.
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problem is: pf(R )R  + p(R) = 0, and as the objective function is concave, this condition 
is sufficient for a social optimum.
Of course, the previous exercise did not consider the social cost of bank failure, 
understood as the foregone value of intermediation, or the cost borne by the deposit 
insurance agency in case of failure. Therefore, absent any bankruptcy cost, the social 
return should equal private profits and the risk neutral social planner should choose the 
level of risk that maximises expected returns, i.e., R*.
When considering bankruptcy costs, the social efficient level of risk would be lower 
than the private optimum.6 However, given tha t R* proposes a simpler framework for 
comparison, in the remainder of this chapter, when referring to the social optimum I 
will be talking about R *, the zero bankruptcy cost, social efficient level of risk; keeping 
in mind this is in fact an upper bound for the true value.
4 .2 .2  C apita l R equirem ents
Capital requirements limit the resources tha t can be invested in the risky technology -  
though any remaining funds can be invested in the safe asset without restrictions. For 
a regulated bank, a capital requirement c$ on its original formulation (the Cooke ratio) 
imposes tha t capital should be at least equal to an 8 percent of risk of weighted loans. 
Denoting by It < Wt + Dt, the investment in the risky portfolio in period t, capital 
requirements in this model translate into:7
Wt ^
T ~ ct'
Clearly, for a given level of equity at any period, the more stringent the requirement 
(the higher the value of c*) the lower the allowed investment in the risky portfolio.
The expected equity of the bank in each period is given by the return of the in­
vestment in the risky asset, plus the return of any remaining funds invested in the safe 
technology, minus the return on deposits; provided the bank has survived to tha t pe­
riod (figure 4-1). Otherwise, and because of limited liability, all remaining resources are
6 A more general way of stating this problem would be to consider bankruptcy costs as a convex and 
increasing function of R, <f>(R). The conditional expected return of the risky portfolio would then be
p { R ) R - ( l - p { R ) ) 4 > { R ) .
The FOC would be given by: p '(R)R+p(R)+p '(R)( f) (R)  — (1 — p{R))(j>'{R) =  0 or p' (R*)R*+p(R*)  =  
(1 — p(R*))</>'(R*) — p'(R*)<f>(R*) >  0, which implies that because marginal returns are decreasing, by 
including bankruptcy costs, risk would be reduced.
7By convention, risk free assets have zero weight. The definition of capital requirements considered 
here only takes into account credit risk. It also assumes that the risky assets are weighted 100%, although 
Pillar I of Basel II includes weights as high as 350%. A justification for the assumption made here would 
be for the assets in the risky portfolio to be unrated (BIS, 2006).
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transferred to the deposit insurance agency and the bank closes down (in other words, 
its equity equals 0).8 Therefore, the bank’s expected equity in each period is given by:
Wo 
E IW J  = p (R ) { I 0 R + (W o+ D 0 - I 0 ) - C ( D 0)} 
= p(R) {Jo (R  -  1) + W o -  (C (D 0) -  £>„)} 
E [ W 2] = p(R) {R R +  { W ^ + D r - h )  - C (£>,)} 
=  p{R) {Jx ( 5 - 1 )  + W , -  (C(J»x) -  D , ) }
The regulated, risk neutral bank manager maximises the expected value of final 
equity, subject to capital constraints and standard feasibility conditions for investment 
in each period:9
(.P ) max p ( R ) { l 1 ( R - l )  +  W 1 + 0 ^ 0 ( 0 ^ }
S t .
(1) Jo (R -  1) + W0 + D 0 -  C ( D 0) -  W : > 0 w
(2) Wo +  Do — Iq >  0 (Ao)
(3) Wo — cqIo >  0 W
(4) Wi +  D l -  h  > 0 (Ai)
(5) W\ — c \I\ > 0 (Mi)
where 6  is the shadow price of equity in t = 1, Xt is the shadow value of the risky 
portfolio in period £, and pt is the shadow cost of the capital requirement in period t.
Sufficient conditions for an optimum are (see Appendix):
8 If the bank fails at t  =  1 (which happens with probability 1 — p(R)),  because of li­
mited liability its equity is max { ( W o  +  D o  — 7 o )  — C ( Z ? o ) ,  0 } . However, it is always the case that 
( W o  — T o) +  ( D o  —  C(Dq ) )  <  0. The first term is negative because the risky technology is weakly do­
minant, therefore investment in the safe asset is effective only when capital requirements are binding, 
that is, if Iq =  ^W o >  Wo- The second term is also negative because, as I said before, by assumption 
C ( D 0 ) >  D o .
9 In order to rule out the possibility for a short sale of assets, non negativity constraints in all the 
variables should also be considered. Instead of explicitly including them, and in order to simplify the 
algebra, I will check they are satisfied at the optimum (see appendix).
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p{RT)R  if ci =  0
# = <  v(R r) — (4-1)
I ^ - i { i ? + ( c i - l ) C " ( D 5 ; ) }  if ci /  0
V 1^
AO =  0 ( C 'T O - 1 )  (4.2)
Moco =  6  (IT  -  C'(Dq)) (4.3)
(4.4)
,i1c i = p ( i r ) ( S - C '( D [ ) )  (4.5)
p'(.Rr ) { /[  (R  -  1) +  W [  +  D \ -  C (D [)} +  0/J =  0 (4.6)
where “r ” stands for the “regulated” solution. Notice from equations (4.3) and (4.5) 
tha t p t are well defined for ct — 0, provided Wt > 0, t = 1, 2. Second order conditions 
are satisfied, as shown in the Appendix.
First notice tha t 9 > 0 for all R  such th a t p{R) ^  0. As I said before, 9 can be 
interpreted as the shadow price of equity in period one, which is always valuable to the 
bank tha t has not gone bankrupt, and is equal to the earnings realised up to tha t period.
The non-negativity of all the multipliers implies tha t iT  >  C '(D q) > 1 and 
R  > c m  > 1. Observe that, because R r > 1 and R  > 1, solutions involving 
Ao =  po = 0 or Ai =  p i = 0 are not feasible. When money is invested in the safe asset 
in a determined period, either equation (2) or (4) in program (P) are slack, and the 
corresponding capital requirement (equation (3) or (5), respectively) should be binding. 
In such a case, investment in the safe asset takes place because the marginal cost of 
deposits equals the marginal return of the safe technology in tha t period. On the other 
hand, every time a capital requirement constraint is slack, the corresponding investment 
in the safe asset in tha t period is nil (because of weak dominance), as in tha t case the 
marginal cost of deposits would be strictly higher than the marginal return of the safe 
technology (equations (4.2) and (4.4)). Summing up, because the risky technology is 
weakly dominant, money is invested in the safe asset if and only if capital adequacy 
requirements in a determined period are binding.
4.3 Unregulated Solution
(Slack C apital A dequacy R equirem ents)
When capital requirements do not bind in either of the two periods, all funds are 
invested in the risky portfolio (I q = W q +  D q and +  D±). By complementary
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slackness p0 =  p , =  0, Ai >  0, A2 >  0, and first order conditions become:
6  = p (R u)R  (4.7)
A0 =  8  {Ru -  1) >  0 (4.8)
C'(D g) = R u (4.9)
Ai =  p(R u) (R  -  1) >  0 (4.10)
C '{D l) = R  (4.11)
p ' ^ R "  + p ( il“) =  {RC(D%) -  {D fR  -  C (D l))} (4.12)
where “u” stands for the non binding case or “unregulated” solution. The second order 
condition relevant to this problem is (see Appendix):
p"(R u)W!t +  2p 'iR ^ R  (Wo + D%) + <  0 (4.13)
I want to compare the risk choice of the unregulated bank with the social opti­
mum. If R C (D q) < D fR  — C (D i), the RHS of equation 4.12 would be positive, then 
,p,{Ru)R u + p (R u) > 0 =  p'(R*)R* + p(R*), and because marginal returns are decrea­
sing this inequality would imply tha t the risk chosen by the unregulated bank would be 
below the efficient level (R u < R*). This is so because future income is so high that 
the bank would be willing to ration credit in the initial period in order to increase the 
probability of getting tha t income. In that case other policies, different from minimum 
capital requirements, would be needed.
Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter I will assume (as in Blum, 1999) tha t 
future income is bounded above by period 0 costs, R C (D q) > D™R — C (D ^), which is 
equivalent to
p '(R u)R u + p (R u) < 0 or R u > R*.
In principle, one would expect the correlation between risk and equity to  be negative, 
because the more capital the bank has, the more is at stake in the event of failure. The 
numerical example shown in figure 4-2 confirms this conjecture, as the optimal level of 
risk chosen by the unregulated bank decreases with the level of initial equity.10 This
10 Consider a quadratic form for the cost function, C( x) =  ax +  bx2, and a linear probability function
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result can be formally proved as follows.
P ro p o s itio n  36 The risk chosen by the unregulated bank is decreasing on initial equity, 
and converges on the social optimum as Wo —► + 00.
dRu
P ro o f. For < 0 see comparative statics in the Appendix (section 4.7.2). 
dWo
Taking the limit as Wo — > + 0 0  in equation 4.12, it is clear tha t the RHS goes to 
zero (Ru,Dq and D “ are bounded), and so the risk chosen by the unregulated bank 
converges on the social optimum. ■
P ro p o s itio n  37 Banks with more equity depend relatively less on deposits to finance 
investment.
P ro o f. It is proved in the Appendix th a t in this case ° <  0, and as C '{D f) = R
a Wo
dD f
then^  = °- ■
P ro p o s itio n  38 There exist critical threshold values for capital requirements in each
period, depending on the value of initial equity, for which regulatory constraints just start
to bind These are cn = __ — __  and c[ = ___ —  ^ ~  _^_  respectivelyftese are o  W q + D u C1 & ( W q + £>«) _  C (D%) + D n > respectively.
P ro o f. Period 0 requirements do not bind if 
Wo >  CO iff =  c0 (Wo + D% )<=^c o < c o =  W°
W 0  + D%
Period 1 requirements do not bind if 
WJ* >  ci/j* =  ci (W f +  D fj
^  (W0 +  D%) R u -  C (D q) =  ci ((Wo +  £>ff) R u -  C(D%) +  D f ) ,
B?(W0 + D X )-C (D $ )
1 1 (Wo +  D J) -  C(D%) + D $ '
This result is consistent with the intuition tha t for well capitalised banks the applica­
tion of small values of the capital requirement should be irrelevant; and indeed, with the 
empirical evidence tha t capital requirements are slack in the majority of banks in coun­
tries tha t have adopted the Basel principles. Nevertheless, sufficiently tight regulation 
will eventually force them into modifying their capital to asset ratios.
The impact of initial equity (Wo) over the effectiveness of capital requirements in 
period 0 is clear (figure 4-3).
p ( R ) =  — j j ^ R ,  with support [1,1/], satisfying the assumptions of this model.
u
I p ( R ) d R  =  1 =► U  =  3, C ( D t ) >  D t and C'(Dt ) >  1 Vt =► a =  1, C"{Dt ) >  0 =► b >  0.
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P roposition  39 The initial period’s threshold is increasing on the bank’s equity.
P ro o f. Using equations 4.9 , 4.11 and 4.12, total differentiation of Co leads to
dc0 D% W 0 dRu \1 - > 0.
dW0 (Wo +  D t f V  DSC" (D}j) dWgJ
Hence, as risk decreases with initial equity <  0^ , the threshold for which the
initial period capital requirement starts to bind raises because, with a higher equity, the 
bank is at the same time more solvent and less risky.
On the other hand, total differentiation of c\ leads to
  Di ( pu i i nu\ dRu \  Ru ( ~  . Wq dR u \
dWo (W?+D*)2 \   ^ 0 ' dW0) cQ(Wf+D\Y V Ru dW°)
Hence,
dci
dWo
> 0 if
< 0 if
W 0 dRl
R u dW 0  
Wq dRu
<  Co 
> CoR u dW 0
and the evolution of this threshold depends upon a sort of “income elasticity” of the 
demand for risk.
At least for the chosen parameters of the numerical example shown here, c\ appears 
to depend increasingly on the level of initial equity (figure 4-3). However, this does not 
constitute a proof and, in principle, c[ could be non-monotonic in W q .
P ro p o s itio n  40 Both thresholds converge on 1 as Wo — ► H-oo.
P ro o f. Direct from their definition (in proposition 38), given tha t R u,D q and D \  
are bounded. ■
Finally, given the definitions of cq and c\ and the assumption on R u,
ci -  co > TU TU 
0 1
{DSRU -  C(DS)]IS ~  j C ( D f )
>0
>0
> .
Notice D \  is independent of Wo, hence, at least for small values of Wo, c\ > Co.
C (D U)
In particular, for Wo =  0, co =  0 and c\ = - . . 0 >  0, and though capital
^  \Do) ~  Di
requirements bind for arbitrarily small values in period 0, a much tighter regulation 
would be needed in period 1 for it to bind. A general relationship between co and c\ for 
different values of Wo, however, cannot be established at this point.
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4.4 Regulated Solution
The main results in Blum’s paper establish tha t tightening the requirement in the initial 
period leads to less risk-taking, while increasing the requirement in future periods raises 
the level of risk above tha t chosen by the unregulated bank.
Blum  (1999) main results: (i) I f  a bank faces a binding requirement in the initial 
period, an increase in the requirement reduces the level of risk.
(ii) When the capital requirement in the intermediate period first becomes binding, tigh­
tening the requirement raises the level of risk. I f  the requirement is further increased, 
risk eventually falls again but never below the level of an unregulated bank.
The first part of the result is intuitive, because by rising co the return per unit
invested in the risky portfolio is reduced as well (each unit invested a t t  = 0 returns — R
co
units at t — 1). These results, however, do not say much about when the requirement 
is active, how is the regulated equilibrium compared to the unregulated one or to the 
social optimum, the effects of regulation over financial intermediation, or its impact on 
the distribution of risk among banks. These questions will be addressed in the following 
sections.
4 .4 .1  In itia l P eriod  B in d in g  R equirem ent
A numerical example for the case of a binding requirement in period 0 only, considering 
the same functions as before, is shown in figure 4-4.11 The discontinuous line shows the 
social optimum. Up to co (which depends on the value of initial equity), the capital 
requirement is slack and the bank chooses the unregulated level of risk. After that, risk 
is reduced until at some point the social optimum is achieved. The following proposition 
formally establishes this result.
Proposition 41 I f  capital requirements bind only in the initial period, tightening the 
requirement always reduces risk below the unregulated solution and, indeed, for each 
positive value of the initial equity there exists a unique value of the requirement, Cg, for  
which the bank chooses the social optimum.
dRProof. Comparative statics in the Appendix show that —— < 0 in this case.
dco
When the requirement just starts binding ( cq  = co), R r = R u > R*. Conversely, for 
the tightest possible regulation (co =  1) equation 4.6 can be re-written:12
11 Different forms of the probability distribution, which keep the assumptions of the model, give similar 
qualitative results.
12When co =  1, if A0 >  0 : Do =  ( ^ )  w o =  0 =► C ( D 0) =  D 0. Else, if A0 =  0 : C'{D 0) =  1 =* 
C(Do) =  D 0.
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(p(R) + p '(R )R ) W qR  = -p '(R )  { D \R  -  C (A )}  > 0.
Therefore p{R) + p '(R )R  > 0 =  p{R*) + p'{R*)R* and R r < R*. Continuity and strict 
monotonicity implies tha t there exists a unique value of co for which R r = R*. ■
R e m a rk  42 Notice co =  0 for Wq — 0 and, as regulation always binds, the bank cannot 
invest in the risky portfolio (Wq = 0 >  cqI q, Vco >  0 =$■ Io = Q), so R  = 1 < R*. 
Therefore, Cg does not exist for Wq — 0.
Additionally, as the requirement binds only for values above co, Cg > c q . Hence, by 
proposition 40, Cg —> 1 as Wo —► +oo (figure 4-5).
P ro p o s itio n  43 The higher the initial equity of the bank, the tighter the regulation 
required to make its risk converge on the social optimum.
P ro o f. When the requirement binds only in the initial period, equation 4.6 can be 
re-written as
(p '(R)R  + p(R)) = -p '(R )  { [A> -  C (D q) -  +  K i] R  -  C (D t )} .
Therefore, R  = R* if and only if [z>0 -  C (D 0) -  +  D i] R  -  C'(-Di) =  0.
Implicit differentiation of the equation above leads to 
jjfc  (1 -  C '(D 0)) + ^  =  0
If A0 =  0 =s> C '(D 0) =  1 and ^  >  0.
If A0 >  0 =S> / 0 =  Wo+Do =s> D 0  =  ( i ^ 1)  Wa, therefore + and
the expression above becomes C '(D q) — 1  ^ =  0 ^ ^  — 0* •
P ro p o s itio n  44 When capital requirements bind only in the initial period, the tighter 
the requirement the less deposits are taken from the public.
P ro o f. Comparative statics in the Appendix show tha t <  0. Also, as D \ is 
constant, =  0. ■
P ro p o s itio n  45 Among banks for which the capital requirement binds only in the initial
period, the better capitalised banks raise more deposits and take on more risk.
P ro o f. Comparative statics in the Appendix show tha t >  0 and > 0 in 
this case. ■
Therefore, the consequences of a first period binding capital requirement on the 
equilibrium risk-taking of banks are mixed. While reducing risk below the unregulated 
solution -  even to the social optimum, for sufficiently tight regulation -  fewer deposits are
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taken, which reduces financial intermediation. Capital regulation is usually considered 
as a natural counterpart to deposit insurance, attem pting to control for moral hazard 
in an industry tha t is implicitly receiving a subsidy from the government. However, 
proposition 45 indicates tha t capital requirements are not sufficient to control moral 
hazard because, among the binding banks, the better capitalised ones raise relatively 
more insured deposits and take on relatively more risk (figure 4-6).
4 .4 .2  In term ed iate  P eriod  B in d in g  R equirem ent
Figure 4-7 shows the dynamic of D \ and R  for the chosen parameters of the numerical 
example presented in this chapter, when capital requirements bind only in the interim 
period. In this case, comparative statics do not give conclusive results. However, when 
capital regulation just becomes binding tightening the requirement will increase bank 
risk-taking, most likely above the unregulated solution for all values of ci. In such a case, 
risk would be decreasing on equity < 0^, making risk-taking even more aggressive 
for poorly capitalised banks (figure 4-8). Therefore, capital requirements will not only 
worsen the risk choice of banks but also make the smaller banks weaker.
The effects on financial intermediation are not clear because intermediate period 
deposits fall with the requirement < 0^ but, provided ^  >  0, first period deposits 
increase =  c '{Dq) afcT — *n order finance the risky portfolio.
4 .4 .3  B ind ing  R equ irem en ts in  B o th  P eriods
The previous results are useful to identify and separate the effects of binding regulation 
in different periods. However, as regulators tend to apply constant capital requirements 
it might happen that, for some values, they bind in both periods. Depending on the 
relationship between the thresholds, one of the following two situations is possible: either 
co < ci or co >  c i-13
Figure 4-9 depicts both cases. The blank areas show the regions of values of co and 
ci where capital requirements are slack. The horizontally dashed areas show the regions 
for which only period 0 capital requirements bind. The vertical dashed areas depict 
the regions for which only period 1 regulation binds. Finally, the diagonal dashed areas 
show the values for which capital requirements bind in both periods. The solid black line 
represents constant capital requirements (co =  ci =  c), which are in fact the framework 
regulators applied under Basel I. For values of the requirement above this line, period 1
13 Although figure 4-3 shows co <  c\ for all values of Wo, this might be highly dependent on the 
functions chosen for that example. In principle, nothing precludes co >  c\ for some (high) values of Wo-
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effects would be stronger, while a decreasing risk effect would be more likely for values 
below the identity line.
P ro p o s itio n  46 When a constant capital requirement binds in both periods, the tighter 
the regulation the fewer deposits are taken from the public in both periods, though better 
capitalised banks take on relatively more deposits.
P ro o f. Comparative statics in the Appendix show tha t <  0 and >  0, for 
t =  1, 2. ■
P ro p o s itio n  47 With a constant binding capital requirement, R r equals R* when c 
equals 1.
P ro o f. W ith c =  1, as capital requirements bind in both periods Wo =  Io and 
W \ = I\.  Equation 4.6 becomes:
\p'(R)R  +  p (R )] W0R  = p '(R) {(C (Do) -  D 0) R  + C  (D i) -  D i}  =  0,
because
A( >  0 =*- D t =  (i=£) Wt = 0 1
V c '  \= > C {D t ) = Dt ( =  1,2
At = 0 => C '(A) = 1 =*• A  = 0 J
Therefore RT (c =  1) =  R*.
Indeed, the regulated solution approaches the optimum "from above", i.e., R r > R *
dRin the neighbourhood of c =  1, because —  < 0 (see comparative statics in the
“C c=l
Appendix). ■
P ro p o s itio n  48 I f  cq < c{, R r = R u for all c < co, R  decreases in c fo r all cq < c < c\ 
and increases right afterwards. Moreover, there exists c* < 1 at which R r = R*.
P ro o f. This is situation (a) in figure 4-9. When c <  co none of the requirements 
bind and so R r = R u . Afterwards, only period 0 requirements bind and in that case it 
has already been proved that ^  < 0.
When c reaches c \ , period 1 requirements start to bind, which in terms of the multipliers 
means p-i = 0 and Ai >  0. So C '{D \) = R  and D \ = Wi, where
W \ = Wo + D o -  C (D 0).
Implicit differentiation of these expressions gives:
^  -  ( ¥ )  (« -  c m )  ^  + ( ^ )  = o => f  > 0.
Therefore, at c\ the risk chosen by the unregulated bank starts to increase. 
Comparative statics do not give a clear sign for ^  (see Appendix), but from proposition 
47 we know that R r approaches the optimum "from above". So, this case presents two 
possibilities: either Cg < c\ or c\ <  Cg. In the first case, when period 1 requirement
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starts binding R r (c[) < R* and afterwards R  increases above R *, then decreases and 
reaches R* once again when c — 1. Otherwise, R r (c{) > R* which means R  equals R* 
only when c =  1 (figure 4-10). ■
P ro p o s itio n  49 I f  co >  ci, =  R u for all c < ci, R  increases right after c\ and 
decreases right after Co. Moreover, only at c — 1, R  = R*.
P ro o f. This is situation (b) in figure 4-9. W hen c <  c\ none of the requirements 
bind and so R r = R u. Afterwards, only period 1 requirements bind and in tha t case it
When c reaches co, period 0 requirements start to bind, which in terms of the multipliers 
means /x0 =  0 and Ao > 0. So C'(Do) = R  and Do =  ( ^ r )  Wo*
Implicit differentiation of these expressions gives:
Comparative statics do not give a clear sign for ^  (see Appendix), but from proposition 
47 we know that R r approaches the optimum "from above" (see figure 4-11). ■
Therefore, the dynamic of risk depends strongly on the relationship between the 
threshold values of the requirement in each period, which in tu rn  depend on the level of 
initial equity of the bank.
4.5 Policy Im plications
The results contained in the previous section indicate th a t where co <  c \ , capital require­
ments can reduce risk-taking below the unregulated solution and even achieve the social 
optimum for a sufficiently tight regulation. However, the effects of capital requirements 
vary among banks with different values of equity. So, how much should the regulator 
want to reduce risk-taking? Or, in other words, given constant capital requirements, 
which type of bank should the regulator aim for?
Consider a system with three banks {S', M, B }  with increasing levels of equity 
(W s  <  W M <  W B) and a constant capital requirement c in both periods, imposed on 
all banks. Assume co (W J) < c\ (W*) Vj €E {5, M , B }, and c* (W s ) < ci (W 5) . Section
4.3 showed that, in an unregulated banking industry, smaller banks take on more risk 
^  o) • So, if the regulator wanted to take the smallest bank to the social optimum, 
a solution like the one depicted in figure 4-12 could occur, where the capital requirement 
binds in the first period for the three banks. While risk-taking is overall reduced, the 
distribution of risks among banks has been modified towards a scenario where the bigger
has already been proved that in the neighbourhood of ci, ^  >  0.
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banks (both in term of equity and deposits) take on more risk (proposition 45).14 Re­
calling tha t bigger banks are of systemic importance, because their failure might either 
bring the system down or trigger expensive rescue packages, the new scenario is more 
dangerous in terms of financial stability.
Then, one could think of a situation where the regulator wanted to take the biggest 
bank to the social optimum.15 Assuming again co (W ■7) < c\ (W-7) V7 € { S ,M ,B } ,  a 
situation like the one presented in figure 4-13 could happen, where the smaller banks 
invest sub-optimally.
Another option could be to  reduce risk-taking towards the unregulated level of bank
B. However, this would need different capital requirements for S and M, and counter­
intuitively, the higher the equity the tighter the requirement: cs  < cM (figure 4-14). 
In this last situation one could think a better idea would be to introduce a minimum 
equity requirement equal to W B. In this model, a minimum equity requirement would 
also reduce financial intermediation, but less than a binding capital requirement. This is 
shown in figure 4-15, where the region of deposits which are not taken by the banks (the 
shaded areas) is smaller in case (b), with a minimum equity requirement.16 However, 
this would reduce competitiveness even more because it would introduce a new and high 
entry barrier in the market.17
In practice, capital requirements hardly ever bind and, when they do, they are 
regarded as regulatory thresholds for prudential intervention (capitalisation plans, admi­
nistration take-over, or asset liquidation; depending on the severity of the problem).18 
Then, a possibility would be to  combine low levels of capital requirements with a low 
minimum equity requirement (Rochet, 1992) set, for example, such th a t R u (W e) = R e, 
where p (R e) is a tolerance level for the probability of failure, defined by the social 
planner. Notice tha t in order to achieve the same level of risk (R e) through capital 
regulation, an increasing requirement in equity would be needed.
But if capital requirements are designed for them not to bind, then they cannot 
curb risk-taking and so, why introduce them? The current financial crisis (the so-called 
subprime crisis, because it originated in tha t segment of the mortgage credit market in 
the USA) enables us to  appreciate how useful capital requirements can be for banks to
14 A worse situation could be imagined, where co (W B) >  c\ ( W B) and the risk choice of the largest 
bank could increase above the unregulated solution.
15 Notice that, in this model, the social optimum is independent of the bank’s level of equity.
16 Wo (c) is defined as the inverse function of cq ( W o )  , that is, the maximum value of the initial equity 
for which a constant capital requirement c binds. Given that Co (Wo) is increasing in Wo, Wo (c) exists 
and it is increasing in c.
17 Remember I am assuming banks behave as a local monopoly.
18 See Bhattacharya et al. (2002), and Decamps et al. (2004).
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build buffers against financial shocks, contributing to  a more resilient banking system.
As a consequence of this crisis, many agents in the market have started to call for 
increased regulation. If that were translated into tighter capital requirements (ci >  co 
in this model), those banks experiencing the higher losses would have lower values of 
equity in the next period, making it more likely for capital regulation to bind for them 
at tha t stage. According to section 4.4.2, the effect would be the opposite from what was 
desired, so risk-taking would be more aggressive in those banks in the current period. In 
the light of these results, any modification of the current regulatory framework should 
be studied carefully.
This model has assumed initial equity to be public information. However, if the 
model were to be replicated infinite times, the initial equity would be the result of 
past periods’ decisions, and so would be private information. In this sense, effective 
monitoring and improved private disclosure (both elements of Basel II) might help in 
revealing Wt. Think of this case in order to analyse the effects of macro-financial shocks 
on the risk choice of a regulated banking system with constant capital requirements. 
If a recessionary shock were anticipated, we would be in a situation similar to the one 
described above. The expected value of Wt+1 would be smaller, making more likely 
for regulation to bind at t +  1, therefore increasing risk-taking at t. In such a case, the 
appropriate policy would depend on the social planner’s objective under tha t scenario, 
because higher risk-taking might lead to a credit expansion, acting to counter the cycle. 
On the other hand, if the shock were not anticipated, at t the bank would realise that 
its initial equity is smaller than expected, making it more likely for regulation to bind 
in the current period and so reducing risk-taking. However, depending on the severity 
of the shock, risk could be reduced to suboptimal levels, exacerbating the downturn.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have explored some features of Blum’s (1999) model neglected in his 
original work. I developed threshold values for which capital regulation becomes binding 
in each period and studied how the regulated equilibrium is compared to the unregulated 
solution and to the social optimum. I also studied the effects of regulation over financial 
intermediation and its impact on the distribution of risk among banks.
In particular, I have shown tha t for unregulated banks risk-taking is decreasing on 
the level of initial equity, and converges on the social optimum when equity is sufficiently 
high. When introducing capital requirements, I show tha t there exist critical threshold 
values in each period for which regulation starts binding. When the requirement binds
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in the initial period only, risk can be reduced below the unregulated solution -  even to 
the social optimum for sufficiently tight regulation -  but fewer deposits are taken, which 
reduces financial intermediation. Moreover, capital requirements are not sufficient to 
control moral hazard because, among the binding banks, the better capitalised raise re­
latively more insured deposits and take on relatively more risk. W hen the requirement 
binds only in the interim period, bank risk-taking increases, most likely above the unre­
gulated solution for all values of the requirement. In tha t case, risk would be decreasing 
on equity, making risk-taking even more aggressive for poorly capitalised banks. There­
fore, interim period binding capital requirements will not only worsen the risk choice of 
banks, but make smaller banks weaker. When a constant capital requirement binds in 
both periods, the tighter the regulation the fewer deposits are taken from the public, 
though better capitalised banks raise relatively more deposits. The dynamics of risk 
in this case depend strongly on the relationship between the threshold values of the 
requirement in each period, which in turn depend on the level of initial equity of the 
bank. Finally, a policy recommendation discussed here is to combine a small capital 
requirement, in order to build a buffer against financial shocks, with a minimum equity 
requirement, which has the advantage of reducing risk-taking with a smaller welfare loss 
in terms of financial intermediation.
These results are of extreme interest in the current situation, where the crisis in the 
international financial markets has called for tighter regulation in the banking industry. 
The discussion in this chapter shows tha t an anticipated increase in capital requirements 
in the next period, combined with a shock reducing the expected return of the risky 
technology, increases the likelihood of a more aggressive risk-taking response by the 
bank. In the light of these results, any amendment to the current regulatory framework 
should be carefully analysed.
This model has the advantage of enabling the study of asset substitution in a simple 
way, while the assumption of universal risk neutrality isolates the risk choice of the bank 
from any other decision in the game. However, all of Blum’s original disclaimers still 
apply. This is not a general model, because the results rely strongly on the assumptions 
made on the probability function and the cost of rising deposits; and the assumption 
of universal risk neutrality, while useful, introduces an atmosphere of “too much risk- 
taking” . Also, assuming R  fixed in the intermediate period may be restrictive, although 
one could think of it as the net present value of all future profitable investment decisions, 
as estimated by the bank manager at each time period. While all these simplifications 
facilitated the development of the main conclusions, they also imply th a t they are in­
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complete. Nevertheless, the analysis is suggestive and it does help to understand the 
effects and limitations of capital requirements in an intertemporal framework.
A remark concerning pro-cyclicality and Basel II. Let me explain briefly how risk 
related weights modify the solution presented before. Consider a weight factor 6  > 0, 
applied to the risky portfolio It. This factor changes the computation of the capital 
to investment ratio, and therefore the effective value of the requirement faced by the 
regulated bank, in the following way:
W, W, -
Y T > c t ^  —  > S c t 
oh  U
If 8  <  1, the effective requirement is smaller, so less likely to be binding. The 
opposite is true for S > 1.
Pillar I of Basel II increases the risk sensitivity of capital requirements. Therefore, 
in a downturn, when risks are more likely to  materialise, capital requirements would be 
higher. However, as discussed in section 4.5, the net effect is not necessarily pro-cyclical 
and will depend on whether the shock is anticipated or not, its size and the level of initial 
equity of the bank. Therefore, policy recommendations are not obvious, and should be 
decided on a case by case basis.
The regulator’s commitment to monitor the bank is an issue that has not been ad­
dressed in this chapter. The computation of the threshold levels of capital requirements 
have assumed the bank is willing to comply with the requirement, which only happens 
when there is an effective threat of punishment for not doing so. This could be the 
subject of future research.
Finally, an interesting extension would be to explore capital requirements in a model 
& la Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), keeping the assumption of universal risk neutrality 
and introducing a second risky technology with the same mean but a higher variance, 
for example, in order to study risk shifting by the manager, and the optimal response 
functions of depositors and the regulator.
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4.7 A ppendix
4.7 .1  T h e R egu la ted  B ank
p n ,ma ?  n r p (P )  { 7 l (P  -  J) +  Wl +  D l -  C ( P l ) }H j J J q  ,io j W  l j ^ 1
s t .
(1) la ( R - 1 )  + Wa + D 0 -C (D o )  -  Wi > 0
(2) Wo +  Do — Io >  0
(3) Wo — colo >  0
(4) W i +  £>i -  / ,  >  0
(5) -  c i / i  >  0
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
£  =  p(R) { /i (R  -  1) + W i + D i -  C (D i)}
+ 6  {Io (R  -  1) +  Wo +  Do -  C (D a) -  W i}
+Ao (Wo +  Do — Io) +  Mo (Wo — colo) +  Ai (Wi +  D i — Ii)  +  p ,
FO C (R )  : p'(R)  { / i  ( S  -  1) +  Wi +  £>! -  C ( D i ) }  + 6 I 0 =  0 
FOC(Do) - . 6 ( 1 -  C'(Do))  +  A0 =  0 
F O C { D i )  : p(R)  (1 -  C'(Di))  +  Ai =  0 
FOC(Io)  : 8 (R -  1) — A0 — copo =  0 
F O C ( h )  : p(R) ( R -  1) -  Aj -  ciP i =  0 
FO C (W i) : p(R) - 6  +  \ i  +  p i  =  0
Solving simultaneously 
Ao =  fl(C '(D 0) - l )
\ i = p ( R ) ( C '( D i ) - l )
6 ( R - l ) - $  (C (D 0 ) - 1 ) - c q i* o  = O = > 0 (R -C '(D 0)) = cop0  
If co =  0, equation (3) of program (P) becomes Wo > 0, so by complementary 
slackness p,0 = 0 .
p(R) (R  -  1) -  p(R) (C '(D i) -  1) -  cip i = 0 => p(R) (R  -  C '(D i)) = c ip i 
If ci =  0, equation (3) of program (P) becomes Wi >  0, so by complementary 
slackness p 1 = 0. Provided p(R) > 0, R  = C "(Pi).
e = p (R )+ X i+ P i =  H ta { R +  (ci -  l)C '(D i)}  = p (R )  { c '(D i)  +  ^ ~ ^ '(P l)} , tha t 
converges on p(R )R  as ci —> 0.
While I have not ruled out short sale of assets explicitly in the constraints, the non­
negativity of the multipliers imply D q, D i > 0. By definition of p(.), R  > 1, and { It} t=\ 2 
equal either ^  or Wt + Dt, both being non-negative numbers.
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w
(Ao)
(Mo)
(Al)
(Mi)
(Wi -  c ih)
Given tha t solutions where fit = A* =  0 are ruled out, there are only nine possible 
combinations for the sign of the multipliers:
Mo A o M i A i
1 ) —0 > 0 = 0 > 0
2) > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
3) > 0 = 0 0 > 0
4) = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
5) —0 > 0 > 0 = 0
6 ) > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
7 ) > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0
8) > 0 0 > 0 > 0
9) > 0 = 0 > 0 = 0
a) Unregulated case (slack capital requirements): fi0 = Hi = 0, and Ao > 0, Ai > 0 
(case 1).
b) Binding requirement at t = 0 only: =  0, Ai >  0 (cases 2 and 3).
c) Binding requirement at t =  1 only: /i0 =  0, Ao >  0 (cases 4 and 5).
d) Both periods binding requirements (cases 6 to 9).
a) Unregulated case:
Wo > c0/ 0 =► Mo =  0 ^  6  (R -  a  (Do)) =► C 1 (Do) =  R  
W\  > c \I\ => ^  = 0 =► C'(Di )  = R  = cnst 
Ao > 0 =>• Iq = Wo +  Do 
Ai > 0 => / i  =  W\  +  D \  
0 =  p (R )R  
W l =  (Wo +  D o ) R - C ( D o )  
p'(R)  {[(Wo +  D 0) R -  C { D 0) +  £>i] R  -  C (D i)}  +  p { R ) R (W0 +  D 0) =  0 
Hence, R  and Do are determined simultaneously from 
CR : j / (R )  { [(Wo +  Do) R  -  C ( D 0) +  D { \ R -  C ( D i ) }  +  p (R )R  (W0 +  D 0) =  0 
CDo : p ( R ) R [ R - C , (Do) ] = 0
The second order condition reduces to prove tha t the following m atrix of second 
derivatives for R  and Do is negative semi-definite, this is, tha t its leading principal 
minors alternate in sign:
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=  pn( R ) W a2+2p, ( R ) (W 0+ D 0)R  p (R )R
p(R )R  - p{R)RC"(D0)
where W2“ =  [(Wo +  Do) R  -  C{D0) +  Di] R  -  C (D i) > 0. 
det [ L \  = p"(R )W l+ 1p/(R )(W a+ D a)R<  0 
det [L2] 2 =  - p ( R ) R C " ( D 0) (I/ ’(R)W^+2p' (R)(W 0+Do)'E} -  (p (R )R )2 
=  - p ( R ) R { C " ( D 0) [p"(R)Wa2+2p ' (R )(W 0+ D 0)R\ +  p ( R ) R }  >  0 
«  C "(D 0) [} / ' (R)WZ+2p'(R){W0+ D 0)R\ + p { R ) R <  0.
b) Binding requirement at t =  0 only
Mo > 0 =#• Wo =  co/o => I 0  = ^
W \ > C ih  =>■ Mi =  0 =>• C '(D i) — R  — cnst 
\ i  > 0 => I \ = \V i +  D \
9 = p (R )R
w t =  ^  (R  ~  1 +  c») +  Do ~  C (D 0)
I f Xo > 0 : I o  = Wo + Do ^ D o = W0  =  cnst
If Ao =  0 : C'(D q) =  1 => 7?o =  cnst
Hence, R  is determined alone from
p '(f i) { ( ^  («  -  1 +  co) +  Do -  C{Do) + D 1 ) r -  C P r ) }  + p ( R ) R ^ =  0, 
and the relevant second order condition is
C.RR-- p"(R) { (R  -  1 +  co) + D 0- C ( D 0) +  D j)  f l -C (D j)}  + 2 p f(R )R ^ <  0.
c) Binding requirement at t =  1 only
M l >  o  =► Wi = a h  =>h = ^
Wo > Coh =*• Mo =  0 o [fl -  C"(D0)] =  0 => C’(Do) = R  
Ao >  0 =>• Io = Wo +  Do
e =  ^ { 5 + ( C l_ i ) c ' ( D 1)}
ci
W1 =  (W'0 +  .D0) . R - C ’(A>)
If A! > 0 : / i  =  Wi +  D i =>Di =  ( i = a )  [(Wo +  Do) R  -  C(Do)]
If Ai =  0 : C '(D i) = 1 =$■ D \ = cnst
In both cases, R  and D q are determined simultaneously from the system:
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CR : p'(R) j K ^ o + g o )^  C{D 0)} +
(R+  (Cl-1 )  C 'iD J )  (Wq+D 0) =  0
-^1
£d„ : —  («  +  (ci -  1) C '(D l )) [fl -  C '(D 0)] = 0.
Cl
The second order conditions reduce to prove tha t the following m atrix of second 
derivatives for R  and D q is negative semi-definite, this is, tha t its leading principal 
minors alternate in sign:
,  p (R)L r r
p(R)L l = p(R)
Cl
(R+  (c: -  1) C 'iD ,))  (R+  (ci -  1) C 'P , ) )  C "(D 0)
C i  C \
where
C r r  = p "(R )W e2 + 2 p'(R) (R+  (c i-1 )  C '(D ,))
VK0, Cl) =
-p (R )  (Wa+ D 0f  $(Aj, R, W 0, c,), 
_  j  C ? m  { ^ ) 2 Ai > 0
> 0,
0 Ai =  0
W | = [(Wo +  Do) R  -  C ( D 0)] ( S i^ 1)  +  D r -  C(D{)  >  0.
d e t[£ 2] 1 =  CR R < 0
det [ L \  =  (R+  (ci -  1) C'OD,)) { Cr r C "(D 0)+ ^  (R+  (cx- l )  <?'(£>,))} > 0
{]f{R )W l+ 2 p f(R ) (R  +  (c i-1 )  C 'p i ) ) } C"(D0)
' (R + ia-V C jD j)
ci+P(R) (Wo +  D 0 ) 2 C"{D 0 ) * ( \ v R t W 0, cy) < 0.
d) Both periods binding requirements (co =  ci = c)
M0 > 0 =*• Wo =  d o  =* Io = ^  
Mi > 0 =4- Wi =  c /i =► / i  =
Wi = ^ ( iJ  + c - l J  + D o-C Po)
9 =  ^ { S  +  ( c - l ) C '( D i ) }
If Ao > 0 =4* Iq = Wo +  D q =>- Z?o =  (^7^) Wa =  cnst
If Ai > 0 =*. h  =  Wi +  D i =4- D x = (i=£) [iW oil -  C ((i=£) W0)]
If Ai =  0 => C '(D i) =  1 => £>i =  cnst
If A0 =  0 =► (1 - C  (D0)) = 0 => C' (D0) =  1 ^  Do = cnst
If Ai > 0 =► h  = Wi +  D x =► D 1 =  (*=£) [JSi (U +  c -  1) +Z>0-C(I>o)]
If Ai =  0 =s> C ’(Di) = 1 => £>i =  cnst
In all cases, R  is determined alone from
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Cr : A R )  { [ ^  (^  +  c -  1) + D 0-C (D 0)] (& tf=l) + B i - C p ^ }
(fi+  (c -  ! ) C' ( ° i ) )  W°=
and the relevant second order condition is:
p " ( R ) w i + 2 p ' ( R ) ^  (R +  (c -  1) C ' i D J )  -  p ( R ) ^ ( Ai, R, W 0, c )  < 0, 
which always holds true, for
W i  =  ( R  +  c -  1) + D 0- C ( D 0)] ( 2 ^ )  +  D ^ - d D J  > 0.
4 .7 .2  C om parative S ta tics
So far, for given values of the parameters Wo, Co and ci, I have derived a set of first
order conditions determining the optimal solution for R , Do, D i, Jo, / i ,  and W \\ and each
possible combination of the sign of the multipliers. I have also shown tha t D i, I q, I \  and
W \ can be written in terms of Wo,co,ci,.R and Do, where either Do is constant, or R
and Do are determined simultaneously from the system:
dC n 
C R = d R = °
r  =  * £  = n 
Do d D 0
From the implicit function theorem it is known tha t
- dR - r
dip
£ r r C'RDq
dDo C'DqR Dq Do
. dip . L2
1 -1
£ r<p
Doip
or simply
dR
dip
dDo
dip
where ip 6 {Wo, Co, ci} 
dR
sign
sign
dip _ 
dDo
\ 1 1= sign
d e tL 2
dip
r i  l— sign
d e tL 2
  £'Do<p ,^RDo £'R<p£'DoDo
^'RR^'DqDq ^RD q^ D qR
  £'R<p£'DoR ^Daip^RR
^ R R ^ D qD q ^ R D q ^ D qR
x sign {Cd0<p£ rd0 ~ £ r<p£ d0d0] , 
x sign [Cr^C dqR — ^D q^ r r ] •
But since SOCs imply det L 2 > 0,
dR
sign
sign
dip
dDo
dip _
=  sign [Cdq(PCr d0 -  £ r <p£ d0d0] , 
=  sign [Cr ^C dqR — £ d0<p£ r r ] •
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a) U n re g u la te d  case:
CR : p'(R) {[(Wo + D 0) R -  C (D 0) +  £>i] -  C(DO} +  p (R )R  (W0 + D 0) = 0
£ D o: p ( R ) R [ R - C , (D0)\ = 0 
<p = W 0
£ r r £ r d q
= L l =
p”(R )W 2+ 2p'(R )(W Q+Do)R p (R )R
£ d qr ^D qDq p(R )R -p (R )R C " (D 0) _
£ r w q =  (jp'(R)R  +  p(-R)) R  
£ d 0w 0 =  0
' dR '
sign
_dW0_
= sign
dDo
sign
dW0.
— sign
\p f(R )R  +  p(R)) p (R )R 2C "(D 0)]
As I have assumed tha t for the unregulated bank p '(R )R  + p(R) <  0, then
dR  dDo n< 0 and ——— < 0.
dW0 dW0
b) B in d in g  re q u ire m e n t a t  t = 0 on ly
CR: p'(R) { (R  -  1 +  co) +  D 0 -  C (D 0) +  D 1)  R  -  C fD j)}  + p ( R ) R ^ =  0
£ d0 ■ D0 -  fn c t  (Wo, co) =  0
In this case D q is independent of R, therefore comparative statics reduce to
dR
=  -  [Cr r ] 1 £ r
But since C r r  < 0,
dip
sign
dR
_dp_
= sign [CR(p]
Notice that for co >  co
dDo _ 
dco
dDc
dW0
Then
=
_Wjl Ao > 0co < 0
0 Ao = 0
1—Cf) Ao > 0Co > 0
0 Ao 0
%  =  £  [p'(fl) (R  -  (1 -  Co) C (D o)) + p(R)} > 0,co
C rco = - R ^  \p’(R) (R  -  C '(D 0)) + p (fl) l <  0,c0
£ rci = 0.
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This comes from the first order condition on R  (C r  = 0): 
p '( R ) ( R - C '( D 0))+ p(R )
=  - T t o / W  {C ' ^ W , R +  [C '(D0)D 0- C ( D 0)] R +  [D1S - C ( D 1) ] } > 0.
This is because C '(0) bounded and C(.) convex, imply C '(D t)D t > Dt for all D t.19 
Also
p f( R)  ( R - ( l - c 0) C ' ( D 0) ) + p ( R )
= ~ ^ r oP'(R) {[C'(D0)D 0- C ( D 0)] R +  [ D j i - C i D J ] } > 0 
Hence, for eg > eg :
dR
dW0
dR
> 0,
dco
< 0.
c) B in d in g  re q u ire m e n t a t  t = 1 on ly
C r .  m )  I [ C W > . ) « - C P , ) I  + D , _ c m ) }
( ii+  ( d - 1 )  C '(D X)) (W0+ D 0) = 0
p(R)
Cl
CDo ■ —  (R  +  (ci -  1) C '(D i)) [R -  C’(D0)} =  0Cl
C r r  £ rdo 
C d  oR £ D qDq
= L l
C r r
p(R)
where
ci
(h +  ( d  -  1) C '(D j)) ( 1 +  (Cl _  j)  c ' i D J )  C "(D 0)
Cr r = p"(R )W c2+2P'(R ) ( f l+ tc x - lJ C 'fD ,) )
-p (i? ) (Wo +  D 0)2 $(AX, R , W 0, cx).
Notice tha t for ci >  ci : 
dD
dci < o ,
’ ( - J j ) [ ( W 0+ D 0) f l - C ( D 0)] Ai >  0 
0 Ai = 0
CRWo = \p'(R)R + p(R)} ( ” +(ci~11)C' (P>))  -p ( iJ ) iJ (W 0 +  D 0)$(A 1,f l ,W 0,c1),
£ rcq =  0,
£#ci =  p'(R) (Wo+Dq)R-C(D q) (C '(D j) - I )  +p(fl)
+p(fl) (Wo +  Do) $ ( Al, Rt w 0t Cl),
£ d 0w 0 -  -p (R )R  (R  — C'(Do)) 3>(Al5 R , W Q, c x) = 0,
Cdqcq 0,
19Define F( D)  =  C ’( D) D -  C(D) .  As C"(0) is bounded, T(0) =  0 , F' ( D)  =  C" ( D) D >  0. Hence 
F( D)  >  0 VD, i.e. C' ( D) D >  C(D) .
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CDo» =  - z f -  (R +  (Cl -  IJC'Pj)) (R -  C’(D0))
+£ffi +  (ci _ 1} C"(D!)^] (D -  C'(Do)) = 0,
because a non binding requirement at t =  0 implies C'{D q) =  R.
Hence,
dR
sign
=  - s ig n  [CDqDq] sign [CRv>] =  sign [CRip]
From £/? =  0,
]j/(R )R  + p(R)] (Wo+Do) 
= p '(R )C (D a) +  j/(R )  ( Cl ” ^ ‘ )  e1+ p (fl)^ l+~ ^ )i  (Wo+Do) (C '(D ,) -  1)
Then,
Crc, = {\p '(R)R  + p(R)} (Wo+Do) -  p '(R )C (D 0)} ( C'(P+ S ) 
+p(R) (W0 +  D0) [ (W'°+f f f i - c ( P . ) ] $ ( Ai,f i , W 0, cj) 
=  { p 'W  ( X c i - i 1)  Cl+P^ % ^ i  (Wo+Do) (C 'iD J  -  1)} 
+p(R) (Wo +  Do) [ (^ °+ fffl-P (P °)] $ (Ai, R, W 0, cx)
For all values of c\ where Ai > 0:
C jtc ,-  P (R) (5+q I i ) cl
+p(R)(W o+Do) ( i ^ )  |[(W o +  D o ) f l - C ( D 0) ) g ^ -  ( f l -C '(D 1) ) |
The first term  is positive, hence
^  >  0 if A  (d )  =  [(Wo+D0) R  -  C (D 0)] £!W l l - (C^ )1S 11) f t  ~  C ' (D ^  ~  0
When the requirement just starts binding (at c\ =  ci), by continuity Hi = 0 and Ai >  0, 
which implies tha t C '(D i) = R.
Hence,
A (ci) = [(Wo+Do) R  -  C (D 0)} > o,
so —— > 0, and by continuity this is also true for values of c\ in the neighbourhood of 
aci
ci.
When ci =  1 (or if Ai — 0)
A  (1) -  [(Wo+Do) R  ~  C (D 0)] C n{Dx) > 0, and indeed 
£ fic iL = i = P ’(R ) ( C(Di ~ Dl )  (C '(D i) - f l)  =  0, because C (D X) =  D v
_ dR  I Therefore, - — = 0 .
CIC\ | ^  j
Also notice tha t lim A (c \) = [(Wo+Do) R  — C (D 0)\ (^"(D j) > 0, which implies tha tCl—>1
dR
in the neighbourhood of ci =  1, —— > 0.
dci
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C r w „  = \p'(R)R + P(R)1 ( J?+(ci-'c11)C"(D‘))  -  p(R)R (Wo + Do) $ (A „ R, W 0,Cj)
Until ci =  ci no requirement bind, therefore by assumption p '(R )R  +  p(R) < 0. 
Hence, when the requirement just starts binding (C '(D \) =  R) :
Crwo = W (R )R  +  p(R)\ R  ~  p (R )R  (Wo +  Do) $(AV R, W 0, Cy) < o 
dR < 0.Therefore,
dWo Cl=Cl
Also, replacing p '(R )R  +  p(R) from C r  = 0 :
Crwo = A R )  [c(D „) +  Cl'
(  R + ( c i - l ) C ' (D , )
 ^ ci(Wb+£>0) )
+ p ( « ) { ( l f l )  ( C i D J - i )  ( R+% ^ l ,: i{Dl))  - R ( W o  + Do) w 0, Cl)}
If Cl =  1 :
Cr w 0 =  p ' ( R ) C ( D q) ^ T Iz T T T T -) <  0 .  
dR
Therefore,
dWo
W0+Do J 
< 0 .
Cl =  l
dR
Summing up, provided R  > R u (as is likely to happen, given the sign of —— around
GtCi
dR
the corner values of ci), -rrrr <  0.
gJVVo
d) Both periods binding requirements (co =  ci =  c)
C r : p'(R) { P ?  (R  + c -  1) + D a- C ( D a)} (R+F1 )  + D y -C (£>,)}
+p(R) (R+ (c - 1) a  ( n o )  * £ =  0 
Cd0 : D0 -  fn c t  ( W 0 , c q )  =  0
In this case Do is independent of R , therefore comparative statics reduce to
But since C r r  < 0,
^  =  - { C r r ] - 1 C r v
sign
dR
dcp = sign [Cr*!
For all c > max {co, ci} :
Ao > 0  
0 A0 = 0  
- ^ { W y  + W o ^ i R - C ' i D o ) ] }  Ai > 0
dDo
dc < 0
dDI
dc
dDo
dW 0
<  0
0
Ao > °  ^  c > 0
0 Ao =  0
Ai = 0
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gS L _ \  0 3 s) [R -  C 'P o) (1 -  c)] Ai > 0
dW0 ~  \  -  U
{ 0 A i = 0
Cr,'- p'(fi) { [ - ^  (R -  1) + (1 -  C 'p 0)) (2±f=l) + (1 -  C 'p,))
+ p 'P ) { -  P ?  ( R +  c -  1) +r»0-C(I>0)] (% i)  }
-2p ( « ) t  (S+ (c ~ ! )C' P P  { C' P 0  + (c -  !)c " P i)  ^ }
= p '(R ) { - ^  (R  -  C '(D a)) (fl+ (c -  1) C 'p,)) -  ^  (l! -  C 'p ,)) } 
“ rW o{2B- (2 -c )C 'P i)}  
W0 [Wi + W0 (1 -  c) (B -  C 'p 0))] (1 -  c) C" (£>i)
c RWo--p'{r ) { [(&tf=i) + (1 - C'p0))|gf] (2±pi) + (1 - a pi))f&}
{ (S+ (c -  1) C" p i))  +W0 (c -  1) C '-p j)!^ }
From the FOC (C r =  0):
\p'(R)R + p(R)} ^  (B +  (c -  1) C  p i ) )
=  - p '( R )  { p o - C p 0)] +  D i - C P , )  +  . . .
. . .  +  ^ ( c - l ) [ B + c - l  +  B ( l - C ' P i ) ) ] } ,
or equivalently
\p'(R)R + p(R)] (R  + c -  1) f i  =  -p (R )  (c -  1) (C1 P i )  - 1 )  ^  
- p 'P )  { [£ > o -C p o)] (E ± |= l)  +  r> i-C (D ,)  +  ^  ( c -  1) (R+c  -  1)}
In particular, when c =  1
\p'{R)R  +  p(iQ] 0, so R  (c =  1) =  R*
and
C r ,: p '(B )W 0 { -  (R  -  C '(0)) R - R ( R -  C /(0)) } -p (B )W 0 {2 R - C '  (0)}
=  -  (p'(B)B + p(B)] W0 (2R - C '  (0)) +  p '(R )W 0BC'(0) =  p '(B )B W 0C"(0) <  0.
dR
Therefore,
dc
< 0.
C = 1
If co <  ci, when c reaches ci, period 0 requirement is binding and period 1 require­
ment starts to bind, which in terms of the multipliers means Ai >  0 and =  0, so 
C '(D 1) = R  and C " (D 1) = 0 .
C r, :  -  f i  R  \p'(R) (R  -  C '(D 0)) +p(B)]
Also, Ai > 0 implies D \ = W i,  therefore C r  = 0 reduces to its form in case 
(b) and
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p f ( R ) { ( ^  (R  -  C’(D 0) +  C '(D 0) +  c -  1) +£>„-<?(£>„)) f - C p , ) }
+ ^ ( ^ 5 ^ =  0
p '( f l ) ^  (fl -  C '(D 0)) & + p(R)Rc^
=  -  P 'W  { ( C' Po)  +  c -  1) + D 0- C ( D 0)) f -C (£ > ,)}  
[ p '( f l ) ( f l - C '( D 0) ) + p ( i ? ) ] S ^
=  -  P'(R) { (C (D 0) +  c -  1) + D 0- C ( D 0)) f -C (Z > ,)}  + P ( R )  (1 -  c) W $ .
If co > ci, when c reaches co, period 1 requirement is binding and period 0 require­
ment starts to bind, which in terms of the multipliers means Ao > 0 and /z0 — 0, so 
C '(D 0) = R  and D0 = ( i ^ )  W0.
This time, however, neither C r c nor C r w 0 have a clear sign.
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Figure 4-1: Timeline for the optimal decision of the regulated bank.
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Figure 4-2: Example of the equilibrium relationship between risk-taking and the initial 
level of equity for the unregulated bank.
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Figure 4-3: Example of binding capital requirement thresholds as a function of initial 
equity.
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Figure 4-4: Risk chosen by the bank facing a binding capital requirement in the initial 
period.
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Figure 4-5: Optimal value of the capital requirement in the initial period.
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W o/2
0 co (W o/2) co (Wo) 1
Figure 4-6: Better capitalised banks take on more risk when the capital requirement 
binds in the initial period only.
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Figure 4-7: Example of the evolution of the equilibrium values of R  and D \, when only 
the intermediate period requirement binds.
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£T(fr0/2) 51(^0)
Figure 4-8: Risk-taking in banks with different levels of equity, under an interim period 
binding capital requirement.
177
Cl
ca
£
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Figure 4-9: Binding capital requirements: (a) cq < cl, (b) cq > c\
R*
10
fT
4 c
0 l
Figure 4-10: Possible paths of R r as a function of c, with constant capital requirements 
and cq < ci.
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Figure 4-11: Possible path of R r as a function of c, with constant capital requirements 
and cq > c{.
c \W s ) c{{Ws) c
Figure 4-12: Distribution of risks when capital requirements are used to force the small­
est bank to the social optimum.
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Figure 4-13: Distribution of risks when capital requirements are used to force the biggest 
bank to the social optimum.
R
.M C,s c‘c
Figure 4-14: Distribution of risks when capital regulation is designed to make the smaller 
banks converge on the unregulated risk choice of the biggest one.
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Figure 4-15: Loss in financial intermediation under (a) a first period binding capital 
requirement and (b) a binding minimum equity requirement.
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